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Abstract 
 This report assesses the economics of reprocessing versus direct disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel.  The breakeven uranium price at which reprocessing spent nuclear fuel from 
existing light-water reactors (LWRs) and recycling the resulting plutonium and uranium 
in LWRs would become economic is assessed, using central estimates of the costs of 
different elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (and other fuel cycle input parameters), for a 
wide range of range of potential reprocessing prices.  Sensitivity analysis is performed, 
showing that the conclusions reached are robust across a wide range of input parameters.  
The contribution of direct disposal or reprocessing and recycling to electricity cost is also 
assessed.  The choice of particular central estimates and ranges for the input parameters 
of the fuel cycle model is justified through a review of the relevant literature.  The impact 
of different fuel cycle approaches on the volume needed for geologic repositories is 
briefly discussed, as are the issues surrounding the possibility of performing separations 
and transmutation on spent nuclear fuel to reduce the need for additional repositories.  A 
similar analysis is then performed of the breakeven uranium price at which deploying 
fast-neutron breeder reactors would become competitive compared with a once-through 
fuel cycle in LWRs, for a range of possible differences in capital cost between LWRs and 
fast-neutron reactors.  Sensitivity analysis is again provided, as are an analysis of the 
contribution to electricity cost, and a justification of the choices of central estimates and 
ranges for the input parameters.  The equations used in the economic model are derived 
and explained in an appendix.  Another appendix assesses the quantities of uranium likely 
to be recoverable worldwide in the future at a range of different possible future prices. 
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Executive Summary 
 
For decades, there has been an intense debate over the best approach to managing 
spent fuel from nuclear power reactors—whether it is better to dispose of it directly in 
geologic repositories, or reprocess it to recover and recycle the plutonium and uranium, 
disposing only of the wastes from reprocessing and recycling. The relative costs of 
reprocessing vs. not reprocessing are one important element of these debates. Economics 
is not the only or even the principal factor affecting decisions concerning reprocessing 
today.  But economics is not unimportant, particularly in a nuclear industry facing an 
increasingly competitive environment.  At a minimum, if reprocessing is being done to 
achieve objectives other than economic ones, it is worthwhile to know how much one is 
paying to achieve those other objectives. 
 
While some analysts have argued in recent years that the costs of reprocessing 
and direct disposal are similar, and that reprocessing will soon be the more cost-effective 
approach as uranium prices increase, the data and analyses presented in this report 
demonstrate that the margin between the cost of reprocessing and recycling and that of 
direct disposal is wide, and is likely to persist for many decades to come. 
 
In particular: 
At a reprocessing price of $1000 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM), and with our 
other central estimates for the key fuel cycle parameters, reprocessing and recycling 
plutonium in existing light-water reactors (LWRs) will be more expensive than direct 
disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price reaches over $360 per kilogram of 
uranium (kgU)—a price that is not likely to be seen for many decades, if then. 
• 
• 
• 
At a uranium price of $40/kgU (comparable to current prices), reprocessing and 
recycling at a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM would increase the cost of nuclear 
electricity by 1.3 mills/kWh.  Since the total back-end cost for the direct disposal is in 
the range of 1.5 mills/kgWh, this represents more than an 80% increase in the costs 
attributable to spent fuel management (after taking account of appropriate credits or 
charges for recovered plutonium and uranium from reprocessing). 
These figures for breakeven uranium price and contribution to the cost of electricity 
are conservative, because, to ensure that our conclusions were robust, we have 
assumed: 
 A central estimate of reprocessing cost, $1000/kgHM, which is substantially 
below the cost that would pertain in privately financed facilities with identical 
costs and capacities to the large commercial facilities now in operation. 
 A central estimate of plutonium fuel fabrication cost, $1500/kgHM, which is 
significantly below the price actually offered to most utilities in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
 Zero charges for storage of separated plutonium or removal of americium. 
 Zero additional security, licensing, or shut-down expenses for the use of 
plutonium fuels in existing reactors. 
 A full charge for 40 years of interim storage in dry casks for all fuel going to 
direct disposal, and no interim storage charge for fuel going to reprocessing—
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 even though most new reactors are built with storage capacity for their lifetime 
fuel generation, so few additional costs for interim storage need be incurred. 
 Geological disposal of spent MOX fuel at the same cost as disposal of spent LEU 
fuel. 
• Reprocessing and recycling plutonium in fast-neutron reactors (FRs) with an 
additional capital cost, compared to new LWRs, of $200/kWe installed will not be 
economically competitive with a once-through cycle in LWRs until the price of 
uranium reaches some $340/kgU, given our central estimates of the other parameters.  
Even if the capital cost of new FRs could be reduced to equal that of new LWRs, 
recycling in FRs would not be economic until the uranium price reached some 
$140/kgU. 
• At a uranium price of $40/kgU, electricity from a plutonium-recycling FR with an 
additional capital cost of $200/kWe, and with our central estimates of the other 
parameters, would cost more than 7 mills/kWh more than electricity from a once-
through LWR.  Even if the additional capital cost could be eliminated, the extra 
electricity cost would be over 2 mills/kWh. 
• As with reprocessing and recycling in LWRs, these figures on breakeven uranium 
price and extra electricity cost for FRs are conservative, as we have assumed: 
 Zero cost for providing start-up plutonium for the FRs. 
 Zero additional cost for reprocessing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel. 
 Zero additional cost for manufacturing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel. 
 Zero additional operations and maintenance costs for FRs, compared to LWRs. 
• Costs for the far more complex chemical separations processes and more difficult fuel 
fabrication processes needed for more complete separation and transmutation of 
nuclear wastes would be substantially higher than those estimated here for traditional 
reprocessing.  Therefore the extra electricity cost, were these approaches to be 
pursued, would be even higher.  Arguments for separations and transmutation to limit 
the need for additional repositories rest on a number of critical assumptions that may 
or may not be borne out in practice. 
• World resources of uranium likely to be economically recoverable in future decades 
at prices far below the breakeven price amount to tens of millions of tons, probably 
enough to fuel a rapidly-growing nuclear enterprise using a once-through fuel cycle 
for a century or more. 
 
In this report, we have focused only on the economic issues, and have not 
examined other issues in the broader debate over reprocessing.  Nevertheless, given (a) 
the costs outlined above; (b) the significant proliferation concerns that have been raised 
(particularly with respect to those reprocessing approaches that result in fully separated 
plutonium suitable for use in nuclear explosives); and (c) the availability of safe, proven, 
low-cost dry cask storage technology that will allow spent fuel to be stored for many 
decades, the burden of proof clearly rests on those in favor of investing in reprocessing in 
the near term. 
x    
   
1.  Introduction 
 
 For decades, there has been an intense debate over the best approach to managing 
spent fuel from nuclear power reactors—whether it is better to dispose of it directly in 
geologic repositories, or reprocess it to recover and recycle the plutonium and uranium, 
disposing only of the wastes from reprocessing and recycling.  These debates have become 
even more salient in recent years, as increasing accumulations of both spent nuclear fuel and 
separated plutonium from reprocessing generate increasing concern worldwide.  Countries 
that have chosen to reprocess are facing high costs and rising political controversies, while 
many of those that have chosen not to reprocess are facing significant political obstacles to 
providing adequate storage space for spent fuel.  No country in the world has yet opened a 
permanent repository for either spent nuclear fuel or the high-level wastes from reprocessing.  
In several countries, proposals to separate and transmute not only plutonium and uranium, 
but other long-lived radioactive materials in spent fuel as well, have gained increasing 
attention in recent years. 
 
 The relative cost of reprocessing vs. direct-disposal is an important element of these 
debates. Economics, of course, is not the only or even the principal factor affecting decisions 
concerning reprocessing today—the inertia of fuel-cycle plans and contracts initiated long 
ago, hopes that plutonium recycling will contribute to energy security, lack of adequate 
storage space for spent fuel, environmental concerns, and other factors also play critical 
roles.1  But economics is not unimportant, particularly in a nuclear industry facing an 
increasingly competitive environment, where the difference between producing electricity at 
slightly higher or lower cost than competitors is the difference between bankruptcy and 
profit, and where fuel-cycle costs are among the few costs reactor operators can readily 
control.  At a minimum, if reprocessing is being done to achieve objectives other than 
economic ones, it is worthwhile to know how much one is paying to achieve those other 
objectives. 
 
There is general agreement in recent studies that with today’s low uranium and 
enrichment prices, reprocessing and recycling is more expensive than direct disposal of spent 
fuel.2  The only argument is over the magnitude of the difference and how long it is likely to 
                                                 
1 For a useful (though now somewhat dated) overview of reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in countries 
around the world, with projections for the future and some suggestions for policies to address the relevant 
issues, see David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 
1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 1997). 
2 The studies on this topic are too numerous to list here.  Official studies are of particular interest.  For example, 
a recent study for the French government compared a scenario in which all of the low-enriched uranium fuel 
produced in French reactors was reprocessed to a hypothetical scenario in which reprocessing and recycling had 
never been introduced, and found that not reprocessing would have saved tens of billions of dollars compared to 
the all-reprocessing case, and would have reduced total electricity generation costs by more than 5 percent.  See 
Jean-Michel Charpin, Benjamin Dessus, and René Pellat, Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power 
Option (Paris, France: Office of the Prime Minister, July 2000, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://fire.pppl.gov/eu_fr_fission_plan.pdf), Appendix 1.  The 1994 study by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Paris, 
France: OECD/NEA, 1994), while finding a total fuel cycle cost only about 14% greater for the reprocessing 
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persist.  Advocates of reprocessing often argue that the extra cost of reprocessing is small 
today, and will soon disappear as uranium supplies become scarce and their price rises.3  The 
data and analyses presented in this report, by contrast, demonstrate that the margin between 
the cost of reprocessing and recycling and that of direct disposal is wide, and is likely to 
persist for many decades to come. 
 
These issues are increasingly important, as a number of countries face major 
decisions about future management of their spent fuel.  In the United States in particular, the 
Bush administration has supported development of new reprocessing approaches that, it is 
argued, might be more proliferation-resistant than previous ones, while minimizing nuclear 
wastes; the Department of Energy plans to spend several hundred million dollars over the 
next several years on research and development related to reprocessing in the Advanced Fuel 
Cycle Initiative,4 although the idea of building a large (1500 metric tons of heavy metal per 
year) aqueous reprocessing plant in the United States around the middle of the next decade 
has apparently been abandoned.5 
1.1.  What Is Reprocessing? 
 
 Reprocessing does not eliminate any of the radioactive material in spent fuel—it 
merely divides that material into several categories (plutonium, uranium, and various types of 
                                                                                                                                                       
option, found a back-end cost twice as high for the reprocessing option as for the direct disposal option.  In 
2003, a major study from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (in which one of the present authors 
(Holdren) participated) came to conclusions quite similar to those we reach in this study.  See John Deutch and 
Ernest J. Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower). The MIT study presents its results by considering the cost of reprocessing as 
part of the cost of preparing plutonium fuel (and the plutonium fuel therefore appears several times as expensive 
as uranium fuel of equivalent energy value), while we present our results with reprocessing counted as part of 
the cost of waste management – but this difference in presentation does not affect the contribution of 
reprocessing and recycling to total electricity cost.  (The MIT study’s central estimate of the increase in 
electricity price resulting from use of reprocessing rather than once-through fuel cycles is higher than the one in 
this study, primarily because they do not assign an extra cost for several decades of dry cask storage of spent 
fuel for the once-through cycle, as we do.)  The RAND corporation also produced a commonly cited study of 
this subject in the early 1990s: see Brian G. Chow and Kenneth A. Solomon, Limiting the Spread of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Materials (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).  A useful summary of statements and studies on 
this subject from the mid-1990s and before can be found in Ingo Hensing and Walter Schulz, An Economic 
Comparison of Different Disposal Methods Used by Nuclear Power Plants: A Cost Simulation of Alternative 
Strategies From the German Point of View Energiewirtschafliches Institute (EWI), University of Cologne 
(Olenbourg-Vourlag,1995), which also finds significantly higher costs for the reprocessing fuel cycle. 
3 For a typical version of the argument, see James Lake (president of the American Nuclear Society), “Outdated 
Thinking is Holding Us Back,” The Washington Post, May 12, 2001, which asserts that “the economic trade-off 
is approximately equal” today, and that for the future, reprocessing offers “significant advantages in sustaining 
low-cost nuclear fuel supplies.” 
4 See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), FY 2004 Detailed Budget Justifications—Office of 
Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology (Washington, D.C.: DOE, February 2003; available as of December 
16, 2003 at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/04budget/content/es/nuclear.pdf), p. 18 and p. 45; see also DOE, 
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, Report to Congress on Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative: 
The Future Path for Advanced Spent Fuel Treatment and Transmutation Research  (Washington, DC: DOE, 
January, 2003, available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.nuclear.gov/reports/AFCI_CongRpt2003.pdf). 
5 Ernest J. Moniz, presentation at the Second Moscow International Conference on Nonproliferation, September 
20, 2003, summarizing Deutch and Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power, op. cit.  
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radioactive wastes).  In a current-technology reprocessing plant, the spent fuel from nuclear 
reactors is chopped into pieces and dissolved in boiling nitric acid.  The uranium and 
plutonium in the spent fuel are extracted from this nitric acid solution using organic solvents 
(typically tributyl phosphate).  Since this extraction is accomplished by manipulating the 
chemical reduction-oxidation (redox) states of the plutonium and uranium ions in solution, 
this process (the only one that has been operated at commercial scale) is called the 
Plutonium-Uranium Redox Extraction (Purex) process.6 
 
The result is that the original spent fuel is transformed into reprocessed uranium 
(representing approximately 95% of the mass of the original fuel material), plutonium 
(roughly 1%), and a nitric acid solution containing the intensely radioactive fission products 
and other isotopes that make up the remaining 4% or so of the original spent fuel—a solution 
known as high-level waste (HLW).  In addition, a variety of low-level and intermediate-level 
wastes (LLW and ILW, some of which are referred to in the U.S. system as transuranic 
wastes, or TRU) also result from the process.  During the processing operation, a small 
portion of the radioactivity is released into the atmosphere or into liquid wastes from the 
reprocessing plant—releases which have been the focus of considerable controversies 
regarding the operation of existing plants. 
 
The liquid HLW from reprocessing must eventually be solidified (usually by mixing 
it with molten glass, which is then hardened, a process known as vitrification), and is then 
slated for disposal in a geologic repository, the same destination as is planned for spent fuel 
in countries where spent fuel is not reprocessed, such as the United States.  Despite 
occasional claims to the contrary,7 in traditional reprocessing many of the long-lived isotopes 
that pose particularly serious threats to the environment and human health remain in the 
HLW.  Hence a repository would have to be designed to contain the material for many 
millennia, whether the material disposed of was spent fuel or HLW from reprocessing.  The 
ILW from reprocessing also requires isolation in a geologic repository, because of its 
plutonium content.  Substantially modified approaches—currently expected to have still 
higher costs—would be needed to separate out and recycle the other long-lived isotopes from 
spent fuel, for possible transmutation in a reactor or in an accelerator-reactor system. (Such 
concepts for separations and transmutation are discussed in Chapter 3.) 
 
In principle, both the uranium and plutonium separated from spent fuel during 
reprocessing can be made into new reactor fuel and recycled.  In practice, this is done for 
only a small fraction of the uranium recovered from reprocessing today, because freshly 
mined uranium is cheap enough that the uranium recovered from reprocessing (which is less 
                                                 
6 For a useful description, see M. Benedict, T.H. Pigford, and H.W. Levi, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd 
Ed. (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1981). 
7 For a typical claim that after reprocessing it is only necessary to dispose of “shorter-lived fission products,” 
which can be held in storage designed to last “for a few hundred years,” see Lake, “Outdated Thinking is 
Holding Us Back,” op. cit.  In reality, expected doses from a nuclear repository over hundreds of thousands of 
years are dominated by long-lived fission products such as technetium and iodine, which are not removed in 
traditional reprocessing approaches.  For a discussion of the effect of various reprocessing approaches on 
repository requirements and performance, see U.S. National Research Council, Committee on Separations 
Technology and Transmutation Systems, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation 
(Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1996), Appendix G, “Effects on Repository,” pp. 315-353. 
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desirable because of various isotopes created during irradiation in the reactor, including U-
234 and U-236) is not competitive for use in fresh fuel.  So nearly all of the uranium 
recovered from reprocessing every year simply remains in storage. 
 
Similarly, a substantial fraction of the plutonium recovered each year from 
reprocessing also remains in storage.  The fabrication of uranium-plutonium mixed-oxide 
(MOX) fuel from this plutonium and its use in reactors has not kept pace with the continued 
separation of additional plutonium through more reprocessing.  The result is that today, there 
are more than 200 metric tonnes of separated civilian plutonium in storage around the world.8  
This separated plutonium, while “reactor-grade,” is usable in nuclear weapons (by any state 
or group capable of making a nuclear weapon with weapon-grade plutonium),9 and the 
current world stock is enough for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.  For this reason, this 
growing accumulation—which will soon exceed the amount of separated plutonium in all of 
the world’s nuclear weapon stockpiles combined—has been the subject of considerable 
controversy.  Unfortunately, as this report will describe in detail, fabricating fuel from this 
plutonium is more expensive than making fuel from freshly mined uranium.  The use of 
MOX from reprocessed plutonium has also been the subject of substantial political 
controversy, focused particularly on safety concerns.  These economic and political factors 
continue to delay the use of MOX fuel in a number of countries, and alternatives such as 
immobilizing separated plutonium as waste have not yet been adopted.  As a result it is not 
yet clear how or when the large world stockpile of separated plutonium will ultimately be 
reduced.10 
 
Originally, no one intended that the plutonium recovered from reprocessing light-
water reactor (LWR) spent fuel would be recycled as fuel in LWRs.  Rather, the nuclear 
power industry expected that there would be a rapid transition to fast-neutron reactors, which 
would use this plutonium as their start-up fuel.  Commercialization of fast-neutron “breeder” 
reactors (so-called because they can be configured to produce more plutonium from uranium 
than they consume in their fuel) has been delayed decades longer than originally expected, 
however.  Therefore, in addition to comparing once-through use of uranium to reprocessing 
and recycling in light-water reactors, this study will also compare once-through use of 
uranium fuel in light-water reactors to reprocessing spent fuel and using the plutonium (and, 
perhaps, other actinides) in future fast-neutron reactors. 
1.2.  Data and Sources 
 
 For some industries, reasonably good data on costs and prices are readily available.  
Data on uranium prices, enrichment prices, and conversion prices, for example, are widely 
                                                 
8 See, for example, David Albright and Mark Gorwitz, “Tracking Civil Plutonium Inventories: End of 1999” 
(Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, October 2000, available at http://www.isis-
online.org/publications/puwatch/puwatch2000.html). 
9 For an authoritative discussion, see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 
Final Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess 
Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, Washington DC: DOE/NN-0007, January 1997, pp. 37-39. 
10 See for example, Kevin O’Neill, ed., Addressing Excess Stocks of Civil and Military Plutonium: Proceedings 
of the December 10, 2001 Conference (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2002, 
available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/2001civilpu/2001civilputoc.html). 
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available from several reliable sources.  This is not the case, however, for the reprocessing 
and MOX fuel fabrication industries.  Dominated by a small number of state-owned firms, 
these industries have maintained strict secrecy over both their costs and their contract prices, 
in an effort to maintain a variety of commercial advantages. 
 
 Data are nevertheless available from several sources, which we have combined in 
preparing this report.  First, some official data on costs associated with specific existing or 
proposed plants are available, and we have relied on these data where possible.  Second, a 
variety of national or international studies over the years have provided cost estimates based 
on data provided by the industry, and we have relied heavily on these figures as well.  Third, 
a variety of reported costs have found their way into the nuclear industry trade press, and 
where particular figures could be confirmed from other sources, we have also made use of 
these.  Finally, we have had the opportunity to review generic, representative cost data 
prepared by the Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC), a major nuclear industry consulting 
firm, for the Department of Energy, and these figures have been helpful in confirming the 
estimates available from other sources.11 
 
 Fortunately, the sensitivity analysis provided in this report demonstrates that our 
conclusions are robust over a broad range of variations in the input parameters.  Even 
changing the cost of reprocessing or of MOX fuel fabrication by a factor of two, for example, 
would not make the reprocessing fuel cycle more cost-effective than the once-through cycle 
under current conditions. Thus differences in estimates from different sources should not 
have any substantial effect on our conclusions. 
 
 Estimating the costs of disposal of spent fuel or high-level nuclear waste poses an 
even more knotty problem.  No repository for spent fuel or high-level waste has yet been 
completed or operated anywhere in the world.  Hard data on real costs are therefore 
nonexistent, and cost estimates inherently uncertain.  Different countries are planning quite 
different types of repositories with a wide range of capacities, and hence their estimated unit 
costs (per ton of spent fuel or of solidified high-level waste) vary significantly; the quality 
and detail of the available estimates also varies. When comparing direct disposal of spent 
fuel to disposal of the wastes that would result from reprocessing it, one is comparing 
approaches that generate different volumes of waste, different physical and chemical forms 
of waste, different rates of heat generation from the wastes, and different degrees (and 
lifetimes) of the wastes’ radiotoxicity.  There is only a very modest literature analyzing how 
these different waste characteristics might affect repository cost.  We have done our best with 
the literature available—focusing primarily on the projected cost for the U.S. repository, 
which is the one for which the most detailed and consistent cost information is available—
but this is clearly an area for additional research.  Fortunately, here, too, even very broad 
variations in assumptions about the relative cost of disposing of spent fuel vs. disposing of 
reprocessing wastes do not change the basic conclusions of this study. 
 
                                                 
11 Geoff Varley and Dan Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data (Atlanta, GA: NAC, October 1999).  This report was 
prepared on contract to the U.S. Department of Energy, and while it includes no proprietary information on 
costs or prices at existing reprocessing or plutonium fuel fabrication plants, the compilation of available data it 
does contain is proprietary to NAC; hence the report is not publicly available. 
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1.3.  Cost vs. Price 
  
 In the classic model of a fully competitive market, the cost of providing a good or 
service and its market price are very closely related.  The price is simply the long-run 
marginal cost of providing the good or service plus a rate of profit similar to what could be 
made by taking similar risks elsewhere in the economy.  If the market price rises to a higher 
level, this will create opportunities for unusually high profits that will lead more producers to 
enter the market, and the resulting competition will drive the price back down to the 
competitive level.  If the market price is below marginal cost plus a competitive profit, 
producers will choose to produce other, more profitable goods and services, and the decline 
in supply will drive the price back up again. 
 
 Few nuclear markets, however, match this classic competitive equilibrium model 
particularly well.  The uranium and enrichment markets match the model at least slightly 
better than some of the other nuclear markets, in that competition in these markets is 
sufficiently intense that no producer can afford to charge greatly more than its costs for very 
long.  Hence, in this report we will rely on price data for these elements of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, rather than attempting to separately assess the underlying costs of providing these 
goods and services. 
 
The reprocessing and MOX fabrication industries, however, have been dominated by 
an oligopoly of only two or three firms, which have set prices that may in some cases be 
quite different from real long-run marginal costs.  Originally, they were able to set 
reprocessing prices at levels above the full capital plus operating cost of reprocessing, 
because customer utilities faced government requirements to reprocess and had no other 
choice.  Today, by contrast, with the capital costs of the reprocessing plants already paid for, 
they are able to set prices at levels that reflect only operating cost, future capital and 
decommissioning costs, and profit—and are therefore below a realistic estimate of the full 
cost of providing the reprocessing service.  (These paid-off plants will not last forever, 
however, and if reprocessing were to continue, prices would have to rise to levels that would 
pay for both capital and operating costs for new plants to replace the existing facilities.)  
Thus, the fact that one of these services is being offered at a particular price does not in itself 
demonstrate that its full cost must be at that price or below—a common misconception.  
Hence, in this report, with respect to reprocessing and MOX fabrication, we will attempt to 
estimate both the cost to provide the service and the prices that have been charged in recent 
times for providing the service.  As discussed below, what it actually costs to provide the 
service depends not only on the capital and operating costs of the plant, but on who owns it 
and what rate of return the investors who provided the money to build the plant expect to 
receive. 
 
Similarly, we have focused on underlying cost rather than market price for the cost of 
waste disposal, as there is no market for this service as yet.  In most countries, geologic 
disposal of nuclear waste is to be done either by the government or by a company owned by 
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the generators of the waste, and hence one would expect that it would be done at cost or close 
to it.  
1.4.  Currency Conversion 
 
The nuclear fuel markets are effectively global—and thus costs are reported in a wide 
range of currencies.  Converting these estimates to dollars inevitably introduces some 
uncertainty, as currency fluctuations can easily change the apparent cost of a facility or the 
price of a contract (when that cost is converted into dollars) by 20 percent or more, with no 
underlying change in its real cost within the economy in which the cost was paid.  In 
addition, costs that were incurred or reported at different times must be converted to the 
dollars of a particular year for fair comparison, to take account of inflation that has taken 
place in the interim. 
 
In this study, the method we use is to convert estimates originally expressed in 
foreign currency to dollars using exchange rates prevailing at the time the estimate was 
made, and then inflate the resulting dollar estimates to 2003 dollars using U.S. GDP 
deflators.  We use a three-year average of the currency exchange rate, centered on the year 
when the estimate was made, to smooth the effect of currency fluctuations somewhat.12 
 
1.5.  Cost of Money, Discount Rate, and Taxes 
 
Estimates of the costs of services provided from large capital facilities (such as 
reprocessing plants or MOX fuel fabrication facilities—or power plants, for that matter) must 
take into account the cost of paying back the money used to build the plant, and providing a 
return on that investment.13  The amount of money needed to pay these capital costs, the 
operating costs, and other costs of the plant is known as the “revenue requirement”; the price 
                                                 
12The World Bank also uses a three-year average approach for converting estimates of costs from different 
currencies, but uses a complex formula known as Atlas that adjusts for changes in inflation and growth in the 
two economies being compared over the three years.  (A discussion of the method was available as of  
December 16, 2003 at http://www.worldbank.org/data/working/working-meth.html.)  For the purposes of this 
paper, the small possible increase in accuracy from using this method is not worth the large increase in 
complexity.  Another possibility would be to use purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, developed to 
reflect the actual cost of buying a typical basket of goods within different economies.  (For a discussion of PPP 
rates and their uses, see, for example, OECD, “PPP Frequently Asked Questions,” available at 
http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-faq-513-15-no-no-322-513,FF.html.)  We 
have chosen to use currency exchange rates rather than PPP rates in this study because (a) nuclear fuel services 
are internationally traded on a global basis, requiring frequent use of different currencies traded at market rates; 
(b) the basket of goods compared to produce PPP estimates is not appropriate for judging the costs of the large 
technical facilities considered in this paper; and (c) essentially all other nuclear fuel cycle cost estimates of 
which we are aware use currency exchange rates rather than PPP.  The use of PPP rates rather than currency 
exchange rates would have the effect of significantly reducing the very high cost estimates for the Japanese 
reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura (though these would remain much higher than the costs of other 
comparable plants).  Estimates of the cost of European facilities and services would also be reduced, but more 
modestly.   
13 See relevant equations in Appendix A. 
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of the service provided by the plant must be set high enough to meet the revenue 
requirement. 
 
The return that lenders and investors will demand depends on the risk of the project—
and thus the revenue requirement and the minimum price that can be charged for the service 
depend on the risk as well.  For a government-owned facility, money can be borrowed at an 
effectively risk-free rate (we use 4% above inflation in this study).14  A facility owned by a 
regulated utility with a rate of return effectively guaranteed by government regulators (or a 
group of such utilities) also represents a relatively low-risk investment, though the risk (and 
the resulting rate that lenders and stock investors will demand) would be higher than for 
government borrowing.15  A private venture subject to the whims of the competitive market, 
by contrast, would represent a significantly higher risk, and would have to offer still higher 
rates of return to lenders and investors to raise funds on commercial markets.16  Thus, 
                                                 
14 For the United States, official instructions for discounting for government-financed programs can be found at 
Office of Management and Budget, “Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
Programs,” Circular A-94, October 29, 1992, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a094.html. This document points out that government 
investments use funds that would otherwise have been available for private investments, and therefore 
recommends that for all projects that have an impact in the private sector or on the public (a category that 
certainly includes processing of spent nuclear fuel), a 7% real discount rate be used, which it says 
“approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an average investment in the private sector in recent years.”  
Only for “internal” government investments, designed purely to increase government revenue or decrease 
government expenses (such as the purchase of a more energy-efficient government building) does it allow the 
use of a rate based on the real rate of return on U.S. government bonds (that is, the government’s cost of 
borrowing).  Nevertheless, we use a rate based on the government bond rate here, to distinguish the 
government-financed case more clearly from the privately-financed case.  The bond rates to be used for such 
discounting are updated every year (see Office of Management and Budget, “OMB Circular No. A-94: 
Appendix C: Discount Rates for Cost Effectiveness, Lease-Purchase, and Related Analyses,” updated February 
2003, available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a94_appx-c.html); 
while the real rate recommended for projects of 30 years or more duration in February, 2003, was 3.2%, 
noticeably less than the figure we use, the rate recommended the previous year was 3.9%, very close to our 
government rate.  A tabulation of the government rates recommended for use in such discounting over the years 
was available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/DISCHIST-2003.pdf.  
15 In this study, we use the peer-reviewed estimates for financing arrangements in NAS, Nuclear Wastes: 
Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., Appendix J, “Fuel Reprocessing Economics,” pp. 
413-446.  For regulated utilities, this means facilities financed with 46% debt, 8% preferred stock, and 46% 
common stock, with real-dollar returns of 4.8% per year on debt, 4.1% on preferred stock, and 8.5% on 
common stock.  With an income tax rate of 38%, a tax depreciation period of 15 years, and a total facility life of 
30 years, and with 2% per year added for property taxes and insurance, this leads to a fixed charge rate—the 
fraction of the initial capital requirement that has to be paid each year to cover taxes, interest on debt, and return 
to equity investors—of 12.3%.  See discussion and relevant equations in Appendix A.  This rate is actually 
somewhat lower than the rates the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) recommends for regulated utilities: 
EPRI envisions a real debt rate of 5.8%, a preferred stock rate of 5.3%, and a common stock rate of 8.7%.  See 
Technical Assessment Guide: Volume 3, Revision 8: Fundamentals and Methods - Electricity Supply, TR-
100281-V3R8 (Palo Alto, CA: EPRI, 1999).  The authors are grateful to George Booras of EPRI for discussions 
of these topics. 
16 For this unregulated case, NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., 
Appendix J, “Fuel Reprocessing Economics,” pp. 413-446 assumes 70% common stock financing and 30% 
debt, with a 9.0% real annual interest on debt and a 16.0% annual return on stock.  With the same assumptions 
on taxes and life of the facility, this leads to an annual fixed charge rate of 20.8%.  See discussion in Appendix 
A.  These are described as financing arrangements typical of large chemical facilities, and therefore do not 
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following the approach taken by the Committee on Separations Technology and 
Transmutation Systems of the National Research Council,17 we will take these three types of 
entities (government, regulated utility, and private venture) as representative of the spectrum 
of possible financing approaches for facilities of this type, and estimate what the costs of 
reprocessing, MOX fabrication, and reactor-generated electricity would be for plants built 
and owned by each of these three. 
 
Of course, actual financing arrangements for specific plants will differ from the 
representative cases we discuss here.  The French UP3 reprocessing plant at La Hague and 
the British Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield were both built with 
unique financing arrangements in which the customers paid the capital costs of the plants 
through pay-ahead contracts—meaning that the reprocessors themselves put very little of 
their own capital at risk and paid essentially no return on the capital invested in the plants.  
This was only possible because foreign utilities faced legal requirements to reprocess their 
spent fuel and no one else was offering the service.  This seller’s market for reprocessing 
services has disappeared, and such financing arrangements are therefore not likely to be 
repeated.  (The same firms, for example, were unable to obtain similar financing 
arrangements for the construction of their MOX fuel fabrication facilities.)  Similarly, the 
firm building the Japanese reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-mura is largely (though not 
entirely) owned by the utilities that will make use of its services, who face a combination of 
legal and political requirements to get the spent fuel out of the spent fuel pools at their 
reactors: while the financing arrangements for this plant remain confidential, it seems likely 
that the return on investment the utility owners expect is the solution of their spent fuel 
problems, not a profitable financial rate of return (and public estimates of the cost of 
reprocessing at this facility make no allowance for any return on investment).  Here, too, 
however, with the increasing availability of dry cask storage, it appears unlikely that such a 
favorable financing package could be structured again in the future.18 
 
Taxes are another important difference between government-owned and private 
facilities.  Privately owned facilities must provide sufficient revenue to pay both corporate 
                                                                                                                                                       
reflect the unique political risks to investors that would be associated with building a privately financed 
reprocessing plant in the United States, or in most other developed countries. 
17 NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., Appendix J, “Fuel 
Reprocessing Economics,” pp. 413-446. 
18 One way of conceptualizing such pay-ahead contracts with a zero rate of return is to consider that the utilities 
are effectively treating the cost of reprocessing (including the capital cost of building the necessary plant) as an 
ordinary fuel expense, much like purchasing uranium – though in this case an expense incurred long before the 
service is actually used.  The money for these pay-ahead contracts would have to come from somewhere – 
either from (a) the utility being allowed to charge higher electricity rates to cover the cost (in the case of a 
regulated utility whose rates are set by the government); (b) utility borrowing (or, equivalently, paying off 
existing debts at a reduced rate), or (c) reduced returns to the utility’s equity investors (for example, a reduction 
in dividend payments).  Thus, while the cost of money might be zero from the point of view of the firm building 
the reprocessing plant for the utilities, a proper accounting from the point of view of the utilities even in that 
case would assign a cost of money at least as high as the rate at which the utility could borrow funds, and 
possibly as high as the average investors’ discount rates.  If reprocessing were analyzed on the assumption that 
the facility would be built with pay-ahead contracts paid for through utility borrowing, the resulting effective 
reprocessing price would be intermediate between the government case and the regulated utility case considered 
in this study.  If the facility were paid for through a combination of utility borrowing and reduced returns to 
investors, the result would be effectively the same as the regulated utility case used in this study. 
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income taxes and property taxes, as well as providing a competitive return to lenders and 
investors, while government-owned facilities are not subject to tax.  This can make an 
enormous difference in the capital component of cost: if $100 million a year is needed to pay 
investors, and the tax rate is 33%, then $150 million in revenue will be needed to pay taxes 
and still have enough left over to pay the investors—increasing the capital contribution to the 
price by 50% compared to what it would be with no taxes.  The costs of property taxes are 
smaller, but still significant—and private firms typically have to pay insurance costs as well, 
while the government insures itself. 
 
As we will show, the effect of these differences can be surprisingly large.  For a 
reprocessing plant with the same capacity and costs as THORP, for example, the minimum 
price in a government-owned case (making reasonable assumptions for such matters as time 
to build and start-up costs) would be in the range of $1350 per kilogram of spent fuel 
reprocessed.  Ownership by a regulated utility paying taxes and higher rates to lenders and 
investors would put the total over $2000/kgHM, and ownership by a private venture with no 
guaranteed rate of return would add more than $1000 beyond that.19 
 
Estimating how much must be set aside today to finance future obligations that there 
is a legal requirement to meet—such as funds for disposal of nuclear wastes or for 
decommissioning nuclear facilities—poses a somewhat different problem.  In this case, 
rather than using the rates one would have to offer investors to finance a commercially risky 
new facility, one must use “risk free” rates—the rates of return that could be earned by 
effectively guaranteed investments, such as U.S. government bonds—because there is a legal 
obligation to ensure that the money will be there when the time comes.  (Many analyses 
make the mistake of using one discount rate for these quite different situations.)  In this 
study, we will use a rate of 3% above inflation (representing the U.S. government bond rate) 
for this risk-free discount rate.  Indeed, while one can have good confidence that such 
investments will continue to provide the expected rate of return over the time required if that 
time is several decades, if the time involved is measured in centuries, then both the 
confidence in the investments and the uncertainties in estimating the future costs grow 
substantially.  For this reason, and because of arguments related to inter-generational equity, 
a number of analysts argue that a zero discount rate should be used for times beyond a single 
generation.20  We will not use this zero discount rate in this report; if we did, the costs of 
reprocessing and MOX fabrication would increase (because the long-term costs of 
decommissioning these facilities would not be discounted) and the costs of geologic 
repositories would also increase (because the costs of operations at these facilities during the 
long times they will remain open would also not be discounted). 
 
1.6.  Real vs. Nominal Dollars 
 
                                                 
19 See discussion in Chapter 2. 
20 For a useful discussion, see Charpin, Dessus, and Pellat, Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power 
Option, op. cit. Appendix 8, “The Choice of a Discount Rate.” 
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Inflation is a fact of life in most economies—and it makes a substantial difference 
when thinking about the costs and revenues of facilities that may take a decade to build and 
may operate for thirty years or more. 
 
There are two methods for presenting economic estimates in such situations—using 
the actual number of dollars that will be spent or received in a given year, without adjusting 
for the fact that those dollars in the future will each buy less than a dollar does today (so-
called “nominal” or “then-year” dollars), or adjusting for the effects of inflation so that all 
dollar values are quoted in the dollars of a particular year, and can be directly compared 
against each other (so-called “constant” or “real” dollars).  In this report, all estimates of 
costs and prices are in constant 2003 dollars. 
 
1.7.  Plan of the Report 
 
 In the remainder of this report, we proceed as follows.  In Chapter 2, we provide an 
analysis comparing the costs of reprocessing and recycling vs. those of direct disposal in 
existing light-water reactors, using central estimates and estimated ranges for the costs of the 
various elements of the fuel cycle.  This section answers the question: “if these central 
estimates and ranges are correct, how expensive would uranium have to become before 
reprocessing became economic, at various reprocessing prices?”  The reverse (but 
equivalent) way of posing the question is: “how cheap would reprocessing have to get to be 
economic, over a range of possible future uranium prices?”  We also analyze the contribution 
of the back end of the fuel cycle to electricity cost for both approaches, at various 
reprocessing and uranium prices.  We then outline the reasons behind each of our cost 
estimates for the input parameters for the calculation, assessing both current prices and the 
likelihood of substantial and long-lasting changes in the future (either upward or downward). 
 
 In Chapter 3, we take the same approach for comparing the economics of LEU-fueled 
light-water reactors with direct disposal of spent fuel, to future fast-neutron breeder reactors 
with reprocessing and complete recycling of the recovered plutonium and uranium (and, 
perhaps, other actinides).  Here a very important (and uncertain) factor is the future 
differential in capital cost between breeder reactors (which have traditionally been expected 
to have higher capital costs) and light-water reactors.  This section answers the question: 
“how expensive would uranium have to become before building and operating plutonium-
fueled breeder reactors became economic, at various capital costs for these plants?”—or, 
equivalently, “how much would the capital costs of breeders have to be reduced before they 
could offer a future energy alternative that was economically competitive with once-through 
use of uranium fuel in light-water reactors?”  Chapter 3 also briefly discusses possible future 
fast-neutron systems built more for the purpose of transmutation of wastes than for breeding 
additional nuclear fuel. 
 
 In Chapter 4 we briefly outline the conclusions we draw from these analyses.  
Appendix A provides a complete description and derivation of the equations used in these 
analyses, while Appendix B discusses estimates of the quantity of uranium likely to be 
recoverable worldwide at various possible future prices. 
  
   
 
   
   
2.  Direct Disposal vs. Reprocessing and Recycling in Thermal Reactors 
2.1.  How to Compare Costs of Different Fuel Cycles 
 A valid comparison of the costs of direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel to those of 
reprocessing and recycle requires a full life-cycle cost assessment for each route, not just an 
assessment of the costs of individual services.  One cannot simply compare, for example, the 
cost of reprocessing to the cost of direct disposal, for this ignores other costs for both fuel 
cycles (as well as the potential value of the uranium and plutonium recovered by 
reprocessing).  In short, the right question is: what are the full costs that a reactor operator 
making a decision between reprocessing and recycling the spent fuel from a light-water 
reactor or disposing of it directly could expect to face on each route? 
 On the reprocessing route, the reactor operator will have to pay the costs of: (a) 
transporting the fuel to the reprocessing plant; (b) reprocessing; and (c) conditioning and 
disposal of the high-level, intermediate-level, and low-level wastes from reprocessing.  The 
operator will then have available plutonium and uranium recovered from reprocessing, which 
can be used as fuel (once the costs of fabricating the plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel 
and of enrichment and fabrication of the recovered uranium are paid).  There may also be 
other costs associated with using these materials as fuel, such as the costs of transporting and 
safeguarding MOX fuel, licensing MOX use in reactors, changes in burnup strategy that may 
be required if the MOX is not licensed to go to as high burnups as LEU fuel, and so on.   
 On the direct disposal route, the reactor operator will have to pay the costs of: (a) 
interim storage of the spent fuel pending geologic disposal, (b) eventual transport to a 
repository site, and (c) encapsulation, conditioning, and disposal of the spent fuel.  In 
addition, the operator in this case must continue to pay the cost of fueling the entire reactor 
core with fresh fuel (including the costs of natural uranium, enrichment services, and low-
enriched uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication), rather than being able to replace some of it with 
plutonium and uranium recovered from reprocessing. 
 In general, if reprocessing and MOX fabrication prices are low, uranium and enrichment 
prices are high, and if the storage, encapsulation, and geologic disposal of the vitrified HLW 
from spent fuel would be significantly cheaper than storage, encapsulation and geologic 
disposal of the spent fuel itself, then the reprocessing-recycle option will be cheaper than the 
direct-disposal option.  If reprocessing and MOX fabrication prices are high, the costs of 
waste disposal for the two approaches are similar, and uranium and enrichment costs are low, 
it will be cheaper to pursue the direct-disposal route. The value of the plutonium and uranium 
recovered by reprocessing—which needs to be high enough to make up for the extra cost of 
reprocessing—increases as the price of natural uranium increases, since the value of these 
recovered materials results from their potential to displace fuel that would be made from 
natural uranium. The price of uranium at which the net present cost of the two fuel cycles is 
exactly equal is the “breakeven” price, represented notionally by the following equation: 
  (2.1)  cost of interimstorage cost of reprocessing  value of recovered& disposal of spent fuel & disposal of wastes plutonium & uranium
    = −        

   
14 ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
 
If the uranium price is below the breakeven price, direct disposal is cheaper; if it is above the 
breakeven price, reprocessing and recycling is cheaper. 
 The terms on the left-hand side of equation (2.1), for interim storage and disposal of 
spent fuel, are simply the costs of particular services, whose costs are discussed in detail 
below (see sections 2.5.3-5).  The same is true for the cost of reprocessing and the cost of 
disposal of reprocessing wastes, which is represented by the first set of brackets of the right-
hand side of the equation. 
 Matters become more complex for the right-most term of equation (2.1), as the value of 
the recovered plutonium and uranium depends on a wide range of factors.  The value of the 
recovered plutonium and uranium is the value of the fuels that can be made from them minus 
the costs of making and using these fuels. Because the fuels made with recovered plutonium 
and uranium would substitute for LEU fuels made using natural uranium, their value is 
determined by the price of equivalent LEU fuel (i.e., fuel with the same design burnup). Thus 
the value of these recovered materials can be represented by: 
  (2.2)   value of recovered cost of LEU fuel made cost of equivalent fuel madeplutonium & uranium  with natural uranium    with recovered Pu & U
    = −        

 Consider a concrete (though simplified) example.  Imagine that a utility is considering 
whether to reprocess a load of spent fuel from its reactor or place it in interim storage 
pending eventual direct disposal.  The utility estimates that the present value of the cost of 
storing the material until a repository is ready (that is, the amount of money that must be paid 
today to get the job done for the entire period) is $200 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM) 
in the spent fuel, and the present value of the cost of direct disposal, including transport to 
the repository site and encapsulation, is $400/kgHM.  (Our estimates for the prices of various 
fuel cycle services are discussed in detail later in this study; the numbers in this paragraph are 
round figures intended only for illustrative purposes.)  The utility estimates the cost of 
reprocessing the spent fuel at $1000/kgHM, and the present value of the cost of eventually 
disposing of the radioactive wastes from reprocessing at $200/kgHM—less than the cost of 
direct disposal, but not by any means enough less to pay for the cost of reprocessing.  So the 
total cost on the direct disposal route is $600/kgHM, while that on the reprocessing route is 
$1200/kgHM—$600/kgHM more.  Hence, in this case reprocessing would begin to make 
economic sense when the value of the plutonium and uranium recovered from the 
reprocessing was $600/kgHM or more. 
 How much would this recovered plutonium and uranium be worth?  For the rough 
purposes of illustration, we can assume that 1% of the spent fuel—10 grams of every 
kilogram—is plutonium and 95% is uranium (with the remaining 4% being radioactive 
fission products and minor actinides).  Let us assume that the uranium is worth the same 
amount as fresh natural uranium (as discussed below, this is not the case, because of the 
buildup of undesirable uranium isotopes during irradiation, but this is not important for the 
illustrative purposes of this discussion).  If the utility estimates that the uranium price is 
$50/kg, then the uranium recovered from reprocessing a kilogram of spent fuel will be worth 
about $48.   
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 Estimating the value of the recovered plutonium requires a bit more work. To make fuel 
from the plutonium equivalent in energy content to typical LEU fuel, roughly 6 kilograms of 
fuel would have to be reprocessed for every kilogram of fresh fuel fabricated.  The utility 
estimates that fabricating each kilogram of fresh plutonium fuel (after mixing the plutonium 
oxide with uranium oxide to form a mixed oxide, or MOX) would cost $1500.  Each such 
kilogram of plutonium fuel could replace a kilogram of LEU fuel, whose costs include the 
cost of the natural uranium that goes into making it (let us say 7 kilograms, for this example, 
at $50/kg), the cost of converting that uranium from the form in which it is mined to the form 
in which it is enriched (7 kilograms again, at a cost the utility estimates at $5/kg), the cost of 
enriching it to a level usable in the reactor (6 separative work units, or SWU—the unit by 
which enrichment work is measured, at a cost the utility estimates at $100/SWU), and the 
cost of fabrication, about $250/kg: 
Uranium 7 kg @  $50/kg $350 
Conversion 7 kg @    $5/kg $35 
Enrichment 6 SWU @ $100/SWU $600 
Fabrication 1 kg @ $200/kg $250 
Total  $1235 
 Unfortunately for the utility, at these prices the recovered plutonium not only will not 
provide enough value to pay the extra cost of reprocessing, it poses an additional liability, 
since making fuel from it costs $1500 and the fuel the plutonium fuel replaces costs less than 
$1300.  In this simplified case, if all other prices stayed the same, the uranium price would 
have to increase to  $88/kg before the plutonium would have any value at all.  The total value 
of the recovered uranium and plutonium in this simplified case, as a function of the price of 
uranium, Cu, is: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
  value of recovered value of recovered value of recovered
uranium & plutonium         uranium       plutonium
cost of LEU cost of MOX
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Substituting this into equation (2.1), we have 
[ ] [ ] [ ]
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 (2.4) 
 In this simplified case, the uranium price would have to rise to over $330/kg—roughly 
ten times current prices, a price no one realistically expects to see for many decades—before 
the value of the recovered plutonium and uranium would be sufficient to cover the $600 extra 
cost of the reprocessing approach.  This would be the “breakeven” uranium price at which 
reprocessing would be economically competitive with direct disposal. 
 Of course, there are a wide variety of economic factors a complete calculation has to take 
into account that are not included in this simple illustration—carrying charges on the cost of 
the material during its processing and use, changes in the quantities of uranium and 
enrichment work that would be used to produce each kilogram of LEU as the uranium price 
increased, the isotopic composition of the uranium and plutonium recovered from 
reprocessing and the resulting plutonium concentrations or uranium enrichment levels 
required to achieve given burnups, and so on.  The equations we have used in this study, 
which take these other factors into account, are explained and derived in Appendix A.21 
 Rather than holding other prices constant and varying the uranium price until the costs of 
the two fuel cycles are equal, it is also possible to hold the uranium price constant and find 
the “breakeven” price for some other commodity or service—for example, how low the price 
of reprocessing would have to go for reprocessing and recycle to be economic at a particular 
uranium price.  In the simplified case we just examined, if the uranium price is $50/kg, and 
all the remaining prices remain the same, the reprocessing price would have to be reduced 
from $1000 to roughly $400/kgHM before reprocessing would be economically competitive.  
Like a uranium price of $350/kg, a total reprocessing cost (including pay-back of 
reprocessing plant capital) of $400/kgHM is not likely to be seen for a very long time to 
come. 
 Another way to analyze the problem, besides considering such “breakeven” prices, is to 
consider the total contribution to electricity price from each of the two fuel cycles, for given 
sets of estimates of the costs of the various services and commodities concerned.  This 
answers the question: how much extra electricity cost is incurred by choosing one fuel cycle 
rather than another?  In this case, the costs on each side of Equation (2.1) are simply 
 
21 In the interests of openness and reproducibility, we have made the Excel file in which we have implemented 
these equations available on the internet, at http://www.puaf.umd.edu/faculty/papers/fetter/publications.htm.  
Anyone with an interest in doing so can review the equations, input their own assumptions about the cost of 
different elements of the fuel cycle, and come to their own conclusions. 
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converted into dollars per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced.  (The specific equations used 
for calculating the contribution to electricity cost are also explained in detail in Appendix A.) 
 In the remainder of this chapter, we will (a) show the breakeven uranium price as a 
function of the cost of reprocessing, for a given set of central, high, and low estimates of the 
costs of other parameters; (b) provide an analysis of the sensitivity of that result to the 
various different cost parameters of the fuel cycle; (c) show the contribution of each fuel 
cycle to the cost of electricity, again as a function of reprocessing price, for the same set of 
parameters; (d) analyze the sensitivity of the cost of electricity to changes in selected input 
cost parameters; and (e) justify our estimates of the prices of all the various parameters 
involved, with discussions of near-term price projections and their possible longer-term 
evolution. 
2.2.  Calculating Breakeven Prices 
Figure 2.1 plots the breakeven uranium price as a function of the price of 
reprocessing (including transportation of fuel to the reprocessing plant, short-term storage of 
spent fuel and plutonium, treatment and disposal of low- and intermediate-level wastes, and 
interim storage of HLW).  Table 2.1 displays our central estimates of various parameters in 
the calculation, as well as estimates that reflect best and worst cases for reprocessing: 
(a) the cost savings from geologic disposal of reprocessing wastes compared to geological 
disposal of spent fuel ($/kgHM of original spent fuel); 
(b) the cost of fabricating MOX fuel ($/kgHM of MOX fuel); 
(c) the cost of interim storage of spent fuel pending ultimate disposal on the direct disposal 
route ($/kgHM); 
(d) the price of enrichment (dollars per separative work unit, $/SWU); 
(e) the burnup of the spent fuel being reprocessed and of the fresh fuel to be produced 
(thermal megawatt-days per kilogram of heavy metal, MWt/kgHM); 
(f) whether or not the enrichment work is done using laser isotope separation, which 
would make it possible to remove the undesirable isotopes from the uranium recovered 
from reprocessing without extra work; 
(g) the discount rate used for the carrying charges (%/y); 
(h) the price of LEU fuel fabrication ($/kgHM); 
(i) the premiums charged for conversion, enrichment, and fabrication of recovered 
uranium rather than natural uranium ($/kgU, $/SWU, $/kgHM); and 
(j) the price of uranium conversion ($/kgU). 
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Figure 2.1.  Breakeven uranium price as a function of the cost of reprocessing, for 
various sets of assumptions about the cost of other fuel-cycle services. 
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The estimates for these parameters we have used are based on a review of the recent 
literature; current prices and projections for the future, with sources for these figures, are 
described in more detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.22 
The solid central line in figure 2.1 shows the breakeven uranium price as a function of 
the price of reprocessing, using the central estimates given in table 2.1 for other fuel-cycle 
prices and parameters.  The dotted lines labeled “Monte Carlo” show the result of a 
simulation in which the values of other parameters are selected randomly from independent 
normal distributions with 5th and 95th percentiles defined by the values given in table 2.1 for 
the best and worst case for reprocessing.  (This is a very rough estimate of the uncertainty in 
                                                 
22 We have not included explicitly charges for the various transportation steps included in the fuel cycle—
ranging from transportation of uranium from the mine to the mill and from there to the conversion facility to 
transportation of spent fuel to a reprocessing plant or a permanent repository—instead incorporating these into 
our estimates of the prices of the individual services.  Hence, the reprocessing cost estimate includes transport 
to the reprocessing plant, and the estimate of the difference in disposal cost between disposing of spent fuel and 
disposing of reprocessing wastes includes differences in the cost of transporting these materials to their final 
repositories. 
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the calculation, since there is no formal justification for assuming independent normal 
distributions for each parameter.) The outer dashed lines on the figure represent the result of 
setting all of the parameters equal to those we estimated as either the best case for 
reprocessing or the worst case for reprocessing. 
 
Table 2.1.  Estimates of fuel-cycle costs (2003 dollars) and other parameters and sensitivity 
analysis for the breakeven uranium price for a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM. 
Parameter Value* Breakeven U price (central = $368/kgU) 
Parameter low central high low high 
change 
compared 
to central 
Disposal cost diff. ($/kgHM) 300 200 100 298 438 ±70 
MOX fuel fabrication ($/kgHM) 700 1500 2300 302 434 ±66 
Interim fuel storage ($/kgHM) 300 200 100 310 425 ±57 
Enrichment ($/SWU) 150 100 50 338 404 –29 +36 
Spent-fuel burnup (MWd/kgHM) 33 43 43 313 368 –54 
Fresh-fuel burnup (MWd/kgHM) 53 43 43 350 368 –18 
Laser enrichment Yes No No 329 368 –39 
Discount rate (%/y, real) 8 5 2 353 380 –15 
+13 
LEU fuel fabrication ($/kgHM) 350 250 150 359 376 ±8 
Premium for recovered uranium       
     Conversion ($/kgU) 5 15 25 362 373 ±5 
     Enrichment ($/SWU) 0 5 10 364 371 ±3 
     Fuel fabrication ($/kgHM) 0 10 20 367 369 ±1 
Conversion ($/kgU) 8 6 4 367 639 ±1 
*low = best case for reprocessing, high = worst case for reprocessing 
As can be seen, including the additional complications of a full calculation leads to a 
result similar to the illustrative calculations provided above.  At the same $1000/kgHM 
reprocessing price considered in the illustration, the breakeven uranium price is about 
$370/kgU for our central estimates of the other parameters.  Again, this is a price far higher 
than any likely to be seen for many decades to come.  Even the 5% boundary of the Monte 
Carlo simulation represents a breakeven uranium price of about $220/kgU for a $1000/kgHM 
reprocessing price.  The reason that uranium prices must increase so much to reach 
breakeven is that the cost of purchasing uranium is only a small fraction of the overall fuel 
cost in the once-through fuel cycle, and hence to affect the overall fuel cycle price very 
much, the uranium price has to increase dramatically.   
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Table 2.2 shows the results of breakeven calculations for selected cost parameters, 
holding uranium price at $50/kgU and setting other costs equal to the central values listed in 
table 2.1. Thus, if the price of uranium price is $50/kgU, the reprocessing price would have 
to be reduced to about $420/kgHM for reprocessing to be as cost-effective as direct disposal.  
As will be discussed below, achieving such a low reprocessing price would be an 
extraordinary challenge, particularly for privately-owned facilities which must pay both taxes 
and higher costs of money on invested capital. 
Table 2.2.  Breakeven prices of selected parameters, assuming a uranium price of 
$50/kgU and central values for other parameters. 
 
Parameter 
Central 
Estimate 
Breakeven 
Value 
Breakeven 
Central 
Disposal cost difference ($/kgHM) 200 630 3.2 
Interim spent fuel storage ($/kgHM) 200 780 3.9 
Enrichment ($/SWU) 100 1200 12 
Reprocessing ($/kgHM) 1000 420 0.42 
Uranium ($/kgU) 50 370 7.4 
    
2.3.  Breakeven Price Sensitivity Analysis 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the sensitivity of the breakeven uranium price to changes in the 
various fuel-cycle parameters.  It shows how much the breakeven price would increase or 
decrease when each of the parameters is varied from our central estimate to our worst-case 
and best-case estimates, for reprocessing prices of $500/kgHM, $1000/kgHM, and 
$2000/kgHM.   
The parameters that have the largest impact on the outcome are the reprocessing 
price, the difference in price between disposal of spent fuel and high-level wastes from 
reprocessing, and the price of MOX fuel fabrication.  The costs of each of these particularly 
important parameters are discussed in detail below.  (The costs of interim storage of spent 
fuel pending disposal are also important; they are addressed briefly below, and more 
extensively in an earlier report on interim storage of spent fuel, by a different group of co-
authors.)23 Appendix B reviews the resources of uranium likely to be economically 
recoverable in the future at different prices. 
                                                 
23 Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, Allison Macfarlane, Susan E. Pickett, Atsuyuki Suzuki, Tatsujiro Suzuki, 
and Jennifer Weeks, Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Safe, Flexible, and Cost-Effective Approach to 
Spent Fuel Management (Cambridge, MA: Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University, and Project on 
Sociotechnics of Nuclear Energy, University of Tokyo, June 2001, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/spentfuel.pdf).  
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Figure 2.2.  Sensitivity of the breakeven uranium price to changes in various parameters, 
relative reference-case values of about $90, $370, and $950/kgU for reprocessing costs of 
$500, $1000, and $2000/kgHM, respectively. 
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Reprocessing price.  Given the wide range we have chosen to display, the breakeven 
uranium price is extremely sensitive to reprocessing price, ranging from roughly $90/kgU for 
a “best case” reprocessing price of $500/kgHM, to $370/kgU for a reprocessing price of 
$1000/kgHM, to $950/kgU for a reprocessing price of $2000/kgHM.  As will be discussed 
below, this is by no means the upper limit of plausible reprocessing prices (the plant now 
under construction in Japan is expected to have a higher reprocessing cost, even if no 
allowance is made for return on capital invested), but there is little point in calculating 
breakeven uranium prices at higher reprocessing costs, since there is no prospect that such 
uranium prices would be reached in this century. 
 Difference in waste disposal costs.  The next most sensitive parameter is the savings 
in waste disposal costs resulting from disposing of the high-level wastes from reprocessing, 
as compared with the direct disposal of the spent fuel.  In a best case for reprocessing, if the 
savings is $300/kgHM (75 percent of the $400/kgHM estimated net present cost of disposal 
of spent fuel at the time of discharge), then the breakeven uranium price would be reduced by 
some $70/kgU dollars below the $370/kgU breakeven price for our central estimate of 
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$200/kgHM in disposal cost savings, at a $1000/kgHM reprocessing price.  If the savings 
was only $100/kgHM, the breakeven price would be increased by a similar amount. 
 MOX fuel fabrication cost.  The other particularly sensitive parameter is the MOX 
fuel fabrication price.  If this price was $2300/kgHM, the breakeven uranium price would 
increase by some $65/kgU; if the MOX price were $700/kgHM, breakeven price would be 
reduced by $65/kgU. 
2.4.  Contribution to the Cost of Electricity 
Figure 2.3 shows the additional electricity cost involved in reprocessing and 
recycling, compared to direct disposal of spent fuel, as a function of uranium price, for 
several reprocessing prices.  (The other fuel cycle cost parameters are set at the central 
estimates described above.)  As can be seen, at a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM and a 
uranium price of $40/kgU (modestly above recent prices), reprocessing would involve an 
additional electricity cost of 1.3 mill/kWh.  (A mill is a tenth of a cent.) Even at a uranium 
price of $130/kgHM—a price not likely to be seen for many decades, if not longer—the 
penalty for reprocessing is still about 1 mill/kWh. If the reprocessing price were 
$1500/kgHM, the electricity price penalty at a uranium price of $40/kgU would be nearly 
doubled, to about 2.5 mill/kWh. 
Figure 2.3.  The additional cost of electricity (COE, mill/KWh) for the reprocessing-
recycle option, for reprocessing prices of $500, 1000, 1500, and $2000/kgHM, compared 
to the cost of electricity for the direct-disposal option. 
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While 1-2 mill/kWh does not represent a large fraction of total electricity costs, it is a 
significant fraction of the costs that owners of existing plants can control—particularly the 
back-end costs.  At $1000/kgHM and $40/kgU, the full costs attributable to spent fuel 
management (after taking account of appropriate credits or charges for the recovered 
plutonium and uranium from reprocessing) are 87% greater for reprocessing and recycling 
than for direct disposal, and amount to an additional expense of roughly $1 million per year 
for a typical LWR.24 
2.5.  Component Costs of the Fuel Cycle 
In this section, we discuss our estimates of the various prices and other parameters 
that enter into the fuel cycle cost calculation.  In most cases, we focus on the near term 
(which we take to be the next 10-15 years); in the case of uranium prices and reprocessing 
costs (which are, in a sense, the key factors to be traded off against each other in considering 
whether it makes economic sense to recycle), we offer some more speculation about the 
longer term. 
 2.5.1.  Uranium Prices  
 Uranium prices are particularly important in our analysis, since we have focused 
significantly on estimating how much the uranium price would have to increase for 
reprocessing and recycling in existing LWRs to be economic. 
 
Near Term 
 
Current uranium prices are generally in the range of $25-$35/kgU, some ten times 
lower than the breakeven price we estimate for a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM.  The 
average uranium price paid by U.S. utilities in 2002 was $26.93/kgU.25  In the European 
Union, the average price paid for deliveries under long-term contracts in 2002 (the most 
recent year for which averages are available) was higher, at $32.30.26  Uranium sold under 
long-term contracts is usually more expensive than uranium sold on the “spot” market—
reflecting a premium paid for the added security to the utility of having long-term contracts 
in place for its fuel supply.  In the United States in 2002, for example, the average long-term 
                                                 
24 With a $200/kgHM charge for interim storage pending geologic disposal, and a $400/kgHM charge for direct 
disposal (including transport to the repository), the total back-end cost of direct disposal is in the range of 1.5 
mill/kWh.  With a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM (including transport to the reprocessing plant), a 
$200/kgHM charge for disposal of reprocessing wastes, and adjustments for the net value/cost of both the 
recovered plutonium and the recovered uranium, the total back-end cost of reprocessing and recycling is almost 
2.9 mill/kWh.  (For the details of the equations used in these calculations, see Appendix A.) For a 1-GWe 
reactor operating with an 85% capacity factor, an extra 1.3 mill/kWh is equal to $1 million/y. 
25 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Uranium Industry Annual 2002 
(Washington DC: Department of Energy, May 2003, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/uia/uia.pdf), Table D6.  Such prices are often expressed in dollars per 
pound U308; such figures must be multiplied by 2.6 to find the price in dollars per kilogram of uranium.  For 
the rest of the chapter, all prices are in constant 2003 dollars, converted using GDP deflators, unless otherwise 
specified. 
26 Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2002 (Brussels: Euratom Supply Agency, 2003, available as of 
December 16, 2003 at http://europa.eu.int/comm/euratom/ar/ar2002.pdf), p. 22, converted from euros to dollars 
at the 0.95$/euro average rate for 2002. 
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contract price was $29.00, while the average spot price was $24.15, and spot purchases 
represented 17% of deliveries.27 In the European Union, the average long-term contract price 
was $32.30, the average spot price was $24.22, and only 8% of deliveries were spot 
purchases—both the modestly smaller amount of the spot purchases and the modestly higher 
price for the long-term contracts reflecting European utilities’ preference for the security of 
long-term contracts (though these differences are much less than they once were).28 As of the 
summer of 2003, the spot uranium price was in the range of $28-$28.50/kgU.29 
Indeed, as shown in Figure 2.4,30 while uranium prices are somewhat volatile, on 
average world uranium prices have been declining steadily for two decades.  Also notable in 
the figure is that the gaps between U.S. and European prices, and between spot and long-term 
prices, have declined significantly in recent years. 
Figure 2.4.  Uranium prices, 1972-2000. 
 
 
Uranium prices are still being depressed by the use of both military and civilian 
uranium inventories: while world uranium production increased by 12% in 2000, that still 
                                                 
27 Uranium Industry Annual 2002, op. cit., p. 19. 
28 Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2002, op. cit., Annex 3. 
29 Spot uranium prices are freely available from Ux Consulting, at http://www.uxc.com. 
30 Reproduced from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, and 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Uranium 2001: Resources, Production, and Demand (Paris, France: NEA 
and IAEA, 2002), p. 68. 
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filled only 56% of world reactor requirements of some 64,000 metric tons of uranium (tU).31  
It is expected that this situation will continue to exist for some time.  The initial 500-ton 
U.S.-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement is scheduled to continue 
to provide LEU blended from 30 tons a year of HEU through 2013, and there are widespread 
expectations that additional excess HEU may enter the market after that; estimates suggest 
that commercial uranium inventories still amounted to 140,000 tU at the end of 2000, having 
declined from 168,500 at the end of 1998.32  Ultimately, as existing inventories are 
consumed, prices will have to rise sufficiently to bring additional production onto the market 
to meet demand.  Relatively modest price increases would be sufficient to result in producers 
supplying additional material to the market: already demonstrated reserves recoverable at 
$40/kgU or less are reported to include more than 2 million tU, and more resources would 
surely be converted to reserves as prices increased.33  Hence it is quite unlikely that uranium 
prices will increase above $50/kgU for any sustained period over the next couple of 
decades.34  One projection in the summer of 2003 suggested that uranium prices in long-term 
contracts would rise to $32.50/kgU in 2005, and to $41.60/kgU by 2013, where they would 
remain for an extended period.35 
We have not chosen central or high and low estimates for uranium prices, instead 
treating breakeven uranium price as the dependent variable resulting from the other factors in 
the fuel cycle cost equation. 
Longer Term 
 
Longer-term price predictions are notoriously difficult.  For much of the nuclear age, 
forecasters have routinely predicted that the uranium price would imminently begin a steady 
rise, and have just as routinely been proved wrong. Throughout the 20th century, the world 
has been finding more of most resources and developing new and cheaper ways to recover 
them faster than these resources have been consumed.  The result, for a wide range of non-
renewable resources, has been prices that have been declining in real terms rather than 
increasing.  In the United States, for example, the real price of a broad range of metals 
declined throughout the 20th century (just as the uranium price has been doing for the last 20 
years).36  Based on the estimates of uranium resources described in Appendix B, there is 
clearly enough uranium available at costs far below the breakeven price for reprocessing at 
$1000/kgHM to last for many decades; indeed, as described in Appendix B, it appears 
unlikely that the uranium price will rise to the breakeven price anytime in the 21st century, 
                                                 
31 Uranium 2001: Resources, Production, and Demand, op. cit., p. 10. 
32 Uranium 2001: Resources, Production, and Demand, op. cit., p. 59, citing a 2001 study by the World Nuclear 
Association (formerly the Uranium Institute). 
33 Uranium 2001: Resources, Production, and Demand, op. cit., p. 21. 
34 See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Power 
Generation and Fuel Cycle Report 1997 (Washington, DC: DOE, September 1997), p. 116, projecting a spot 
market price essentially stable at between $40/kgU and $41/kgU (1996 dollars) from 2004-2010.  This is the 
last year for which this report is available.  
35 See Michael Knapik, “LES Hires Advisers to Prime Renewed Push to Site Tennessee Plant; PACE Slams 
USEC,” Nuclear Fuel, May 26, 2003, reporting projections from Energy Resources International. 
36 Daniel E. Sullivan, John L. Sznopek, and Lorie A. Wagner, “20th Century U.S. Mineral Prices Decline in 
Constant Dollars” (Washington DC: U.S. Geological Survey, Open File Report 00-389, available as of 
December 16, 2003 at http://pubs.usgs.gov/openfile/of00-389/of00-389.pdf).  
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even with substantial growth in nuclear power.  Appendix B also addresses the long-term 
possibility of recovery of the huge uranium resource in seawater, which, if it could be done 
on an industrial scale at a price comparable to or less than the breakeven price, would 
provide a long-term competitor to reprocessing and recycling of plutonium for fueling the 
future of fission-based nuclear energy. 
2.5.2.  Reprocessing Costs and Prices  
 Our analysis is also particularly sensitive to the price of reprocessing, and therefore 
we discuss reprocessing costs and prices in some detail.  Commercial reprocessing is 
expensive.  Chemically processing intensely radioactive spent fuel while maintaining 
adequate safety standards requires large, complex facilities and substantial numbers of highly 
trained personnel, and results in significant quantities of radioactive and chemical wastes that 
must be managed.  For example, the French UP2 and UP3 facilities at La Hague, the world’s 
largest commercial reprocessing center, cost 90 billion francs to build (over $16 billion 2003 
dollars) and employ 6,000-8,000 people.37 
Exactly how expensive reprocessing is depends, of course, on the specifics of 
individual facilities.  The actual experience of existing facilities provides a far better basis for 
judging the cost of future facilities than paper studies by optimistic designers, but this actual 
experience is limited: only two companies outside the former Soviet Union operate large 
commercial reprocessing plants today (COGEMA, now part of the Areva group, in France, 
and British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) in the United Kingdom), and these plants only 
began operation in the 1990s.  More is known about the costs at BNFL’s Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (THORP), because of the extended debates that have surrounded that 
facility since its inception.  Unlike cost parameters such as uranium and enrichment prices, 
for which published prices are widely available, virtually all aspects of the economics of 
reprocessing are considered proprietary information.  The cost estimates in this study are 
therefore based on the limited statements that are available from the reprocessors, studies 
from other sources, and press reports.  The sections below discuss costs and prices charged at 
existing plants, followed by a discussion of possible costs at new facilities in the longer-term 
future. 
Costs   
 The THORP facility cost some $5.9 billion (2003 dollars) to build.38  While there has 
been considerable controversy over its annual reprocessing capacity (arising from its frequent 
                                                 
37 Christian Bataille and Robert Galley, L’Aval du Cycle Nucléaire (The Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle), 
Part 1, General Study, Report to the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological 
Choices (Paris, France: French Senate, June 1998, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.senat.fr/rap/o97-612/o97-612.html).  As discussed in Chapter 1, the cost estimate in francs has been 
converted to dollars using a three-year average of exchange rates centered on the year of the estimate, and then 
inflated to 2003 dollars using U.S. GDP deflators.  The employment figure covers both employees of 
COGEMA and subcontractors. 
38 British Nuclear Fuels Limited, The Economic and Commercial Justification for THORP (Risley, UK: BNFL, 
1993), p. 22.  BNFL states that the “construction cost of THORP, spread over the ten years 1983-1992, equates 
to around £1.9Bn.  However, taking account of other projects which are directly related to THORP, the overall 
capital cost of the programme was around £2.85 Bn.”  These estimates have been converted to dollars using a 
 
DIRECT DISPOSAL VS. REPROCESSING AND RECYCLING IN THERMAL REACTORS  27 
 
 
failure to meet targets), we will use an estimate of 800 tons of heavy metal per year (tHM/y).  
BNFL has never provided an official figure for THORP’s operating costs, but before THORP 
began operating, BNFL provided a public estimate that a similar plant would cost some $560 
million per year (2003 dollars) to operate (or roughly $700/kgHM).39  BNFL in this period 
frequently underestimated future costs, and indeed, on a per-kilogram basis BNFL has 
concluded that costs are higher than originally anticipated, and has asked for additional 
payments from customers to cover these higher costs.40  Nevertheless, to be conservative, we 
will rely on this early BNFL estimate.   
Both THORP and UP-3 were built with very favorable financing arrangements—pay-
ahead contracts from their utility customers paid essentially the entire capital cost over a 10-
year “baseload” period, with no interest or return to investors required.  Amortizing a $5.9 
billion capital cost over 10 years of operation at 800 tHM/y would result in a capital 
contribution to reprocessing cost of $740/kgHM.  With capital and operating costs added 
together, this comes to $1440/kgHM.  If we assume (conservatively) that start-up costs 
amount to one year of operational costs (also amortized over the ten-year baseload), this adds 
some $70/kgHM; conservative allowances for refurbishment and decommissioning add a 
further $100/kgHM.  Thus the total cost under this financing arrangement would be in the 
range of $1760/kgHM.41 
The cost of reprocessing at new facilities with capital and operating costs comparable 
to THORP would depend crucially on how they were financed (see appendix A.)  Financing 
with pay-ahead contracts and without requirements for return on investment was possible 
only because the reprocessors’ customers were legally obliged by their governments to enter 
into reprocessing contracts and BNFL and Cogema were the only firms offering the service; 
this seller’s market for reprocessing services will not occur again.  A government-owned 
facility able to borrow money at low, risk-free government rates, and amortize the capital 
                                                                                                                                                       
three-year average of exchange rates centered on the time of the estimate, and then inflated to 2003 dollars 
using U.S. GDP deflators.  Other estimates (including from BNFL) lead to somewhat higher figures in 2003 
dollars, but these variations may be more a matter of currency fluctuations than real differences in the estimated 
cost of the facility when built.  In 2000-2001, BNFL asked customers to cover £100 million in additional capital 
costs not initially anticipated (approximately $150 million in 2003 dollars), but to be conservative, we have not 
added these additional costs to our estimates of THORP capital costs.  See, for example, Ann MacLachlan, 
“BNFL, Overseas Customers Agree on New Reprocessing Contract Terms,” Nuclear Fuel, October 15, 2001. 
39 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, The Economics of the 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Paris: NEA, 1994), p. 113.  The costs estimated in that study are in 1991 money values (p. 
23), and have been converted to 2003 dollars using the same method as used for capital costs. 
40 See, for example, MacLachlan, “BNFL, Overseas Customers Agree on New Reprocessing Contract Terms,” 
op. cit. 
41The assumptions used here for capital, operating, refurbishment, startup, and decommissioning costs lead to a 
total cost, if the plant were only to operate for the 10-year baseload, of $11.8 billion, quite comparable to 
BNFL’s estimate, before the plant began to operate, of total costs of $11.3 billion.  (See BNFL, The Economic 
and Commercial Justification for THORP, op. cit., p. 22, converted to current dollars by the same methods 
described above).  The difference is likely attributable largely to our assumptions on capital refurbishment 
costs, which we treat as levelized throughout the plant’s life, but BNFL may have assumed could largely be 
postponed until after the baseload period (and hence these costs may have not have been fully included in an 
accounting limited to costs incurred during the baseload period); refurbishment is not even mentioned in this 
BNFL document, and in the OECD study, major refurbishments are assumed to occur at 10 years (just after the 
baseload) and 20 years after the plant begins operations (OECD/NEA, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle, op. cit., p. 120. 
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cost over 30 years rather than only 10, would have a total cost, using otherwise similar 
assumptions, just under $1350/kgHM; a private facility with a guaranteed rate of return (and 
therefore a low cost of money, though not as low as the government’s rate, and also facing a 
requirement to pay taxes and insurance) would have a total cost of over $2000/kgHM; and a 
private facility with no guaranteed rate of return would have a total cost of over 
$3100/kgHM—all for the same capital and operating costs as BNFL estimated for THORP.42  
These figures are consistent with those estimated by a committee of the National Academy of 
Sciences in the mid-1990s (also on the basis of reported THORP costs), when those estimates 
are converted from 1992 to 2003 dollars.43 Such private-capital costs would take the cost of 
                                                 
42 These figures assume, in addition to the capital and operating costs for THORP described in the text: (a) a 10-
year construction time, as assumed in OECD/NEA, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit., p. 120, 
comparable to the construction times for UP3 and THORP; (b) an annual refurbishment cost of 1% of overnight 
capital cost; (c) property taxes and insurance for the private facilities of 2% of overnight capital cost; (d) an 
annuity for decommissioning, with decommissioning costing 30% of overnight capital cost, and occurring 20 
years after the 30-year operational life of the plant, and funds set aside in a fund that generates a 3% real interest 
rate, resulting in a decommissioning charge of roughly $26/kgHM; (e) continuous operation at 800 tHM/yr 
throughout the 30-year life of the plant; and (f) startup costs equal to one year of operations costs, adding just 
over $560 million to total capital costs.  As discussed in Chapter 1, annual fixed charge rates are assumed to be 
5.8% for government financing, 10.3% for a private entity with a guaranteed rate of return, and 18.8% for a 
private entity with no guarantee of revenues—plus 2%, as just noted, for property taxes and insurance in the 
case of the private facilities.  Describing the spend-out of funds during construction with the beta-binomial S-
curve described in Appendix A, and assuming real rates for interest during construction (IDC) of 4%, 6.4%, and 
9% for the government-owned, regulated-utility-owned, and private-venture-owned cases, respectively, leads to 
adding 18%, 31%, and 46% to the overnight construction costs to find the total capital cost including interest 
during construction.  (Although it seems very unlikely that lenders would be willing to finance 100% of the cost 
of building such a facility with no equity investment, even if equity shares were to be sold to pay off some of 
the debt once the facility was operational, we have nonetheless used the lower rate for all-debt financing for the 
private venture case, as otherwise the cost of interest during construction over 10 years of construction would be 
prohibitive.  This follows the approach taken in U.S. National Research Council, Committee on Separations 
Technology and Transmutation Systems, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation 
(Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1996), Appendix J, “Fuel Reprocessing Economics,” pp. 413-445.)  
Thus for a government-owned facility, the total capital cost, including overnight cost, IDC, and startup costs, 
would be roughly $7.5 billion; the annual capital contribution to the revenue requirement would be nearly $440 
million; and the capital contribution to per-kilogram cost would be just under $550/kgHM.  Adding just over 
$700/kgHM in operations cost would bring the per-kilogram cost to some $1250/kgHM, and refurbishment and 
decommissioning set-asides would bring the total to some $1350/kgHM.    For a facility owned by a regulated 
utility, the total capital cost would be $8.3 billion, contributing an annual revenue requirement of some $850 
million, or just over $1060/kgHM; operating, refurbishment, and decommissioning costs are assumed to be the 
same, but there would also be a cost of some $150/kgHM for property taxes and insurance, bringing total costs 
to some $2020/kgHM.  For a facility owned by a private venture without a regulated rate of return, the total 
capital cost would be $9.2 billion, the annual revenue requirement would be $1.7 billion, the capital 
contribution to per-kilogram cost would be over $2150/kgHM, and the total reprocessing cost would be over 
$3100/kgHM.   Assumptions on fixed charge rates, refurbishment, property insurance, and taxes, are drawn 
from U.S. National Research Council, Committee on Separations Technology and Transmutation Systems, 
Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, Washington DC: National Academy Press, 
1996, Appendix J, “Fuel Reprocessing Economics,” pp. 413-445; assumptions on decommissioning are drawn 
from BNFL’s own assumptions in OECD/NEA, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit., p. 114.  We 
have charged property taxes and insurance separately from the fixed charge rate on total capital cost (so as to 
apply these charges only to overnight cost, not to total capital cost), and our annual fixed charge rates are 
therefore 2% lower for both of the private cases than the figures used by the NAS panel. Thee NAS panel 
appears not to have included its estimated 1% annual charge for refurbishment in its fixed charge rates.  (Ray 
Sandburg, private communication, July 2003.) 
43 See NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., pp. 413-445. 
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reprocessing to the edge of Figure 2.1 and beyond, to a region where the breakeven uranium 
price would be in the range of $1000/kgU, or far higher than that for reprocessing at a private 
facility without a guaranteed rate of return. 
Costs for the French UP3 plant, built at roughly the same time to meet essentially the 
same market, have been reported to be generally similar to those for THORP, though much 
less detail is available.44  Costs for the most recent large reprocessing plant, the Rokkasho-
Mura plant nearing completion in Japan, have been astronomically higher—despite the 
design having been modeled on UP3—not lower, as might be expected from having the 
benefit of the experience of the plants in France and the United Kingdom.  The capital cost of 
the Rokkasho-Mura plant is now expected to be 2.14 trillion yen (roughly $18 billion at 
exchange rates that prevailed in the first half of 2003) and the operations cost over 40 years is 
expected to be 6.8 trillion yen (over $1.4 billion per year)45—both about three times the 
THORP costs discussed above.  Even amortized over 40 years, with zero return on capital 
and no allowances for interest during construction, startup costs, refurbishment, or 
decommissioning, this would come to over $2300/kgHM.  Total costs including these other 
costs are expected to be dramatically higher still, at over $4100/kgHM—though it is not 
entirely clear which components of the reprocessing-recycling-waste disposal program are 
included in that huge total—prompting the Japanese utilities to ask for a government subsidy 
to pay all costs other than operations.46 
 In short, the $1000/kgHM reprocessing cost we have used as our central estimate is 
quite conservative.  For facilities with capital and operating costs comparable to THORP, 
per-kilogram costs in this range could only be achieved for facilities whose capital cost has 
already been paid off, or which are government-financed.  If, as seems likely, future plants 
would not be built by governments, but would have to raise funds on private capital markets 
(and pay taxes and insurance), then simply achieving our central estimate of $1000/kgHM 
would require more than a 50 percent reduction in the capital and operating costs experienced 
                                                 
44 One press report indicates that COGEMA estimated the capital cost of UP3 at 27.8 billion francs in 1992, 
roughly $6.2 billion 2003 dollars.  See Ann MacLachlan, “COGEMA Inaugurates UP3 with Promise of More 
Upgrades,” Nuclear Fuel, April 27, 1992.  Similarly, an earlier press account reported that COGEMA had 
estimated the total cost of building the UP3 plant (with a capacity of 800 MTHM/yr) and expanding UP2 from a 
capacity of 400 MTHM/yr to 800 MTHM was 50 billion francs; if two-thirds of this, or 33.3 billion francs, was 
for UP3, that would be roughly similar to the 27.8 billion franc estimate reported in MacLachlan.  See NAS, 
Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., p.418, quoting Reprocessing News, 
“Design and Characteristics of the UP-3 Plant,” Hanover, Germany: United Reprocessors, 1990. While 
COGEMA has not revealed operating costs, BNFL has indicated that UP3 operating and decommissioning costs 
are “comparable” to those estimated for THORP.  See BNFL, The Economic  and Commercial Justification for 
THORP, op. cit., p. 18.  More recently, a French study relying on figures from COGEMA has reported that the 
capital cost of UP3’s sister plant, UP2, was 37 billion francs (2000 money values, some $5.7 billion in 2003 
dollars, quite similar to the THORP estimate), and the continuing variable cost is 4 million francs per ton 
reprocessed (some $619/kgHM in 2003 dollars).  See Yves Marignac, “Briefing: Results of the `Charpin-
Dessus-Pellat’ Mission Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option” (Paris, France: World 
Information Service Energy-Paris, January 18, 2001), p. 7. Marignac was one of two authors of the supporting 
study to the Charpin et al. study, on the economics of the existing nuclear power infrastructure in France.     
45 See, for example, “Nuke Fuel Reprocessing to Cost 15 Trillion Yen,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 15, 
2003. 
46 Total cost for reprocessing at Rokkasho-mura is estimated at 15.9 trillion yen.  See “Nuke Fuel Reprocessing 
to Cost 15 Trillion Yen,” op. cit.  
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at past large commercial reprocessing plants (excluding Rokkasho-Mura)—even if the 
facility had the advantage of the low investor risks associated with a guaranteed rate of 
return. 
 
It is also important to note that for simplicity, in our model the reprocessing cost 
includes the cost of transport to the reprocessing plant, which is not in fact included in the 
above estimates of the per kilogram costs at existing facilities.  Over modest distances, spent 
fuel transport is typically estimated as costing an additional $50/kgHM.47  Transport between 
Europe and Japan is significantly more expensive. 
 
 Prices 
 
BNFL figures indicate that the “baseload” contracts for THORP, designed to retire 
the entire capital cost of the plants in the first 10 years of operation, were in the range of 
$1600/kgHM (1989 dollars), over $2300 in 2003 dollars.48  This would be consistent with 
suggestions that the baseload contracts were based on expected costs plus a fee in the range 
of 20%.  UP3 contract prices have been reported to be similar to THORP’s.  Some sources, 
however, suggest somewhat lower baseload contract prices, in the range of $1700-
1800/kgHM (2003 dollars); this difference may be attributable more to uncertainties 
introduced by currency conversion in the presence of currency fluctuations than by real 
differences in estimations of the prices paid.49  In some cases, domestic customers (such as 
Eléctricité de France for COGEMA, both largely owned by the French government) received 
modestly lower prices.  These baseload contracts were not fixed-price contracts, but cost-plus 
contracts, allowing BNFL and COGEMA to pass on cost increases to the customers.  Both 
have sought increases over the prices originally negotiated, as a result of higher than 
expected costs (though in COGEMA’s case, this occurred before the plant began 
operations).50 
                                                 
47 See, for example, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency,  
Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles: A Comparative 
Study (Paris, France: NEA, 2002, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.nea.fr/html/ndd/reports/2002/nea3109-ads.pdf), p. 211. 
48See, for example, BNFL, The Economic and Commercial Justification for THORP, op. cit., p. 18.  The 1990 
BNFL analysis referenced therein indicated that roughly 6000 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) of baseload 
contracts were worth  £6 billion (1989 money values), meaning that the average price was 1000 £/kgHM, or 
over $1600/kgHM at the average exchange rate for the three years centered on 1989.  An identical figure of 
$1600/kgHM was provided in an interview by one of the authors with an industry participant in March 1994, 
referring to contract offers from both COGEMA and BNFL as being roughly similar.  A number of other 
studies from the early 1990s refer to prices in the range of $1600/kgHM (then-year dollars). 
49 For example, a 1995 German study done by authors with access to data from the German utilities reported a 
baseload price of 2400 DM/kgHM.  If we assume that this is in 1994 money values (rather than the amount at 
the time the baseload contracts were concluded, more than a decade earlier), then this comes to just over 
$1800/kgHM (2003 dollars); see Ingo Hensing and Walter Schulz, An Economic Comparison of Different Back-
End Paths of Nuclear Power Plants: A Cost Simulation of Different Strategies From a German Point of View, 
Energiewirtschafliches Institute (EWI), University of Cologne (Olenbourg-Vourlag,1995).  Similarly, the 
Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC) reports typical baseload prices at $1500-$1700/kgHM in 1999 dollars 
($1630-$1850 2003 dollars); see Geoff Varley and Dan Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data (Atlanta, GA: NAC, 
October 1999).  As noted in Chapter 1, this NAC report was prepared on contract to the U.S. Department of 
Energy, and is not publicly available because it contains information that is proprietary to NAC. 
50 MacLachlan, “BNFL, Overseas Customers Agree on New Reprocessing Contract Terms,” op. cit. 
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Early post-baseload contracts, no longer including payback of capital costs, were 
reportedly concluded in 1989-1990 at prices in the range of $1000-$1500/kgHM (2003 
dollars).51  More recently, however, with significant competition between BNFL and 
COGEMA for post-baseload contracts, prices offered for new reprocessing contracts have 
reportedly fallen to the range of $600-900/kgHM,52 representing, in essence, the operations 
cost of the plants plus a modest allocation for profit.  These prices are only possible because 
amortization of capital is no longer included, and therefore do not represent long-term 
sustainable prices for reprocessing services. 
 
Longer Term Prospects in New Facilities 
 
If reprocessing is to play any significant part in the nuclear future, new plants would 
have to be built to replace the existing plants.  An obvious question is: can the cost of 
reprocessing be reduced substantially compared to the cost experience in existing facilities?  
As noted earlier, at a uranium price of $50/kgU, for our central estimates of the other 
parameters, the breakeven reprocessing price would be in the range of $425/kgHM; if the 
uranium price rose to $80/kgHM decades from now, the breakeven reprocessing price would 
be in the range of $480/kgHM.  These figures represent a reduction by 75% or more 
compared to the reprocessing price that would pertain at a facility with identical capital and 
operating costs to THORP, financed at the rates that would pertain for a regulated utility with 
a guaranteed rate of return.  Is it plausible that reprocessing prices this low might be achieved 
in the future? 
 
The Plutonium Redox Extraction (PUREX) process used in existing commercial 
reprocessing facilities has been used and perfected over more than five decades, for both 
military and commercial reprocessing.  While refinements are possible (and ongoing), the 
technology is highly mature.  It seems unlikely, therefore, that dramatic cost reductions could 
be achieved using this same technology, or other variants that would also involve chopping 
the spent fuel, dissolving it in acid solutions, and using organic solvents to extract the 
plutonium and uranium from the fission products.  BNFL and COGEMA have argued that, 
using the experience gained from their existing plants, and taking advantage of process 
                                                 
51 See, for example, Mark Hibbs, “More Downward Pressure Expected By Germans on Reprocessing Price,” 
Nuclear Fuel, February 9, 1998, reporting post-baseload German contracts with BNFL at 5500 french francs per 
kilogram of heavy metal, or roughly $1275/kgHM in 2003 dollars; BNFL, The Commercial and Economic 
Justification for THORP, reports that if the 275 MTHM of reserve capacity were sold at the “same price” as the 
first post-baseload contracts with German utilities, signed in 1989, it would be worth £200 million in additional 
profit (1992 money values), or 727 £/kgHM (roughly $1500/kgHM in 2003 dollars)—note that BNFL appeared 
to be assuming that with the plant operating in any case, there would be minimal or zero additional costs from 
reprocessing this additional amount of fuel; the EWI study reported a post-baseload price of 1800 DM/kgHM, 
or about $1350/kgHM in 2003 dollars (Hensing and Schulz, An Economic Comparison of Different Back-End 
Paths); and in OECD/NEA, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit., it is reported that contracts were 
available to utilities at a price in the range of 720 ECU/kgHM, roughly $1150 in 2003 dollars.  Here again, the 
NAC study provides figures on the low end, estimating $900-$1100/kgHM (1999 dollars, roughly $980-$1170 
2003 dollars), Varley and Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data, op. cit. 
52 See, for example, Varley and Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data, op. cit, who indicate that offers have been made 
(though never concluded in a contract) in the range of $700/kgHM (1999 dollars), and describe $600-
$900/kgHM (1999 dollars) as a “plausible” range for future offers from these plants. 
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simplifications that might be possible if they were allowed to leave a somewhat larger 
portion of the plutonium in the waste, costs could be reduced by some 30%.53  On the other 
hand, increasingly stringent environmental and safety regulations could put upward pressure 
on costs; in negotiations over marine pollution of the Atlantic, for example, there has been 
substantial pressure on Britain and France to agree to reduce emissions from their 
reprocessing plants toward zero, and both BNFL and COGEMA have argued that extreme 
emissions requirements could drive up their costs.54  It appears that more stringent safety and 
environmental requirements (particularly seismic safety requirements, which may be less 
severe in other countries) may have been a significant factor in driving the enormous cost of 
the Rokkasho-Mura reprocessing plant.55  In the end, the official estimate in a recent report to 
the French government, based on COGEMA data, concluded that building a new plant 
similar to UP3 would still cost $6.0 billion (2003 dollars), the same as the cost of the original 
plant.56  In short, if the cost is to be reduced four-fold, PUREX and similar aqueous processes 
are not likely to be the answer. 
 
Economies of scale may have a significant impact on per-kilogram costs, depending 
on the size of new plants.  A common rule of thumb is that both capital and operating costs 
scale roughly with the 0.6 power of throughput.  (This may or may not be the case for 
reprocessing plants even larger than the large commercial facilities now in operation: the fact 
that COGEMA chose both to double the capacity of the UP2 facility and to build the new 
UP3 facility at the same time suggests that it did not believe that substantial economies of 
scale would be achieved by having all the new capacity in one facility.)  If this rule of thumb 
did hold, then a new 2000 tHM/yr reprocessing plant, if scaled from the capital and operating 
costs for THORP described above, would have reprocessing costs in the range of 
$940/kgHM if government-financed, $1400/kgHM if privately financed with a guaranteed 
rate of return, and $2150 if privately financed without a guaranteed rate of return.57  By 
contrast, the new 50 tHM/yr reprocessing plant in China would be expected to have much 
higher per-kilogram costs, even if it achieved the same technological level as THORP: at a 
government-financed rate, the cost scaled from THORP would be in the range of 
$4200/kgHM, while for a privately financed facility with a guaranteed rate of return, the cost 
would be over $6700/kgHM.58 (Actual costs at that facility may not be quite so high, as both 
                                                 
53 See, for example, discussion in Oxford Research Group, Nuclear Reprocessing: Has it a Future?  Views 
From Inside and Outside the Industry (Oxford, UK: Oxford Research Group, October 1999). 
54 These discussions have been taking place primarily in the context of the Oslo Paris Commission (OSPAR), 
which oversees implementation of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic, which has directed that by 2020, emissions be reduced to the point that additional concentrations 
resulting from them are “close to zero.”  See OSPAR Commission, “Strategy With Regard to Radioactive 
Substances,” 1998, available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/sap/radstrat.htm. 
55 Shiro Sasaki, “Changes in the Construction Program of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant,” Plutonium, No. 13, 
Spring 1996, Council for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Tokyo, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.cnfc.or.jp/pdf/plutonium_013e.pdf. 
56 Bataille and Galley, The Back End of the Fuel Cycle, op. cit., estimate of 32 billion francs. 
57 Authors’ calculations. 
58 Authors’ calculations.  The Chinese plant is government-financed—but in a rapidly growing economy where 
availability of capital is a major constraint, estimates of the real cost of a government project should be based on 
a discount rate that reflects the opportunity cost of not spending those resources elsewhere.  Hence, we report 
both the cost for a facility financed at the U.S. government borrowing rate and the cost for a privately financed 
facility.  
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labor rates and the costs of construction materials in China are presumably substantially 
lower than they are in the United Kingdom.) 
 
A wide range of alternative chemical separations processes have been proposed over 
the years, which might contribute to reducing costs.59  The family of non-aqueous processes 
that has been the focus of most research and development has been eletrometallurgical 
processing or pyroprocessing, in which the spent fuel would be dissolved in some type of 
molten salt, to which a voltage would be applied, and some of the constituents would gather 
on the anode and others on the cathode.  Because the chemistry of the minor actinides tends 
to be similar to that of plutonium in such a molten salt environment, using such methods it is 
difficult to separate “clean” plutonium from spent fuel, and therefore such systems have 
generally been proposed for use in systems for separations and transmutation for nuclear 
waste, where both the plutonium and the minor actinides would be incorporated in fresh fuel 
for irradiation.  Proponents have argued that eletrometallurgical processes could dramatically 
reduce reprocessing costs. A 1996 review by a committee of the National Academy of 
Sciences, however, concluded that the cost estimates provided in studies of new separations 
processes in the mid-1990s were “inexplicably low,” that “it is by no means certain that 
pyroprocessing will prove more economical than aqueous processing,” and that the costs of 
current plants such as THORP and UP-3 “provide the most reliable basis for estimating the 
costs of future plants.”60  More recently, official reviews have concluded that even using such 
techniques, the types of reprocessing required for separations and transmutation are likely to 
be substantially more expensive than traditional aqueous reprocessing—a nominal estimate 
of $2000/kgHM (2.5 times higher than their too-low nominal estimate of $800/kgHM for 
traditional reprocessing) in two of the most recent analyses.61  At the same time, however, 
there continue to be official analyses whose estimates can only be described as “inexplicably 
low,” in the words of the NAS committee.62 
                                                 
59 For a useful review, see NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., 
Appendix D, “Separations Technology—Additional Information,” pp. 147-190. 
60 NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., p. 417 and p. 421. 
61 See NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. 
cit., p. 211 and p. 216, and U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Generation IV Roadmap: 
Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group (Washington, DC: DOE, March 18, 2001, available as of July 25, 
2003 at 
http://www.ne.doe.gov/reports/GenIVRoadmapFCCG.pdf.), p. A2-6 and p. A2-8.  For a discussion of the 
remaining difficulties facing pyroprocessing also N. Donaldson, G. Lamorlette, R. Thied, and D. Greneche, 
“Pyroprocessing: From Flowsheet to Industrial Facility,” in Proceedings of Global 2001: Back End of the Fuel 
Cycle: From Research to Solutions, Paris, France, September 9-13, 2001 (Paris: Commissariat à l’Energie 
Atomique, 2001).  
62 For example, in R.I. Smith et al., Estimated Cost of an ATW System (Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory, October 1999), which provided the background for the $280 billion undiscounted cost figure for 
deployment of an Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) system in U.S. Department of Energy, A 
Roadmap for Developing Accelerator Transmutation of Waste (ATW) Technology: A Report to Congress 
(Washington, DC: DOE, October 1999), it is estimated that design and construction of a 685 tHM/yr 
reprocessing plant using UREX technology (a variant on PUREX which is designed to separate only the 
uranium) and pyroprocessing of the resulting raffinate with plutonium, minor actinides, and fission products, 
would cost $1.5 billion (1999 dollars, some $1.6 billion 2003 dollars).  This amounts to some $2400/kgHM of 
annual capacity, two-thirds less than THORP’s $7400/kgHM of annual capacity—despite a lower throughput 
(which should result in higher per-kilogram costs) and the need to add two quite separate chemical processes 
together.  Operations were estimated at $114 million per year (1999 dollars, $124 million/yr in 2003 dollars), or 
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The discussion to this point has been entirely about reprocessing that simply separates 
the plutonium and the uranium from everything else.  In the case of aqueous separations 
processes, also separating the minor actinides (and, perhaps, those fission products that make 
major contributions to estimated doses from a geologic repository, such as technetium and 
iodine) would involve adding additional complex separations steps, inevitably involving 
additional costs.63  In the case of pyroprocessing, as just described, the minor actinides come 
with the plutonium as a matter of course, but current official estimates still suggest that costs 
for the complete separation of actinides from fission products will be substantially higher 
than the costs of traditional reprocessing.64 
 
In short, while future technological developments hold some promise, it does not 
appear likely that within the next few decades the cost of reprocessing, including payback of 
capital costs of facilities (likely at commercial costs of money), will be reduced to prices that 
would allow reprocessing to compete economically with uranium at prices likely to pertain 
for most of this century.  As noted earlier, it is also conceivable that costs could increase 
significantly—as suggested by the remarkable increase in cost of Rokkasho-Mura compared 
to THORP and UP-3—driven by the costs of meeting more stringent requirements as societal 
attitudes change. 
 
2.5.3.  Costs of Disposal of Spent Fuel and Reprocessing Wastes 
 
The costs for treatment and final disposal of wastes are perhaps the most uncertain of 
the various fuel cycle costs, and vary from country to country depending on national 
approaches.65  Neither geologic disposal of spent fuel nor geologic disposal of HLW has yet 
been done, making cost estimates inherently uncertain.  In most countries, geologic disposal 
of nuclear wastes is to be managed either by the government, or by a monopoly firm reactor 
operators are required to contribute to: hence there is not really a market for disposal services 
with real prices offered, and this section will discuss only costs, not prices.  For the present 
purposes, the difference in costs between the two fuel cycles is more important than the 
                                                                                                                                                       
$180/kgHM, compared to THORP’s $700/kgHM.  Decommissioning was estimated at only 10% of 
construction cost, one-third BNFL’s expectation for THORP.  These cost estimates are totally implausible.  
Moreover, the levelized costs per-kilogram costs are then determined using a 3% real discount rate with no 
allowance for taxes and insurance, appropriate only to a government-owned operation. 
63 See, for example, the discussion in NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, 
op. cit., pp. 147-190.  See also D. Greneche, P. Rance, and C. Zimmerman, “The Partitioning and 
Transmutation Issue: An Industrial Point of View,” in Proceedings of Global 2001: Back End of the Fuel Cycle: 
From Research to Solutions, Paris, France, September 9-13, 2001 (Paris: Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, 
2001). 
64 In the NEA review, for example, not only was their central estimate for reprocessing the main plutonium-
bearing fuels 2.5 times higher than their estimate for reprocessing LEU LWR fuel, their estimate for 
reprocessing specialty transuranic or minor actinide fuels that might be needed in an accelerator-driven 
transmutation system was 7,000/kgHM, more than 8 times their estimate of the cost of reprocessing in existing 
PUREX facilities.  See NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear 
Fuel Cycles, op. cit., p. 211 and p. 216. 
65 See, for example, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, The Cost of High-Level Waste Disposal in Geologic 
Repositories (Paris, France: OECD/NEA, 1993). 
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absolute magnitude of these costs, as costs that are the same for each fuel cycle do not affect 
the comparison between them. 
 
To estimate the costs of disposal of spent fuel and those of reprocessing wastes, it is 
important first to understand what activities are included.  For either approach, a permanent 
high-level waste repository must be sited, licensed, built, operated, and eventually closed; 
depending on the specific circumstances, more than one such repository in a particular 
country may eventually needed, if nuclear energy is to continue into the future.  In the case of 
direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel, the fuel must be transported to the repository, packaged 
for disposal (often referred to as “encapsulation”), and emplaced in the repository.  In some 
national programs, it is also expected that spent fuel will be conditioned before 
encapsulation, for example by removing the fuel pins from the fuel assemblies to reduce the 
overall fuel volume and the size of the needed final disposal containers.  In the case of 
disposal of reprocessing wastes, canisters of vitrified high-level waste (HLW) must similarly 
be transported to the repository, placed in appropriate waste packages for permanent 
disposal, and emplaced in the repository.  Much of the low-level wastes generated by 
reprocessing can be buried in cheaper low-level waste disposal sites.  For those intermediate-
level wastes contaminated with plutonium and other long-lived species, however—referred 
to in the U.S. waste classification system as transuranic or TRU wastes—disposal in a 
permanent geologic repository, with its attendant costs, is likely to be needed. 
 
Spent Fuel Disposal Costs 
 
The U.S. geologic repository program has prepared some of the most detailed and up-
to-date cost analyses of any program in the world.  The most recent (May, 2001) 
undiscounted cost estimate for the entire U.S. geologic waste disposal program is $57.5 
billion (2000 dollars—$59.8 2003 dollars).66  Of this $57.5 billion total, $41.84 billion is for 
an assumed total of 83,800 tHM of civilian spent fuel (the remainder being for disposal of 
military spent fuel and reprocessing wastes).  In 2003 dollars, this comes to $520/kgHM as 
the total cost of direct disposal of spent fuel.  This is financed by charging utilities a fee of 1 
mill (a tenth of a cent) per kilowatt-hour.  With a burnup of 43,000 megawatt-days per ton of 
heavy metal (MWd/tHM), an efficiency of 33%, four years in the reactor, and the fee 
discounted to time of discharge at a 5% real annual rate, this comes to $370/kgHM (the 
central estimate of spent fuel disposal costs used in this study is $400/kgHM).  With interest 
accumulated over the time between discharge and disposal, this is expected to be sufficient to 
fund the full costs of transport to the repository, encapsulation, and disposal of the spent fuel, 
including all future repository construction and operations costs.67  Indeed, DOE is required 
by law to periodically reassess whether this fee will be sufficient.  (The relatively modest 
difference between the $520/kgHM undiscounted figure and the $370/kgHM figure for 
present value of the cost at time of discharge arises because a substantial portion of the 
                                                 
66 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Analysis of the Total System 
Life Cycle Cost of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program (Washington, DC: DOE, May 2001, 
available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/pm/pdf/tslccr1.pdf).  
67 Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Nuclear Waste Fund Fee Adequacy: An Assessment, 
DOE/RW-0534 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, May 2001, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/documents/feeadr/index.htm).  
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disposal costs—initial repository development and construction, transportation of spent fuel, 
and the like—occurs early on in the program, rather than decades later when the fuel is 
actually emplaced in the repository.) 
 
While in the past, a number of other countries with smaller nuclear power programs 
had projected per-kilogram waste disposal costs far higher than U.S. projected costs, U.S. 
costs have, in essence, grown to match other countries’ estimates.  Sweden, for example, 
which in earlier studies had some of the highest per-kilogram disposal cost estimates in the 
world,68 because of its small nuclear program (with fewer economies of scale), and its plan to 
use of particularly expensive waste packages, released a cost estimate in 1998 that comes to 
$300-$350/kgHM, more or less comparable to the U.S. estimates.69 While it remains possible 
that these total cost estimates will continue to grow in the future, the figure of $400/kgHM 
present value at time of discharge is a reasonable current benchmark for total disposal cost.  
Thus, our central estimate of $200/kgHM as the cost savings for disposal of wastes from 
reprocessing as compared to direct disposal of spent fuel implies that reprocessing would 
reduce waste disposal costs a full 50 percent.  This cost saving would have to rise to almost 
$700/kgHM—far more than current estimates of the total cost of disposal of spent fuel—for 
reprocessing at $1000/kgHM to be economic at a uranium price of $50/kgU. 
 
Factors Affecting Costs of Disposal of Spent Fuel and Reprocessing Wastes 
 
Spent fuel and the wastes that result from reprocessing it differ in a number of ways 
that could affect the costs of their disposal—in volume, in heat generation, in the number of 
waste packages per ton of original spent fuel, in types of materials, in radiotoxicity, and so 
on.  In general, the most important of these variables in determining disposal cost are likely 
to be the heat, the volume or mass, and the number of waste packages to be handled. 
 
Heat.  The heat output from waste packages determines how close to each other they 
can be placed while remaining within the repository’s maximum temperature constraints 
(which in turn are set based on judgments related to the effect of temperature on repository 
performance and behavior of the various materials within the repository).70  Thus, size and 
number of repository tunnels that have to be dug out for a given amount of waste is driven 
not by the waste’s physical volume, but by its heat output.  At thirty years after discharge, the 
heat output from the vitrified HLW from a given amount of spent fuel is about 70% of the 
heat output of the original spent fuel—and the heat output of the HLW declines more rapidly 
than that from the spent fuel thereafter.71  This reduction of almost one-third in heat output at 
                                                 
68 See NEA, The Cost of High-Level Waste Disposal in Geologic Repositories, op. cit. 
69 Cited in Shigekazu Matsuura, Analysis of the History of Cost Evaluation of High-Level Radioactive Waste 
Disposal (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Managing the Atom Project, forthcoming 2003). 
70 See discussion in NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, pp. 323-328.  As 
described there, this appears to apply to both dry repositories (like Yucca Mountain) and wet ones (as planned 
in Sweden and some other countries). 
71 See NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., p. 325.  In fact, this 
comparison is for “actinide free” HLW, whereas HLW from reprocessing as currently practiced includes all of 
the heat-generating minor actinides.  Hence the heat from the HLW for this traditional type of reprocessing 
would be closer to that from spent fuel than this calculation would indicate.  Even at 100 years after discharge 
from the reactor—that is, after more than two more 30-year half-lives of the dominant heat-generating fission 
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30 years may offer much more than 30% packing efficiencies, as (a) some of the thermal 
limits on repository capacity are dependent on integrated long-term heat output, rather than 
on thermal power when first emplaced, and (b) strategies for emplacement of the waste over 
the decades that a repository would be operating could take advantage of the roughly 30-year 
half-life of the thermal power of the HLW (for example leaving spaces between HLW 
packages empty at first, and then filling them decades later when the heat of the original 
packages had declined substantially).  (While a similar strategy could be pursued with spent 
fuel, it does not offer as dramatic a benefit, as the spent fuel cools more slowly.)  Thus, 
particularly if the actinides were removed from reprocessing wastes entirely (as is not the 
case with current reprocessing approaches, but might be if more extensive separations were 
performed in the future as part of a nuclear waste separations and transmutation program), it 
may be possible to multiply by many times the amount of waste a repository of given volume 
could hold.72 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
products—HLW from traditional reprocessing retains roughly half the heat output of spent fuel.  See NEA, The 
Cost of High-Level Waste Disposal in Geologic Repositories, op. cit. 
72 How much more HLW could be disposed in a given volume, if limited only by heat, depends on a wide range 
of factors that go beyond the scope of this study, including repository design (dry vs. wet, actively cooled vs. 
not, what temperature constraints are considered binding, and the like), what radioactive isotopes remain in the 
HLW (e.g., how much americium and curium was in the spent fuel when reprocessed, and whether these go to 
the HLW),, the strategy for emplacing the wastes, and more.  For the Yucca Mountain repository, there are a 
variety of different thermal limits that may be binding in different cases: for example, the constraint on the 
maximum temperature the waste packages may reach limits the thermal power of the waste at the time 
(currently projected as about 75 years) when active cooling would be turned off, which is when this peak 
temperature is likely to occur; by contrast, the constraint on the maximum temperature in the rock between the 
emplacement tunnels is limited more by the total heat output over the first couple of millennia after 
emplacement.  These constraints therefore have very different effects on spent fuel and on HLW with actinides 
that dominate heat after the first 100 years removed.  One early treatment of this subject estimated that in a dry 
repository such as Yucca Mountain, removing the actinides and leaving only fission products, combined with 
clever approaches to emplacing the wastes over time to take advantage of the 30-year half-life of the dominant 
fission products, could increase repository capacity by 4-9 times compared to disposal of unreprocessed spent 
fuel.  See Lawrence D. Ramspott et al., Impacts of New Developments in Partitioning and Transmutation on the 
Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste in a Mined Geologic Repositor, UCRL-ID-109203 (Livermore, CA: 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, March 1992), pp. 7-5-7-11; NAS, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for 
Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., p. 325 estimates a factor of 4-5, including HLW emplacement 
strategies that take advantage of the cooling over time, compared to an “aggressive” schedule for emplacement 
of unreprocessed spent fuel; a more recent study, using a repository model based on the current design of Yucca 
Mountain, with active cooling finds that waste from 3.2-3.4 times as much spent fuel could be emplaced in each 
length of tunnel if 99-99.9% of the actinides were removed.  This estimate assumes all the waste is emplaced at 
once (hence does not use an emplacement strategy taking advantage of the cooling of the HLW over time), and 
it is clear from the analysis that, in addition to the 3-fold increase in linear loading in the tunnels, the tunnels 
could also be placed closer together while meeting the criterion that the space between them must remain below 
the boiling point of water, so the total factor by which capacity could be increased might be as much as 10 or 
more.  See Roald A. Wigeland, Theodore H. Bauer, Thomas H. Fanning, and Edgar E. Morris, Repository 
Benefit Analyses – Series I Impact, ANL-AFCI-089 (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory, August 2003).  
Only if the major heat-generating fission products (cesium and strontium) are allowed to decay before 
emplacement (which could be accomplished by an additional separation focused on managing these 
radionuclides separately, or simply by delaying disposal of the HLW from processing by some 300 years) can 
the even larger packing factors that are sometimes discussed be achieved, such as the factor of 20-59 for 90-
99.9% efficient separations of the major heat generating species estimated in Wigeland et al. 
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There are, however, a wide variety of strategies other than reprocessing that could be 
pursued to increase repository capacity—allowing longer storage periods before 
emplacement, expanding the area covered by a given repository, adding a second or third 
emplacement layer, mixing older and newer spent fuel, and the like.  These approaches could 
provide alternative means of expanding the available repository volume within fixed 
temperature limits.  At the same time, these other approaches can be complements to, rather 
than alternatives to, the heat reduction offered by disposing of HLW rather than spent fuel.73 
 
In repositories in geologic media such as the volcanic tuff of Yucca Mountain, the 
cost of digging additional tunnels is a relatively modest part of the overall waste disposal 
program cost.  Even in hard rock repositories, this cost is not very large.  In the 1987 U.S. 
document laying out the method for calculating the assignment of costs to different types of 
waste, for example, the portion of the cost related to the “areal dispersion” of the waste 
within the repository—driven by the heat output—came to only 10-17% of the total waste 
program cost (depending in part on whether the envisioned repository was to be in hard rock, 
granite, tuff, or salt).74  In the latest design of the Yucca Mountain repository, the amount of 
area that had to be covered by the expensive titanium drip shield would also be related to the 
spacing of the packages and thus to the heat.  (In the latest cost estimate, the entire cost of 
actual underground construction at the repository and of the drip shield—the two cost 
elements most determined by heat—comes to 19% of total waste disposal program cost.)75  
Thus, if considers the costs that do not change with the type of fuel emplaced are fixed, even 
a four-fold improvement in the amount of waste that could be packed into a given area of the 
repository would only result in a 7-13% overall cost reduction.  If, on the other hand, one 
assumes that the total cost does not change with the type and amount of waste, a four-fold 
packing improvement would imply a 75% reduction in unit cost, at least for those waste 
program costs related to the repository itself (as opposed to the manufacture of the waste 
packages, transport to the repository, and the like). 
 
For the United States, which has chosen a repository site in a mountain with fixed 
sides (and therefore a limit on the ultimately available capacity), a substantial packing 
improvement would also lead to a large increase in the amount of nuclear energy that could 
be generated before taking on the political uncertainties and economic costs of building 
another repository. Some have argued that the cost of a second repository would likely be 
significantly higher than the cost of the first, and is in any case highly uncertain—and that 
therefore a substantial uncertainty premium should be factored in to the cost of disposal if the 
United States is going to continue to rely on direct disposal of spent fuel.76  While siting and 
building a second repository in the United States would certainly be a task fraught with 
uncertainities, we would argue that (a) a second repository is likely to be cheaper than the 
first, per unit of capacity (though politically controversial), given the extensive experience 
                                                 
73 See discussion in Ramspott et al., Impacts of New Developments in Partitioning and Transmutation, op. cit. 
74 “Civilian Radioactive Waste Management: Calculating Nuclear Waste Fund Disposal Fees for Department of 
Energy Defense Program Waste: Notice,” Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 161, August 20, 1987, pp. 31,507-
31,524. 
75 OCRWM, Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost, op. cit. The drip shield is expected to cost $4.8 
billion (p. B-1), and subsurface construction and emplacement operations combined $6.1 billion (p. A-2), out of 
$57.5 billion total program cost.  
76 Per Peterson, personal communication, August 2003. 
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developed in analyzing, licensing, building, and operating the first facility; (b) even with 
continued reliance on direct disposal, it is very likely that the capacity of the first repository 
can be extended sufficiently to be adequate for many decades to come (for example, by 
adding one or more additional emplacement levels, extending the area of the repository, and 
the like); and (c) the political, technical, and cost uncertainties involved in proposals for 
advanced separations and transmutation are at least as large, and probably larger, than those 
involved in continued reliance on direct disposal—meaning that any risk premium that might 
be considered should be added to both approaches, not just to direct disposal.  (See 
“Reprocessing to Reduce the Need for Additional Repositories,” p. 64.) 
 
An important point to keep in mind when considering issues related to heat output is 
that the uranium and plutonium separated by reprocessing do not simply disappear, but are 
returned to the fuel cycle.  Most countries today are recycling plutonium only once, because 
of the buildup of undesirable isotopes in plutonium in spent MOX fuel.  If spent MOX fuel is 
to be disposed of in geologic repositories, its heat output is dramatically higher than the 
output of spent LEU fuel (over 2,200 watts per ton of heavy metal for MOX fuel of 43 
MWd/tHM burnup 50 years after disposal, compared to just over 700 w/tHM for LEU fuel of 
comparable burnup and storage time).77  Indeed, the total heat output from the combination 
of HLW from reprocessing and disposal of MOX spent fuel is higher, per unit of electricity 
generated, than the total heat output from the LEU spent fuel from a direct disposal fuel 
cycle.78  Even if the MOX spent fuel is recycled continuously in a “self-generated recycle” 
mode, so that no spent fuel is ever disposed of, the total heat output from the HLW from that 
fuel cycle is still higher than the once-through heat, per unit of electricity generated, for the 
first 50 years after discharge from the reactor.79  (This results from the buildup of long-lived, 
heat-generating actinides such as americium and curium.)  Only if the recycling soon 
switches to fast-neutron reactors or more complete separation and transmutation of the 
wastes would the near-term heat output from the HLW be less than from spent fuel from a 
once-through cycle. 
 
Thus, reprocessing and recycle as traditionally practiced would likely increase, not 
decrease, the heat-determined waste disposal costs. A future separations and transmutation 
program might substantially decrease total per-kilogram repository costs, but at the expense 
of reprocessing and recycle costs estimated in the most recent official studies to be much 
higher than those discussed in this chapter.  A recent review concluded that currently 
envisioned approaches to separations and transmutation would multiply total fuel cycle costs 
several fold, increasing total nuclear electricity generation costs by 10-50 percent.80 
 
Volume.  The physical volume of the wastes to be disposed of affects waste package 
costs (though as noted above it does not determine the needed repository volume).  In the 
case of the U.S. Yucca Mountain repository, the costs of waste packages amounts to 15% of 
                                                 
77 Calculations by Jungmin Kang, using ORIGEN software.  Personal communication. 
78 See Brian G. Chow and Gregory S. Jones, Managing Wastes With and Without Plutonium Separation, Report 
P-8035 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999). 
79 Ibid.  This is because of the buildup of heat-generating minor actinides in the HLW as the plutonium is 
recycled multiple times. 
80 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit. 
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the total waste program costs.81 In some other repository designs (such as the Swedish and 
Finnish designs), the waste packages may be even more expensive and represent a larger 
total fraction of cost.  Waste package cost will not scale linearly down as the volume of waste 
contained gets smaller, however: a substantial fraction of the waste package cost is devoted 
to having a waste package robust enough to prevent radionuclides from getting out for 
thousands of years, and this involves a substantial fixed cost even for a relatively small 
volume of contained material. Volume (and mass) presumably also affect transportation 
costs, which account for another 10% of total project costs in the U.S. case.  The volume of 
vitrified HLW waste containers with no final waste package around them is roughly one 
quarter the volume of the spent fuel the HLW came from, also with no final waste package 
included.  When the volume of the waste packages for each type of waste is included, the 
total volume per ton of original heavy metal in fuel ranges from roughly equal to roughly half 
as large for the HLW; this is presumably the better comparison, if the concern is the cost of 
fabricating and transporting the necessary volume of waste packages.  (See sidebar, “Volume 
of Wastes From Direct Disposal and Reprocessing.”)  If ILW that also requires permanent 
geologic disposal is included, the volumes are actually larger for reprocessing wastes—but if 
spent fuel and HLW waste packages are expensive, one would expect that ILW would be put 
in cheaper, less impressive packages.    If spent fuel and HLW waste packages are expensive, 
however, presumably ILW will be put in less impressive packages.  Hence, it is reasonable to 
think that the smaller volume of reprocessing wastes might reduce these aspects of disposal 
costs by as much as 50 percent. 
 
Number of packages and canisters.  There are some costs which are associated with 
the sheer number of “piece parts” that must be handled—fuel assemblies or HLW canisters to 
be loaded into waste packages, waste packages to be emplaced, and the like.  Where the 
advantage lies here depends on the design of HLW canisters and waste packages; in general, 
since each canister of HLW glass typically contains HLW from reprocessing somewhat more 
than one fuel assembly, one might expect a modestly lower number of packages for HLW 
than for spent fuel.  In the 1987 U.S. analysis of cost allocation for the U.S. repository, costs 
driven by “piece count” represented approximately 10% of total program costs.82 The real 
number is presumably higher than this, as this figure did not include costs that were directly 
assignable to spent fuel or HLW, such as the costs of packaging and transportation, many of 
which may be significantly affected by the number of items to be handled.  One of the most 
explicit recent studies on this point is a paper by NIREX, the UK radioactive waste 
management organization (based on a study for the European Union) which estimates that 
each HLW waste package would hold 2 canisters of HLW glass, each containing the HLW 
from reprocessing roughly 1.2 tHM of spent fuel, so that for reprocessing, there would be .8 
HLW canisters and .4 waste packages per ton of heavy metal; for disposal of LEU spent fuel, 
there would be 4 PWR fuel assemblies (containing 461 kgHM each) per waste package, so 
that for this approach there would be 2.2 fuel assemblies and .54 waste packages per ton of 
heavy metal.  Overall, the reduction in the number of items to be handled might reduce these 
                                                 
81 The waste packages and drip shields together cost $13.29 billion, but $4.8 of this is the drip shield, as noted 
earlier. See OCRWM, Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost, op. cit., p. A-2. 
82 “Civilian Radioactive Waste Management,” Federal Register, op. cit. 
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piece-count related costs by something like 30%.83  Here, too, the increased heat from MOX 
spent fuel would come into play, if it was to be disposed of after one recycling, as NIREX 
has also estimated that the intense heat from MOX spent fuel would reduce the amount of 
spent fuel that could be put in each waste package four-fold, driving up the number of waste 
packages to be handled. 
 
Costs from ILW and LLW management. All of these potential cost reductions from 
disposing of HLW from reprocessing rather than of spent fuel, however, come at the price of 
having to incur the costs of managing ILW and LLW from reprocessing.  As noted in the box 
on waste volumes, this may be addressed through substitution, which would increase 
volumes of HLW returned to customers (and their corresponding costs per ton of original 
spent fuel) by about 20%.  (If this is not addressed through substitution, the costs to the 
customers for transporting and disposing of the LLW and ILW are expected to be still 
higher.) 
 
Likely Reductions in Cost for Disposing of Reprocessing Wastes 
 
 We can get a rough idea as to how much the total disposal cost per kilogram might be 
reduced by reprocessing by dividing the total disposal program cost estimate described above 
into components that are affected in different ways by heat, volume, or number of packages 
(or not affected by any of these), and then, for each of these categories, assigning a notional 
reduction factor for the disposal of reprocessing wastes rather than direct disposal of spent 
fuel.  This breakdown of costs by category will vary depending on the specific disposal 
program design.  For the U.S. program (which has published the most detailed cost 
information), a notional breakdown might be that (a) the elements that are significantly 
driven by repository size, and therefore by heat output from the wastes, would include 
repository construction and fabrication of the drip shield (which must be large enough to 
cover the whole area where waste packages are emplaced); (b) the elements significantly 
driven by volume, mass, or number of waste packages would include repository 
emplacement operations and monitoring, waste package fabrication, and transportation; and 
(c) the cost elements unrelated to whether the waste emplaced is spent fuel or HLW would 
include siting, licensing, design and engineering, and the like.  These distinctions, of course, 
are by no means absolute: the cost of fabricating waste packages, for example, may well be 
affected not only by the volume of the material the packages are to contain, but to a modest 
degree by its heat generation as well.  This breakdown is shown in table 2.2, which indicates 
that the items related to heat constitute 19% of the most recent $57.5 billion cost estimate; 
those related to volume, mass, or number of items 53%; and those not related to type of 
material emplaced 28%. 
 
Neglecting the extra heat from MOX fuel that would arise in traditional reprocessing 
approaches, we have notionally assigned a four-fold reduction factor for those items related 
to heat, or not related to type of material emplaced (corresponding to a potential four-fold 
increase in the amount of fuel that could be emplaced in the repository), and a 50% reduction 
                                                 
83 “Scoping Assessment of Implications of Reprocessing Scenarios for Disposal Options: Paper to RWMAC 
[Royal Waste Management Advisory Committee],” NIREX Doc. 334004 (London, UK: United Kingdom Nirex 
Limited, May 2000). 
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factor for those items related to volume, mass, or number of packages (which is somewhat 
generous on the basis of the volume discussions above and in the accompanying sidebar).  
All costs, however, are also assumed to be multiplied by 1.2, to reflect the larger amount of 
HLW returned to customers due to substitution (or, if substitution does not occur, due to the 
extra costs of managing ILW and LLW from reprocessing).  Overall, this results in an 
estimate of total cost for disposal of HLW rather than spent fuel that is reduced by some 
45%. 
 
 This corresponds very well with our central estimate of $200/kgHM for disposal of 
reprocessing wastes, compared to $400/kgHM for disposal of spent fuel—that is, a 50% 
savings for disposal of reprocessing wastes.  Given the very large uncertainties in such 
estimates, we have used a range from a difference of $100/kgHM (25% savings) to 
$300/kgHM (75% savings). 
 
 
Table 2.3.  Notional Cost Reduction for Disposal of Reprocessing Wastes (Billions) 
 
Cost Category 
2001 
Estimate 
Percent of 
Total 
Reduction 
Factor 
Reprocessing 
Waste Cost 
Significantly Driven By Heat 
Repository 
Construction 
$6.1 0.25*1.2 $1.8 
Drip Shield $4.8 
 
19% 
0.25*1.2 $1.4 
Significantly Driven By Volume, Mass, or Packages 
Repository Operation $4.9 0.5*1.2 $2.9 
Waste Package $8.5 0.5*1.2 $5.1 
Monitoring $5.9 0.5*1.2 $3.5 
Surface Operations $4.9 0.5*1.2  $2.9 
Transportation $6.0 
 
 
53% 
0.5*1.2 $3.6 
Not Affected By Waste Type 
Other Costs $16.4 28% 0.25*1.2 $4.9 
Total $57.5 100% 0.46 $26.3 
     
 
 In our reference case we have assumed equal costs for the geological disposal of 
spent LEU and MOX fuels of the same discharge burnup.84 If, as seems likely, the greater 
heat output of spent MOX fuel render its disposal more expensive than equivalent spent LEU 
fuel, then the economics of reprocessing and recycle become even less attractive. For 
                                                 
84 In the breakeven case, equal disposal costs is economically equivalent to reprocessing of spent MOX fuel, 
although we have not made adjustments for the isotopic composition of the plutonium in spent MOX fuel, 
which would be less valuable. 
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example, if disposal of spent MOX costs $400/kgHM more than spent LEU (i.e., double the 
reference value of $400/kgHM for LEU), the breakeven uranium price would increase by 
$26/kgU. 
 
Results of other studies. Unfortunately, most recent studies of disposal costs are 
country-specific, and focus on one option or the other, making direct comparisons between 
direct disposal of spent fuel and disposal of reprocessing wastes difficult.  A 1993 OECD-
NEA study, however, compared the estimated repository costs for many countries 
(considering only the encapsulation and disposal costs, not the siting, licensing, and 
transportation costs), and found that the weighted average cost was $144/kgHM for direct 
disposal (in then-year dollars), and $82/kgHM (43% less) for disposal of HLW.85  Obviously 
total costs have increased substantially since then, but this percentage difference is very close 
to that estimated by different methods above. 
 
A recent study by NIREX, the UK nuclear waste organization, calculated a rather 
high total cost for HLW disposal of $770/kgHM (though the incremental cost of additional 
HLW disposal was much lower).86 The total cost of direct disposal of LWR spent fuel was 
not estimated, but NIREX estimates that the quantity of spent fuel that could be emplaced per 
unit area of the repository would be only 12% less than the quantity of HLW that could be 
emplaced.  The amount of MOX that could be placed in each tunnel would be four-fold less, 
because of its greater heat generation.87 By contrast, a recent French study offers 
substantially more optimistic figures for the costs of disposal of both spent fuel and HLW 
than those used here—some $130/kgHM for direct disposal of LEU spent fuel, and just under 
$80/kgHM for disposal of vitrified HLW.  That study also estimated that costs for disposal of 
MOX fuel would be dramatically higher, some $1,200/kgHM, because of its higher heat 
generation (even at a lower burnup than the LEU, and after storage for 150 years before 
disposal rather than 50 in the case of LEU).88  The difference between HLW and spent fuel 
                                                 
85 OECD/NEA 1994, op. cit., pp. 149-152, providing additional analysis of the data from OECD/NEA 1993, op. 
cit. 
86 NIREX, “Scoping Assessment,” op. cit., estimates £2.633 billion (1999 money values) for a repository to 
hold 710 cubic meters of HLW, with each tHM of spent fuel resulting in 0.12 cubic meters of HLW.  Converted 
to dollars at a 3-year currency exchange rate average and inflated to 2003 dollars using GDP deflators. 
87 NIREX, “Response to Questions Raised Based on Reference 334004,” letter to Mike Sadnicki, November 22, 
2000.  This document shows that each 500-ft tunnel could hold 192.24 tHM of spent fuel, or 26 cubic meters of 
vitrified HLW (with .12 cubic meters for each tHM of spent fuel reprocessed). 
88 These estimates were provided by the French radioactive waste management organization, ANDRA, as inputs 
to Jean-Michel Charpin, Benjamin Dessus, and René Pellat, Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power 
Option (Paris, France: Office of the Prime Minister, July 2000, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://fire.pppl.gov/eu_fr_fission_plan.pdf).  Per-kilogram figures for LEU disposal and MOX disposal are 
provided in the study itself (F 850,000/tHM for LEU, F 3.8 million/tHM for MOX), on p. 214.  The HLW 
figure in the text comes from Marignac, “Briefing: Results of the `Charpin-Dessus-Pellat’ Mission Economic 
Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option” op. cit., p. 7. As noted earlier, Marignac was one of two authors 
of the supporting study on the economics of the existing nuclear power infrastructure in France.  Marignac’s 
figure of 4.2 million/m3 for HLW was converted at .12 m3/tHM.  (Marignac offers higher figures for what is 
translated as “storage,” but from context clearly includes disposal, of LEU and MOX spent fuel, of F1.8 
million/tHM for LEU and F 7.8 million/tHM for MOX; this difference is not explained, but may relate to 
including interim storage and transport in Marignac’s figures, but not in the figures in the main report.  Using 
Marignac’s figures for LEU disposal rather than those in the main report would put the difference between LEU 
and HLW disposal in the range of our $200/kgHM central estimate.) 
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disposal in this French study is much less than we assume, because the total prices for each 
are much less than we assume: the roughly 40 percent reduction in cost for disposal of HLW 
in the French study is similar in percentage terms to our central estimate. 
 
A recent review of future fuel cycle options by a group advising the U.S. Department 
of Energy estimated a cost of $300/kgHM (2000 dollars) for conditioning and disposal of 
spent fuel (with a range from $130-$500/kgHM), compared to $200/kgHM for conditioning 
and disposal of vitrified HLW (with a range from $80/kgHM to $310/kgHM).89  This 
estimate is consistent with the low end of our range for the difference in cost between 
disposal of spent fuel and disposal of HLW.   An NEA review of transmutation technologies 
that included cost estimates for various elements of the fuel cycle provided central estimates 
of $210,000/m3 for spent fuel conditioning and disposal, compared to $400,000/m3 for HLW 
disposal (2000 dollars).  If these are converted based on the volume of each type of waste 
encased in a waste package (using, to be conservative, a high figure of 2 m3/tHM for that 
volume in the case of spent fuel, and the lowest figure for HLW discussed in the volumes 
sidebar, 0.8 m3/tHM), they come to $420/kgHM for spent fuel and $320/kgHM for HLW), 
with a difference of $100/kgHM, again at the low end of our range.90 
 
While the U.S. program has a legal requirement to assign costs fairly between spent 
fuel and reprocessing wastes, nonetheless current U.S. data do not provide a very good 
answer as to the relative costs of direct disposal of spent fuel vs. disposal of reprocessing 
wastes, as the fuel reprocessed to produce the U.S. HLW was low-burnup plutonium 
production reactor fuel, and working out the “comparable” number of kilograms of 
commercial spent fuel corresponding to the HLW in each canister is nearly impossible.  In 
1998, however, the program did provide data on the costs for disposal of HLW from the 
small amount of commercial reprocessing that took place at West Valley in the United States: 
this came to approximately $165 million for 640 tons of fuel reprocessed, or approximately 
$260/kgHM.91  If that estimate is increased proportionally with the total repository cost 
estimate in its 2001 version, the total would be approximately $320/kgHM (2003 dollars)—
just over 60% of the average spent fuel disposal cost calculated above.  This HLW, of course, 
                                                 
89 Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, op. cit. p. A2-6. 
90 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 211 and p. 214.  The NEA study compares the volume of vitrified HLW canisters without packages for final 
disposal to the volume of spent fuel with packages for final disposal, and therefore concludes in the text that the 
volume of HLW from reprocessing is “four to ten times lower” than the volume of spent fuel—but in the 
footnote where the actual calculation is performed, they inexplicably use the low end of their volume range for 
HLW and the high end for spent fuel, resulting in the HLW having a volume 17 times less than the spent fuel, 
rather than four to ten times less.  As a result, their per-kilogram estimates are $420/kgHM for spent fuel, and 
$46/kgHM for HLW—a ten-fold difference that in-depth analysis of the impact of different types of waste on 
disposal program costs would not be able to sustain.  Using the “four to ten times lower” figure in their text, the 
cost for HLW disposal, if the cost for spent fuel disposal was $420/kgHM, would be $80-$200/kgHM, with the 
upper bound identical to our estimate.  
91 Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost of the 
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW-0510 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Energy, December 1998), p. 37, inflated to 2003 dollars.  640 tHM reprocessed at West Valley from U.S. 
Department of Energy, Ohio Field Office, West Valley Demonstration Project, “The West Valley Nuclear 
Timeline,” available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.wv.doe.gov/linkingpages/sitehistory.htm.  
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has been cooling for decades, and originated from relatively low-burnup spent fuel, so it 
should have a larger-than-average cost advantage. 
 
 Estimates of waste management costs decades in the future will almost certainly be 
different from what they are today.  Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the qualitative 
factors affecting the relative balance between the costs of direct disposal of spent fuel and the 
costs of disposal of reprocessing wastes will change dramatically.  Our range from $100-
$300/kgHM of cost savings for disposal of reprocessing wastes—from 25% to 75% of the 
currently estimated total cost of disposal of spent fuel—seems quite likely to contain the real 
value. 
 
Interim Storage: Postponing the Costs of Either Approach 
 
Whether a reactor operator chooses reprocessing or direct disposal for spent fuel, 
costs can be reduced by storing the spent fuel for decades before it is either disposed of or 
reprocessed, allowing the funds set aside for these purposes to accrue interest.  (As discussed 
above, the accrual of interest is the reason why it is possible to finance the U.S. repository 
program at a charge of a tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour generated.)  Since interim storage 
in dry casks can be continued for decades at very little operational cost, utilities can save 
substantial sums by postponing near-term spent fuel management costs to the long term, 
thereby leaving all options open and leaving time for technology to develop further and 
choices to become clearer.  This may help explain why the preponderance of the spent fuel 
generated every year around the world remains in storage, neither reprocessed nor buried in a 
geologic repository.  As legal and political obstacles to dry cask storage are overcome, 
providing a viable alternative for spent fuel management, fewer and fewer utilities are likely 
to be willing to pay the extra costs of near-term reprocessing. 
 
2.5.4.  Costs and Prices for Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication and Use 
 
The principal cost of using plutonium recovered from reprocessing as fuel is the fuel 
fabrication.  Like reprocessing, fabricating plutonium into uranium-plutonium mixed oxide 
(MOX) fuel is expensive, because it requires large capital-intensive facilities with significant 
numbers of highly trained personnel.  It is substantially more expensive than fabricating fuel 
from low-enriched uranium (LEU), primarily because of the safety requirements resulting 
from the much higher radioactivity of the plutonium, and also because of the greater 
safeguards and security requirements when handling weapons-usable material such as 
separated plutonium.  As with reprocessing, the industry is dominated by a small number of 
firms (COGEMA, BNFL, and Belgonucléaire), and virtually no official information on costs 
and prices is made public.  Here again, therefore, we have relied on what little information is 
publicly available from the firms themselves, combined with industry, government, and press 
reports. 
 
Costs 
 
Most recent reports of capital costs for large MOX plants cover a fairly narrow range.  
Again, because of the public controversies over it, of the operating facilities most is known 
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about BNFL’s Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP), designed for a capacity of 120 tHM/yr.  SMP is 
officially estimated to have cost £300 million to build,92 or some $540 million in 2003 
dollars.  When the cost of financing SMP over the prolonged construction period and the 
subsequent delays in gaining approval are included, SMP was valued at £462 million in 
BNFL’s accounts as of March 2000,93 or about $750 million 2003 dollars.  Similarly, 
Siemens’ 120 tHM/yr plant at Hanau, Germany, which was built and never operated, 
reportedly cost DM 1 billion to build (a figure that appears to include interest during 
construction), or roughly $750 million in 2003 dollars.94  Estimates of the construction cost 
of the COGEMA’s MELOX plant are not publicly available.  Similarly, in 1993, the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that the overnight cost of building a facility with a 
nameplate capacity of 100 tHM/yr in the United States would be $440 million (1992 dollars), 
or just under $550 million in 2003 dollars.95 
 
Current capital cost estimates for planned new plants in Japan and the United States 
are substantially higher, however.  The overnight cost of building a MOX plant in the United 
States for disposition of excess weapons plutonium is currently estimated at over $1 billion 
(not counting over $300 million in R&D and pre-capital expenses, or some $500 million 
allocated for contingencies).96  A portion of the capital and operating cost of this facility will 
go to purifying the weapons plutonium to remove gallium and other impurities before it can 
be fabricated into MOX fuel; even if this cost represented 30% of the total, however, the 
plant would still have an overnight cost of some $700 million, substantially more than that of 
the Sellafield plant.  Similarly, the Rokkasho MOX Plant (RMP) in Japan, with a planned 
capacity of 130 tHM/yr, is expected to cost 120 billion yen (roughly $1 billion 2003 dollars). 
 
Operating costs at existing MOX plants have not been published.  A group of 
independent analysts critical of BNFL has estimated the operating costs of SMP, if operating 
at 100 tHM/yr, at roughly $50 million per year (2003 dollars).97  This is consistent with an 
industry analysis which concluded that operations costs in a large industrial MOX facility of 
this kind would amount to some $560/kgHM (2003 dollars)—roughly $56 million per year at 
the same production rate.98  The $50 million/yr figure is also consistent with the low end of 
                                                 
92 See UK Environment Agency, Radioactive Substances Act 1993: Document Containing the Agency’s 
Proposed Decision on the Justification For the Plutonium Commissioning and Full Operation of the Mixed 
Oxide Fuel Plant (London, UK: UK Environment Agency, October 1998). 
93 See British Nuclear Fuels Limited, The Economic and Commercial Justification for the Sellafield MOX Plant 
(SMP) (Sellafield, UK: March 2001). 
94 See, for example, Mark Hibbs, “Utilities End Hanau MOX Support; Bonn Now Angling for Russian Pu,” 
Nuclear Fuel, July 6, 1995. 
95 See National Academy of Sciences, Panel on Reactor-Related Options, Management and Disposition of 
Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor Related Options (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1995), p. 
297. 
96 National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Report to Congress: 
Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site (Washington, D.C.: NNSA, February 15, 
2002, available as of  December 16, 2003 at http://www.nci.org/pdf/doe-pu-2152002.pdf), pp. 5-9. 
97 Mike Sadnicki, Fred Barker, and Gordon MacKerron, Re-Examination of the Economic Case for the 
Sellafield MOX Plant (Brighton, UK: Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, May 2000), p. 21.  
Their estimate was £14.7 million annually in fixed operating cost, plus £0.157/tHM in variable cost (2000 
money values). 
98 Nigel Mote, “The Commercial Use of Mixed-Oxide Fuel in Light-Water Reactors,” presented at “U.S.-
Department of Energy-RF Ministry of Atomic Energy Experts Workshop: Costing Methodologies for Economic 
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an NEA estimate that the operating costs of such facilities are in the range of 10-25% of their 
capital costs.99 The 1993 DOE estimate cited above estimated annual operating costs 
(including an annuity for decommissioning) at $76 million per year (2003 dollars), also 
consistent with the low-to-mid section of the NEA range.100  The operating costs for the 
planned U.S. MOX plant, however, are expected to be higher, in the range of $100 million 
per year (2003 dollars).101  If 30% of this figure were for the operations of the facility to 
purify the weapons plutonium, not needed for a commercial facility, then this figure would 
be consistent with the 1993 DOE estimate.  As with reprocessing, there will be additional 
costs for interest during construction, start-up, refurbishment, and decommissioning. 
 
MOX plants generally do not produce at their full licensed capacity all the time.  If a 
plant with the officially reported capital cost of SMP and the $560/kgHM operating cost 
reported in the industry study succeeded in producing 100 tHM/yr throughout a 30-year life, 
then the fabrication cost (with assumptions similar to those above for reprocessing plants, 
except for a six-year construction time rather than a ten-year construction time) for a 
government-financed facility would be in the range of $1010/kgHM; for a regulated private 
facility with a guaranteed rate of return, roughly $1460/kgHM; and for a private facility with 
no guaranteed rate of return, approximately $2140/kgHM.102  Transport of the resulting 
                                                                                                                                                       
Evaluation of Utilization Options of Weapons Plutonium from Defense Programs in the Course of Nuclear 
Disarmament,” Obninsk, Russia, May 12-14, 1999.  This figure includes plant operations and transport of 
uranium and plutonium to the MOX plant, but not transport of the resulting MOX fuel to the reactor. 
99 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 215. 
100 NAS, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor Related Options, op. cit., p. 297. 
101 NNSA, Report to Congress: Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site, op. cit., pp. 
5-9 (dividing their total operations by 13 years of full-scale operations and inflating to 2003 dollars). 
102 These figures assume, in addition to the capital cost for SMP described in the text, and an operating cost of 
$560/kgHM: (a) a 6-year construction time; (b) an annual refurbishment cost of 1% of overnight capital cost; 
(c) property taxes and insurance for the private facilities of 2% of overnight capital cost; (d) an annuity for 
decommissioning, with decommissioning costing 30% of overnight capital cost, and occurring 20 years after the 
30-year operational life of the plant, and funds set aside in a fund that generates a 3% real interest rate, resulting 
in a decommissioning charge of roughly $19/kgHM; (e) continuous operation at 100 tHM/yr throughout the 30-
year life of the plant; and (f) startup costs equal to one year of operations costs.  As in the case of reprocessing 
plants, annual fixed charge rates are assumed to be 5.8% for government financing, 10.3% for a private entity 
with a guaranteed rate of return, and 18.8% for a private entity with no guarantee of revenues—plus 2%, as just 
noted, for property taxes and insurance in the case of the private facilities.  Describing the spend-out of funds 
during the six-year construction time with the beta-binomial S-curve described in Appendix A, and assuming 
real rates for interest during construction (IDC) of 4%, 6.4%, and 9% for the government-owned, regulated-
utility-owned, and private-venture-owned cases, respectively, leads to adding 11.5%, 19%, and 27.4% to the 
overnight construction costs to find the total capital cost including interest during construction.  Thus for a 
government-owned facility, the total capital cost, including overnight cost, IDC, and startup costs, would be 
roughly $660 million; the annual capital contribution to the revenue requirement would be roughly $38 million; 
and the capital contribution to per-kilogram cost would be just over $380/kgHM.  Adding $560/kgHM in 
operations cost would bring the per-kilogram cost to some $940/kgHM, and refurbishment and 
decommissioning set-asides would bring the total to some $1010/kgHM.    For a facility owned by a regulated 
utility, the total capital cost would be roughly $700 million, contributing an annual revenue requirement of 
nearly $72 million, or nearly $720/kgHM; operating, refurbishment, and decommissioning costs are assumed to 
be the same, but there would also be a cost of some $110/kgHM for property taxes and insurance, bringing total 
costs to some $1460/kgHM.  For a facility owned by a private venture without a regulated rate of return, the 
total capital cost would be over $740 million, the annual revenue requirement would be roughly $140 million, 
the capital contribution to per-kilogram cost would be $1400/kgHM, and the total MOX fabrication cost would 
  
48 ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
 
MOX fuel to the reactor will be significantly more expensive than transport of equivalent 
LEU (because of the additional safety and security issues involved in transporting MOX), 
and might add $120/kgHM to these figures,103 for totals of $1130 (government), $1580 
(regulated), or $2260 (private unregulated). 
 
These costs apply for large fabrication campaigns of fuel of the same design.  When a 
customer needs only a modest amount of MOX fuel, using different design parameters from 
those used by other customers, then the plant has to be shut down to change over more 
frequently, and throughput suffers.  This is among the reasons why, as described below, 
prices reported by German and Swiss utilities (generally buying MOX in much smaller lots 
than the giant French utility, Eléctricité de France) are generally substantially higher.  As 
with reprocessing, economies of scale also have their effect: fabrication in small, less 
automated facilities such as the Belgonucléaire plant or COGEMA’s Caderache plant is 
significantly more expensive than fabrication in large, automated facilities.  Per-kilogram 
costs would increase substantially if demand were not sufficient to keep the plant fully 
booked, so that the fixed costs of capital and operations have to be spread over a smaller 
number of kilograms of fuel.104 
 
In many cases, there are additional costs to a reactor operator associated with using 
MOX fuel rather than LEU fuel, which, to be conservative, we have not included in this 
analysis.  First, MOX fuel is often licensed to lower burnups than LEU fuel; in countries 
where this is the case, reactor operators with MOX fuel in part of their reactors will have to 
shut down for refueling more often than if they were using only LEU.  Second, since fresh 
MOX fuel contains weapons-usable plutonium, after the fuel arrives at a reactor site and 
before it is loaded into a reactor, it typically requires more security than would fresh LEU 
fuel, imposing additional costs.  (In some cases, however, the fresh MOX fuel is simply 
placed in the pool with the spent fuel until it is loaded, without any additional facilities or 
security arrangements, on the assumption that it would be difficult and dangerous for 
attackers to attempt to remove it from the pool.)  Third, in a number of countries there are 
substantial political concerns over the use of MOX (which in some cases may require, for 
example, additional payments to local communities), and additional licensing requirements 
for reactors wishing to use both MOX and LEU fuels.  Hence, the market value of a kilogram 
of MOX fuel, if there were an open market allowing utilities to choose their fuels, would not 
be the same as that of a kilogram of LEU fuel of equivalent energy value, as assumed here, 
but rather would be significantly less.  In the case of the U.S. program for disposition of 
excess weapons plutonium, for example, to convince any U.S. utilities to use this fuel 
required offering it at a price some 40% below the price of LEU fuel of equivalent energy 
                                                                                                                                                       
be roughly $2140/kgHM.   As described above in the case of reprocessing plants, assumptions on fixed charge 
rates, refurbishment, property insurance, and taxes, are drawn from Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for 
Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., pp. 413-445; assumptions on decommissioning are drawn from 
BNFL’s own assumptions in OECD/NEA, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit., p. 114. 
103 This is the figure, converted to 2003 dollars, cited in Mote, “The Commercial Use of Mixed-Oxide Fuel in 
Light-Water Reactors,” op. cit. 
104 Whether there will be sufficient demand for SMP’s services to allow the plant to break even (treating its 
initial capital cost as sunk) has been a substantial source of controversy between BNFL and its critics.  See, for 
example, Sadnicki, Barker, and MacKerron, Re-Examination of the Economic Case for the Sellafield MOX 
Plant, op. cit. 
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value105—equivalent to increasing the net fabrication price for the MOX fuel by several 
hundred dollars per kilogram.  In addition, we have assumed a reprocessing and recycling 
system that is operating efficiently and in balance—so that there are no charges for storage of 
separated plutonium, or for separation of the americium that builds up if separated plutonium 
is stored for an extended period before fabrication.  In the industry currently, such an 
efficient system has not been achieved, over 200 tons of separated civilian plutonium are in 
storage around the world, and charges for plutonium storage and americium removal 
represent a substantial cost to reactor operators—commercial rates being estimated at $1000-
$2000 per kilogram of plutonium per year for storage, and $10,000-$28,000 per kilogram of 
plutonium for americium removal.106  Including several years of plutonium storage and one 
round of americium removal would dramatically increase the effective MOX cost in our 
model. 
 
 Prices 
 
MOX fabrication prices, like costs, are not publicly divulged.  For essentially all of 
the 1980s and 1990s, demand was higher than supply, and in this seller’s market, prices were 
higher than one would expect based on the underlying plant costs described above. One 
review indicates that in the 1980s, real prices were in the range of $1900-$2400 (escalated to 
2003 dollars), while in the 1990s they were in the range of $2100-$2700.107  A DOE survey 
of fabricators in 1993 reported a range of offers centering around $1850/kgHM (escalated to 
2003 dollars).108  Eléctricité de France enjoys lower prices, as it buys very large quantities of 
a standard product, and has a special relationship with COGEMA and its MELOX plant 
(including having the same principal owner as COGEMA—the French government).109  
                                                 
105 The Department of Energy has stated that the $449 million difference between its 1996 estimate of $1.027 
billion (2001 dollars) for the fuel credit for the MOX fuel produced and the $578 million (2001 dollars) it 
estimated in 1999 resulted from the 1996 estimate being based on equal per-kilogram value for the MOX and 
equivalent LEU fuel, and the 1999 estimate being based on the assumption that “the economic value of MOX 
fuel is lower than of the corresponding displayed LEU fuel.”  This represents a reduction in value by over 40 
percent.  See U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Report to 
Congress on the Projected Life-Cycle Costs of the U.S. and Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Programs 
(Washington, DC: NNSA, March 30, 2001), pp. 4-9.  This report was never publicly released, but was obtained 
and leaked by the Nuclear Control Institute. 
106 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 213.  These figures are in 1987 dollars, but based on recent discussions, it appears that offered prices are still 
in similar ranges, so we have not inflated them to 2003 dollars. 
107 Varley and Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data, op. cit. 
108 See discussion in NAS, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor Related 
Options, op. cit., pp. 295-297, reporting a 1992 dollar figure of $1500/kgHM.  That study, after an extensive 
review of the literature available at that time, provided a central estimate of fabrication cost of  $1565/kgHM 
(1992 dollars), for a facility built with a 7% real cost of money paying no taxes or insurance (see pp. 292-298).  
See also discussion of the $1500/kgHM (1992 dollars) figure used in Frans Berkhout et. al., “Disposition of 
Separated Plutonium,” Science and Global Security, 1992, Vol. 3, pp. 1-53. 
109 Eléctricité de France reported a MOX fabrication price of 6,000 francs/kgHM in 1996 (roughly 
$1,200/kgHM in 2003 dollars); see Anne MacLachlan, “EDF Makes Case for Economic Advantage of 
Reprocessing Over Interim Storage,” Nuclear Fuel, October 7, 1996.  A more recent study for the French 
government referred to a price of 8,000 francs/kgHM (2000 money values); while significantly higher in francs, 
with inflation in the intervening period and fluctuations in currency exchange rates, is approximately the same 
($1240/kgHM) in 2003 dollars.  See Marignac, “Briefing: Results of the `Charpin-Dessus-Pellat’ Mission 
Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option” op. cit., p. 7. 
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German and Swiss utilities, on the other hand, tend to report much higher prices, which 
reflect their smaller purchases, and the fact that much of their fuel has been fabricated in 
smaller, less automated plants.110  With SMP now open, and the supply of MOX fabrication 
services likely outstripping demand in the future, prices may fall significantly from their 
1990s levels—though the MOX fabrication firms will still have substantial leverage to 
demand high prices, since the only available alternative for utilities with plutonium stored at 
their sites is to pay ongoing plutonium storage costs determined by the same firms that offer 
the MOX fabrication service. 
 
 Longer-Term Future in New Facilities 
 
 Like reprocessing, if plutonium fuel is to play a significant part in the future of 
nuclear energy, new plutonium fuel fabrication facilities will ultimately be required.  The 
MOX case is different from the reprocessing case, however, in that there is no large-scale 
military experience, and even more modest commercial experience in large, modern 
facilities. Overall, plutonium fuel fabrication is less thoroughly matured than is PUREX 
reprocessing, leaving more room for further improvement (and cost reduction) in the future.  
As one recent review put it, “new plants would benefit greatly from the extensive experience 
gained during the last decades, thereby allowing them to simplify the plants, decrease their 
size, and reduce maintenance requirements.”111 
 
 If, however, the focus remains on pellet-based fuels for LWRs similar to current LEU 
fuels, manufacturing each pellet to stringent standards will continue to be an exacting 
process, and there may be limits to the scope of potential cost reduction.  Large modern 
facilities are already very highly automated and designed to minimize maintenance 
requirements as much as was possible at the time they were designed.  Moreover, as with 
reprocessing, there may also be trends that would increase per-kilogram costs over time—
including not only increasing societal demands for more stringent safety and security 
precautions (a substantial factor driving the high cost of the planned U.S. MOX plant), but 
also customer demands to fabricate fuels with higher plutonium content, using more 
radioactive plutonium recovered from higher-burnup spent fuels, and to be able to accept 
plutonium that has been stored longer and therefore includes more gamma-emitting 
americium.  Thus, with current technologies, one might expect that future costs might be 
reduced, but not dramatically so.  There may also be opportunities for new technologies that 
could simplify plutonium fuel fabrication, and potentially reduce cost: advocates have long 
argued, for example, that so-called “vibropak” fuels, in which the plutonium and uranium 
powders are packed into the fuel pins by vibration, with no pellet manufacturing involved, 
could significantly reduce costs.  Initial studies for the weapons plutonium disposition 
                                                 
110 See, for example, Hensing and Schulz, An Economic Comparison of Different Back-End Paths of Nuclear 
Power Plants, op. cit..  They give an estimate of 4000 DM/kgHM (over $3000/kgHM in 2003 dollars), and 
point out than an earlier study by the association of German utilities used a figure of 5000 DM/kgHM (over 
$3700/kgHM in 2003 dollars).  Similarly, a German court ordered the state of Hesse to compensate Siemens for 
the state’s closure of Siemens’ small Hanau MOX plant, with an amount derived from an estimated price of 
5300 DM/kgHM (almost $4000/kgHM in 2003 dollars).  See Mark Hibbs, “Court Says Hesse Must Pay 
Siemens for Costs of Shutting MOX Plant,” Nuclear Fuel, April 26, 1993. 
111 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 213. 
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program, however, suggest that the operational savings from using vibropak fuels for a 
portion of that program would not be sufficient to justify the necessary cost of building an 
additional MOX plant for that part of the effort—in other words, that using both pellet MOX 
technology and vibropak technology would be more expensive than using only pellet MOX 
technology.112  Further development is likely to be required to determine whether new 
approaches such as vibropak can offer substantial MOX fuel cost reductions. 
 
 The types of fabrication likely to be needed for systems designed for separations and 
transmutation of waste are likely to be significantly more expensive than traditional MOX 
fabrication—because the intensely radioactive fuel materials involved in such systems, 
including not only plutonium and uranium but minor actinides as well, will require the fuels 
to be fabricated remotely, in heavily shielded facilities.  On the other hand, a variety of fuel 
types have been proposed for future systems that do not require manufacturing pellets to tight 
tolerances for size, shape, and density, as MOX fuel does (such as concepts for fluid fuels in 
which there would be no fuel fabrication, in the most extreme case), and these could, once 
demonstrated, involve lower fabrication costs.  Two recent reviews both concluded that the 
per-kilogram cost of fabrication in fast-neutron reactor systems intended for transmutation 
would be more than twice as high as the cost of traditional MOX fabrication.113 
 
 Overall, our central estimate of $1500/kgHM is quite conservative with respect to 
prices actually being charged to most reactor operators at existing facilities, but is reasonable 
for a future world in which supply and demand was balanced and MOX prices closely 
reflected MOX production costs.  Our $700/kgHM lower bound would require either very 
substantial technological innovation or sales from facilities whose capital costs are already 
amortized (and which do not, therefore, reflect a long-run sustainable cost for providing the 
service).  The $2300/kgHM upper bound is in the range of prices already charged at existing 
facilities, and could reflect future prices if the societal and customer demands above drive 
costs higher than past experience in the future.  
 
 Resulting Value (Cost) of Separated Plutonium 
 
 If the cost of making and using MOX is less than the cost of making and using fresh 
LEU of equivalent energy value, then plutonium will be economically value.  If, on the other 
hand, the cost of making and using MOX fuel is higher than the cost of making and using 
fresh LEU, plutonium will have a negative value (it will not simply be zero, because of the 
high costs of storing the separated plutonium if it is not used as fuel).  With a $1500/kgHM 
fabrication price, and assuming that providing depleted or reprocessed uranium to mix with 
the plutonium is free (except for a $6/kgU price for converting the material to appropriate 
                                                 
112 See Joint U.S.-Russian Working Group on Cost Analysis and Economics in Plutonium Disposition, 
Scenarios and Costs in the Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium Withdrawn From Russia’s Nuclear 
Military Programs (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, April 2003).  The group did not examine an 
all-vibropak MOX program compared to an all-pelletized MOX program (the best basis for comparison of total 
costs), as vibropak fuel for the VVER-1000 reactors would not be ready and licensed in time to meet the 
program goals. 
113 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 211 and 216, and Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, op. cit. p. A2-6 and 
A2-8. 
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oxide powder for fuel fabrication), then the cost for each kilogram of heavy metal in 
plutonium fuel (discounted to the time of fuel loading) will be roughly $1460.114  At a 
uranium price of $40/kgU (comparable to recent prices), and for the central estimates of the 
other values of the relevant parameters, the cost of a kilogram of fresh low-enriched uranium 
of equivalent energy value would be $1130.  Hence, every kilogram of MOX produced 
would represent an additional cost in the range of $330/kgHM, and since some 15 kilograms 
of MOX could be produced from each kilogram of plutonium, each kilogram of separated 
plutonium would represent a liability to its owner (under these assumptions) of roughly 
$5000.  The uranium price would have to roughly double to bring this liability down to 
zero—even if reprocessing of fuels with ever higher burnups (producing plutonium with 
more undesirable isotopes) did not increase the problem over time. 
 
2.5.5.  Costs of Interim Storage of Spent Fuel 
 
For reactor operators who choose near-term reprocessing, interim storage of spent 
fuel for decades is not required.  Storage for several decades generally is required for direct 
disposal, as most repositories are not expected to be available for decades to come.  We have 
therefore counted interim storage as an extra cost for the direct disposal fuel cycle (though 
the latest reactors are being built with pools able to accommodate storage of all the fuel they 
will generate in their lifetime, reducing or eliminating this extra storage cost).  Costs of 
interim storage can vary significantly depending on the specific technology chosen, whether 
fuel is to be transported to a centralized site or kept at reactor sites, whether taxes or other 
payments must be made to local, regional, or national governments, whether the fuel is stored 
at an operating reactor site and therefore can be a modest addition to license maintenance 
costs that must be paid in any case or is stored at sites with no other activity and therefore 
must bear all costs without sharing, and the like.   Dry-cask storage of spent fuel, in 
particular, is now a well-established technology for storing spent fuel for decades with 
minimal operating costs. 
 
In the United States, total upfront costs to establish a new dry storage facility at a 
reactor site (which are largely fixed, regardless of the amount of spent fuel to be stored) are 
estimated to be in the range of $10 million.115  Costs to purchase and load the dry casks, 
including labor, consumables, and decommissioning, are estimated to be in the range of $70-
90 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM) in the spent fuel.116  Operating costs are very 
modest, since virtually nothing needs to be done to the casks each year once they are loaded; 
the principal operating costs relate to providing the security and safety monitoring needed to 
                                                 
114 See calculation in Appendix A. 
115 $9 million (1998 dollars) in TRW Environmental Safety Systems Inc, CRWMS Modular 
Design/Construction and Operation Options Report (Washington DC: Department of Energy, December 1998), 
table E-7; $8-$12 million (1998 dollars) in Eileen M. Supko, “Minimizing Risks Associated with Post-
Shutdown Spent Fuel Storage and LLW Disposal,” paper presented at the Infocast “Nuclear Power in the 
Competitive Era” post-conference workshop, “Developing Risk Strategies for Successful Decommissioning,” 
January 30, 1998. 
116 TRW, CRWMS Modular Design, op. cit., estimates $80/kgHM for the total of all these costs (table E-7); 
Supko, “Minimizing Risks,” op. cit, estimates $60-$70/kgHM for casks and loading, with another $1/kgHM for 
eventual unloading, and a total of $2-$4 million for decommissioning of a 1000-ton facility (adding another $2-
$4/kgHM).  These have been escalated to 2003 dollars in the text. 
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maintain the NRC license for the facility.  For storage sites co-located with operating 
reactors, many of these costs can be charged to the reactor operation, and the net additional 
operating costs are estimated to be only $820,000 per year (largely independent of the 
amount of spent fuel to be stored).117  Thus the total undiscounted costs for 40 years of dry 
cask storage at an operating reactor site in the United States, for a 1000 tonnes of spent fuel, 
would be in the range of $110-130/kgHM (assuming the higher cask and loading costs); with 
the modest annual operating costs discounted at a 3% real annual rate, this figure would be in 
the range of $100-120/kgHM.  
 
For independent storage sites or storage sites at reactors which have been shut down, 
all of the costs of maintaining the license, including security and safety personnel, must be 
attributed to the storage facility, making its net additional operational cost substantially 
higher. For shutdown reactors with all their spent fuel in dry storage, operating costs are 
estimated to be $3.3-4.4 million per year.118  Total undiscounted life-cycle costs for forty 
years in this case would range from $210-$275/kgHM (for a 1000-tonne facility), or $155-
$200/kgHM with the 40 years of operations cost discounted at a 3% real annual rate. A large 
centralized facility could spread these operations costs over a larger amount of spent fuel—
but there would be additional up-front costs for transportation to the centralized site.119 
Somewhat higher costs have been estimated in Japan (where all fuel cycle costs are 
higher than they tend to be in the United States, as many other costs are).  In an official 1998 
study, total undiscounted costs for 40 years of storage in a 5,000-tonne centralized dry cask 
facility were estimated at 160.8 billion yen (some  $290/kgHM).120  When the authors of that 
study applied a 5% discount rate over the 54 years considered from start of construction to 
completion of decommissioning and disposal, these total costs resulted in a discounted per 
kilogram cost of $280/kgHM (a small difference because operations and decommissioning 
costs were only estimated to be 15% of total undiscounted cost). 
 
For both the United States and Japan, it should be noted that costs of the variety of 
benefits that may be paid to the local community to build public acceptance and gain 
government approvals are not included in these totals.  These costs will vary from zero to 
significant additions to the total, depending on the circumstances of the individual case. 
 
                                                 
117 TRW, CRWMS Modular Design, op. cit. (table E-7), escalated to 2003 dollars. 
118 Supko, “Minimizing Risks,” op. cit. gives $3-$4 million; the estimate in TRW, CRWMS Modular Design, 
op. cit. (table E-7) is $4 million/yr; these have been escalated to 2003 dollars in the text. 
119 See discussion in Bunn et al., Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, pp. 13-16.  We have not included in 
our cost estimate the possibility that reactor operators might have to pay for on-site dry cask storage, and then 
pay again for centralized dry-cask storage of the same fuel, before eventual disposal in a repository; it appears 
that relatively few reactor operators will face this kind of double whammy, and if we were to include the costs 
of such a dysfunctional fuel cycle for the once-through case, we should include comparable costs for the 
reprocessing case, such as the costs of extended storage of separated plutonium, and americium separation 
(neither of which are included in our estimates in this study, though both are resulting in substantial costs in the 
current nuclear fuel market). 
120 Toward Implementation of Interim Storage for Recycled Fuel Resources, Interim Report of the Nuclear 
Energy Working Group, Advisory Committee for Energy, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (Tokyo, Japan: June 11, 1998), with figures converted using a three-year average of 
currency exchange rates centered on 1998, and then inflated to 2003 dollars using U.S. GDP deflators. 
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In some cases, significantly higher per-kilogram prices have been paid or considered, 
when very limited storage capacity was available in a particular country, and another country 
agreed to accept that country’s fuel, for storage or for reprocessing.  Russia, for example, 
recently passed a law allowing it to import foreign spent nuclear fuel, and expects 
substantially higher per-kilogram fees than just described for in-country storage.121  It must 
be recognized, however, that accepting spent fuel from a foreign country is a fundamentally 
different service than in-country interim storage – and once the fuel has arrived in the foreign 
country to which it is shipped, the economic factors relating to whether it should be 
reprocessed or stored and eventually disposed of directly will be similar to those described in 
this report. 
 
We have chosen $200/kgHM as our central estimate of interim storage costs 
(substantially more than the cost of at-reactor dry cask storage in the United States, and 
comparable to the discounted present value of the cost of independent dry cask storage in the 
United States at small facilities), with a range of $100/kgHM to $300/kgHM.  In the future, 
the direct costs of storage are likely to decline (as reactors are built with sufficient storage for 
their lifetimes, and technology improves), but the indirect costs, including payments to 
nearby communities, could increase. 
 
  2.5.6.  Enrichment Prices 
 
In recent years, enrichment prices have been somewhat volatile, because of ups and 
downs of market competition, trade actions, and the U.S.-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium 
Purchase Agreement.  Long-term contract prices for enrichment services fell from earlier 
levels of  over $100/SWU (in then-year dollars) to the mid-$80s by late 1999, only to 
increase back to some $110/SWU in 2001, as a result of market uncertainties caused by the 
U.S. Enrichment Corporation’s trade actions against its European competitors.122  As with 
uranium prices, the gap between long-term and spot SWU prices has declined substantially as 
utilities have become more confident in supply and are less willing to pay large premiums for 
the security of long-term contracts.  In the first half of 2003, the spot SWU price in the 
United States was in the range of $100-$110/SWU.123  Since the trade action does not affect 
purchases by European utilities (and, in fact, creates incentives for European enrichers to sell 
more of their service there than in the United States), prices in Europe are now lower than 
prices in the United States, though higher than they were in 1999.124  One projection in mid-
2003 suggested that SWU prices in long-term contracts would likely remain in the range of 
$105/SWU for some years, and then rise slightly toward the end of the decade.125   
 
Although it is possible that some combination of trade restraints and uncertainties in 
deliveries from Russian military supplies could drive prices temporarily to levels well above 
                                                 
121 See discussion in Bunn et al., Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, op. cit., Chapter 4. 
122 For a discussion, with a graph of long-term SWU contract prices over time, see Thomas L. Neff, “Decision 
Time for the HEU Deal,” Arms Control Today, June 2001, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_06/nefjun01.asp.  
123 Spot SWU prices are freely available from Ux Consulting, at http://www.uxc.com.  
124 Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2002, op. cit., p. 15. 
125 See Knapik, “LES Hires Advisers to Prime Renewed Push to Site Tennessee Plant; PACE Slams USEC,” op. 
cit., reporting on Energy Resources International projections.  
 
DIRECT DISPOSAL VS. REPROCESSING AND RECYCLING IN THERMAL REACTORS  55 
 
 
$100/SWU, the enrichment market is competitive, new enrichment plants are being 
considered, and it is unlikely that prices would stabilize at significantly more than $100/SWU 
for long (as high prices would call forth investment in new supplies that would drive down 
prices). Gas-centrifuge enrichment is a mature technology, with a cost of production below 
$80/SWU, and its cost appears highly unlikely to increase over the next few decades: rather, 
costs can be expected to decrease as the next generation of more efficient centrifuge designs 
are put in place.126 Additional supplies from military stockpiles would affect enrichment 
prices as well. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has estimated that enrichment prices in the “short to 
medium term” will be in the range $80-$120/SWU; over the longer term, the NEA reports 
that “it is hoped” that new facilities using advanced processes can reduce the cost of 
enrichment to the range of $50/SWU.127 
 
We have chosen a central estimate of $100/SWU, with a high of $150/SWU and a 
low of $50 per SWU, allowing a somewhat broader range of possibilities than the near-to-
medium term NEA projection.  Enrichment prices are unlikely to reach either the high or the 
low end of the price range for some decades to come, barring a substantial technological 
breakthrough or a substantial reduction in the number of suppliers in the market. 
 
2.5.7.  Low Enriched Uranium Fuel Fabrication Prices 
 
Fabrication prices for LEU fuel vary depending on such factors as the burnup and 
neutronic efficiency desired, the competitiveness of different markets, and the type of 
reactor.  In general, fabricating fuel for boiling-water reactors (BWRs) is more costly than 
fabricating fuel for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs).  For either type of reactor, prices are 
somewhat higher in Europe, where the markets are less competitive, than in the United 
States, and are higher still in Japan (though Japanese prices have recently declined 
substantially due to the introduction of competition).128  Prices have not increased 
substantially with increased burnup; it appears that cost reductions are keeping pace with 
added technology, much as has been the case with personal computers in recent years, where 
prices remain roughly stable but capabilities increase over time. Past overcapacity in the 
fabrication market has made the market competitive, reducing prices and leading to 
substantial consolidation of the fabrication firms.129  Unlike uranium, conversion, or 
enrichment prices, LEU fabrication prices (which depend on the specifics of each company’s 
design and processes) are considered proprietary information and are not regularly tabulated 
in published form.  Nevertheless, there is sufficient information available to make a good 
judgment of  prices. 
 
                                                 
126 Varley and Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data, op. cit. 
127 Nuclear Energy Agency, Trends in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Economic, Environmental, and Social Aspects 
(Paris, France: NEA, 2001), p. 54 and p. 83. 
128 Personal communication with Japanese industry participant.  See also discussion of this overall picture in 
Charles K. Anderson, “Developments in the U.S. and European LWR Fabrication Markets: A 1998 Update,” in 
Uranium Institute: 23rd Annual Symposium, September 10-11, 1998. 
129 See, for example, NEA, Trends in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit., p. 22. 
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The NEA projects LEU fabrication prices in the short to medium term at $200-
$300/kgHM (2001 dollars).130  A previous survey by a National Academy of Sciences 
committee chose a central estimate of $250/kgHM.131  This central estimate is somewhat 
higher than recent prices in the highly competitive U.S. market, but somewhat lower than 
most prices in the European market.132  One projection in mid-2003 suggested that 
competitive bids in the U.S. market for PWR fuel were in the range of $220/kgHM, and 
would remain largely flat; European market prices were said to be 25-30 percent higher.133  
Suppliers’ actual fabrication cost is estimated to be below $200/kgHM.134 
 
We have chosen a central estimate of $250/kgHM for LEU fabrication cost, with a 
low of $150/kgHM and a high of $350/kgHM, again allowing a somewhat broader range of 
possibilities than the NEA projections.  (We consider the very high prices paid for fabrication 
services in Japan prior to the introduction of competition to be an outlier, not likely to be 
broadly applicable to prices available to utilities in the future.)  The technology of LEU fuel 
fabrication is mature, the suppliers at least reasonably diverse, and the safety and health 
impacts modest, so it appears unlikely that this price would change substantially in the near 
future.  Prices could go up if utilities decide to pursue still higher burnups, requiring new 
materials and designs—but that would also substantially reduce the desirability of 
reprocessing, as the high-burnup uranium and plutonium to be recovered would be much less 
attractive material for reactor fuel (see discussion below).  Prices could also go up if ongoing 
consolidation created effective monopolies in some markets—but that artificial market 
situation would probably be corrected in the long term. 
 
2.5.8.  Premiums for Handling Reprocessed Uranium 
 
Uranium recovered from reprocessing contains a variety of undesirable isotopes built 
up during its irradiation in the reactor.  Chief among these are U-232 (whose radioactive 
daughter products emit highly penetrating gamma rays, increasing requirements for radiation 
protection for workers in facilities handling reprocessed uranium) and U-236 (which is a 
neutron absorber, requiring that the enrichment of LEU made from reprocessed uranium be 
higher than the enrichment of LEU made from fresh uranium to achieve the same burnup). 
 
Because of the higher radioactivity, fuel cycle firms charge higher prices for 
conversion, enrichment, and fabrication of reprocessed uranium.  If fresh uranium is cheap, 
reprocessed uranium typically has no value at all—though it is not a liability to the same 
degree that plutonium is, as its storage is very cheap.  As a result of these factors, while 
recycling of reprocessed uranium has been demonstrated, and is being done on a modest 
scale,135 most utilities have not bothered to recycle their reprocessed uranium: the vast 
                                                 
130 NEA, Trends in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit, p. 54. 
131 NAS 1995, pp. 286-287, took $200/kgHM (1992$) as its central estimate, rounded from $248 to $250 2003 
dollars. 
132 Varley and Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data, op. cit. 
133 Knapik, “LES Hires Advisers to Prime Renewed Push to Site Tennessee Plant; PACE Slams USEC,” op. 
cit., reporting projections from Energy Resources International. 
134 Varley and Collier, Fuel Cycle Cost Data, op. cit. 
135 An ingenious approach, being pursued in a partnership between Russian and European firms, is to mix the 
reprocessed uranium with HEU made excess as a result of arms reductions.  With this approach, the undesirable 
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majority of all the uranium ever recovered from reprocessing of LWR fuel remains in 
storage.  Market estimates of the relevant premiums are therefore somewhat uncertain, as the 
prices charged to date reflect a more or less pilot-scale market with few suppliers.136  Based 
on data provided by market participants, we have chosen a central estimate of $15/kgU for 
conversion (with a range from $5 to $25), $5 for enrichment (with a range from $0 to $10), 
and $10 for fuel fabrication (with a range from $0 to $20).137  Over time, approaches to 
managing reprocessed uranium will probably improve, but the burnup of fuels will increase, 
making the reprocessed uranium less economically desirable. 
 
The possibility of laser enrichment.  For some decades to come, it appears that gas 
centrifuges will continue to be the dominant enrichment technology.  They will only be 
replaced if some other technology appears which is significantly cheaper. Laser enrichment 
is one possibility for significant cost reduction, though both the United States and France 
have phased out most of their support for near-term commercialization efforts.  If laser 
enrichment is eventually commercialized, this would lower the lines on figure 2.1 slightly, 
since the ability to easily remove undesirable isotopes would increase the value of uranium 
recovered from reprocessing.  At the same time, significant decreases in enrichment prices 
would make the once-through cycle somewhat more attractive, and free up more uranium 
resources (as lower prices would make it attractive to strip more of the U-235 from each 
kilogram of natural uranium, leaving less in the enrichment tails). 
 
2.5.9.  Conversion Prices 
 
Conversion of uranium from U3O8 to uranium hexafluoride for enrichment is a 
relatively minor cost in the nuclear fuel cycle, which has little impact on the economic 
calculations presented in this report.  We have chosen a central estimate of $6/kgU, with a 
low of $4/kgU and a high of $8/kgU.  This is more than the depressed prices of 2000-2001; 
the U.S. spot price in the first half of 2003 was under $5/kgU, with the European price over 
$6/kgU.138  Converdyn, the main U.S. supplier, estimates its production cost at $4.40-
                                                                                                                                                       
isotopes are not further concentrated by additional enrichment, and there is no need to convert the reprocessed 
uranium to uranium hexafluoride and back again.  This is currently being done at Elektrostal, in Russia, where 
the resulting blended LEU is fabricated into fuel for European reactors under license to Siemens (whose fuel 
fabrication division is now part of Framatome).  See, for example, Ann MacLachlan, “Dutch Utility EPZ Buys 
Russian Fuel Made From Blending HEU, Reprocessed Uranium,” Nuclear Fuel, September 30, 2002; Ann 
MacLachlan, “GKN Says Elektrostal Option Only Solution For Repu Use,” Nuclear Fuel, September 30, 2002; 
and Mark Hibbs, “Framatome, Elektrostal Looking to Double Business in Downblended HEU Fuel,” Nuclear 
Fuel, August 19, 2002.  
136 Collier and Varley, Fuel Cycle Cost Data, op. cit.  
137 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 212, cites a central cost estimate of $24/kgU for conversion of reprocessed uranium, compared to $5/kgU for 
conversion of fresh uranium, a premium of $19/kgU for handling the irradiated material.  The NEA study points 
out that such conversion costs can be avoided by using the recovered uranium for MOX fabrication, but (a) we 
have assumed in this analysis that uranium for MOX fabrication is free, so taking this approach would amount 
to assigning a zero value to the recovered uranium; and (b) there is much more recovered uranium arising from 
reprocessing than is needed for fabrication of MOX fuel, so this approach can only be taken with a fraction of 
the material. 
138 Conversion spot prices are freely available from Ux Consulting, at http://www.uxc.com.  
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$4.70/kgU.139  The NEA projects conversion prices in the short to medium term in the range 
of $3-$8/kgU, nearly identical to our range.140 
 
2.5.10.  Non-Price Factors: Fuel Burnup and Discount Rate 
 
Burnup of Reprocessed Fuel and Fresh Fuel 
 
The economic viability of reprocessing gets worse and worse as the burnup of the 
reprocessed spent fuel increases, because the isotopic quality of the recovered plutonium and 
uranium gets worse.141  The worldwide trend toward increased burnup in LWRs therefore 
casts additional doubt on the economic future of reprocessing and recycling in LWRs. 
 
On the other hand, increased burnup of the fresh fuel to be produced—either MOX or 
LEU—makes the comparison better for using plutonium that has already been separated as 
MOX, as additional enrichment has to be put into each kilogram of LEU to achieve the 
greater burnup, increasing the cost of the LEU the MOX would replace.142  The ideal 
situation for the economics of reprocessing is reprocessing of relatively low-burnup fuel, to 
make relatively high-burnup MOX.  Thus we have taken as our “best case” for reprocessing 
plutonium and uranium recovered from reprocessing of spent fuel with a burnup lower than 
that used by most current utilities, of 33,000 megawatt-days per metric ton of heavy metal 
(MWD/MTHM), making MOX for a burnup of 43,000 MWD/MTHM.143  Our central 
estimate and “worst” estimate have equal burnups of 43,000 MWD/MTHM, but in fact 
higher burnups, now in wide use around the world, would be worse still for the reprocessing 
case.  Thus our use of these burnups is conservative, understating the economic 
disadvantages of reprocessing. 
 
Disposal Time and Discount Rate 
 
Final factors in the calculation include the times at which various events take place 
(which effects how far in the future their costs should be discounted), and the discount rate. 
 
The time factor and how it is treated is particularly important for the costs of disposal.  
We have assumed, as discussed above, that $400/kgHM has to be set aside at the time of 
discharge for disposal of spent fuel, even though the disposal itself may not take place until 
decades after the fuel is discharged.  This is because, in the U.S. program (as is likely to be 
true in many other national nuclear waste disposal programs), many of the costs (such as 
                                                 
139 Michael Knapik, “Help for Converdyn Still Seen Possible; Spot U Price in U.S. Continues to Slide,” Nuclear 
Fuel, October 30, 2000. 
140 NEA, Trends in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit. 
141 See, for example, Wolfgang Heni, “Evaluation of Direct Disposal From the Point of View of One Utility and 
Perspectives for Waste Management,” Nuclear Technology, Vol. 121, pp. 120-127, February 1998.  Heni is the 
fuel manager for the GNS utility in Germany. 
142 See, for example, discussion in NAS, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, op. cit., pp. 301-302. 
143 We use the 33,000 and 43,000 figures because useful sets of consistent isotopic figures are provided for 
these burnups in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency, 
Plutonium Fuel: An Assessment (Paris, France: OECD/NEA 1989). 
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siting and building a repository and its associated infrastructure) occur early on, rather than at 
the later time when the fuel is actually emplaced.  Had we followed the approach used in 
some other studies, and discounted a fixed per-kilogram disposal cost only modestly larger 
than the one we assumed to be paid at time of discharge for decades into the future, the 
present value of the costs for disposal of either spent fuel or high-level waste at time of 
discharge would have been much less, and hence the difference between them would have 
been much less than our $200/kgHM central estimate.144  
 
Since we have assumed that the disposal costs are lower for the reprocessing and 
recycling case, it is better for the relative economics of reprocessing for disposal to occur 
sooner rather than later, so that this cost advantage is not shrunken by additional discounting.  
Nevertheless, in countries around the world a period of decades between discharge of spent 
fuel and permanent disposal of the spent fuel or reprocessing wastes is planned to be the 
norm. We have taken a central estimate of disposal 40 years after discharge of the spent fuel 
from the reactor (for either disposal of spent fuel or disposal of HLW from reprocessing) 
with a range of 20 to 60 years. 
 
The issue of the discount rate is somewhat more complex.  As noted in Chapter 1, for 
calculating the amount that must be set aside today to cover a future expense one is legally 
obligated to incur (such as disposal of spent fuel or decommissioning of a nuclear facility) it 
is appropriate to use a “risk free” discount rate.  Thus in this study, for discounting the future 
costs of waste disposal or storage, we use a 3% real rate, as advised by the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget as being roughly equivalent to the return on long-term U.S. 
government bonds. 
 
We use a separate rate for the cost of money during the various periods when fuel has 
been bought but has not yet been completely used (such as the time between purchasing the 
uranium and enrichment, the time between enrichment and fabrication, the time between 
fabrication and loading into the reactor, and the time the fuel is in the reactor).  For this cost 
of money, we have chosen to use a 5% real interest rate, roughly the real debt rate available 
to a regulated utility with a guaranteed rate of return,145 with a range from 2% to 8%.  This 
has only a modest effect on our calculations of breakeven price and cost of electricity. 
                                                 
144 This is the approach taken in NEA, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, op. cit., with the result that 
although they envision a large difference in costs between disposal of HLW and disposal of spent fuel, those 
costs and the difference between them are discounted so heavily as to make very little contribution to the cost of 
electricity. 
145 See discussion in Appendix A. For such operating costs, pure debt financing would be appropriate. 
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Sidebar: Volumes of Wastes From Direct Disposal and Reprocessing 
 
Advocates of reprocessing frequently point out that reprocessing reduces the total 
volume of high-level waste.146  Unfortunately, in most cases neither the hazard from 
radioactive waste nor the cost of managing it is closely related to the physical volume of the 
waste.  Nonetheless, it is of interest to compare the volumes and types of wastes generated by 
direct disposal of spent fuel and reprocessing of that spent fuel. 
 
The principal waste generated in direct disposal of spent fuel is the spent fuel itself.  
The volume of wastes from the various handling steps after the reactor cooling pond—
transport to the repository, packaging, and repository emplacement—is expected to be 
comparatively minor, as are the volumes of wastes from decommissioning the relevant 
facilities.  (There are, of course, wastes generated in many other parts of the fuel cycle, but 
the costs of managing these is included in the costs charged for the various fuel cycle 
services, and is not addressed here.) 
 
Reprocessing advocates frequently estimate the volume of spent fuel for direct 
disposal at 2 cubic meters per metric ton of heavy metal.147 This is roughly correct for spent 
fuel disposed of in the German Pollux cask, which is 5.52 meters long, 1.56 meters in 
diameter, and can hold 5.5 tHM of spent fuel, for a volume of 1.9 m3/tHM.148  The Swedish 
disposal program, which also has large waste packages, has an average planned volume of 
1.6 m3/tHM for the packaged spent fuel,149 and a recent British study, based on a study for 
the European Union, came up with a similar figure.150 But in the case of the planned U.S. 
Yucca Mountain repository, the plan is to have larger waste packages with more fuel 
assemblies in each package, reducing the average volume: pressurized-water reactor (PWR) 
spent fuel will primarily be in large packages holding 21 assemblies each.  These packages 
are planned to have a volume of 10.25 m3 and will contain 9660 kgHM of spent fuel, for an 
average of 1.06 m3/tHM, roughly half the 2 cubic meter estimate.151 This is the total waste 
package volume, much of which is empty space or waste package rather than the spent fuel 
itself. A typical PWR assembly has a volume of 0.19 cubic meters, and contains 460 kgHM 
of fuel, for a volume of 0.41 m3/tHM, less than half the packaged volume.152 
                                                 
146 As one of many similar examples, see B. Barré and H. Masson (Cogema), “State of the Art in Nuclear Fuel 
Reprocessing,” paper presented at “Safewaste 2000,” October 2-4, 2000, Montpelier, France. 
147 See, for example, Barré and Masson, “State of the Art in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing,” op. cit. 
148 Frank von Hippel, personal communication. 
149 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, The Cost of High-Level Waste Disposal in Geologic Repositories (Paris, 
France: OECD/NEA, 1993), hereinafter OECD/NEA 1993, shows on p. 50 a planned 7,840 tHM of Swedish 
spent fuel going into waste packages with a total volume of 12,900 m3. 
150  “Scoping Assessment of Implications of Reprocessing Scenarios for Disposal Options: Paper to RWMAC 
[Royal Waste Management Advisory Committee],” NIREX Doc. 334004 (London, UK: United Kingdom Nirex 
Limited, May 2000).  This paper envisioned 4 PWR assemblies (which contain 461 kgHM of fuel each) in 
canisters that would be 4.54 m long and 0.9 m in diameter, for an average of 1.57 m3/tHM. 
151 These packages will be 5.335 m long, with an outer diameter of 1.564 m. 
152 Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Final Environmental Impact Statement  for a Geologic 
Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear  Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye 
County, Nevada DOE/EIS-0250 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, February 2002, available at 
http://www.ymp.gov:80/documents/feis_a/index.htm), p. A-25.  Spent fuel from high-temperature gas reactors 
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Reprocessing spent fuel does make it possible to concentrate the intensely radioactive 
materials in a much smaller volume of high-level waste (HLW).  At the same time, however, 
reprocessing also results in significant volumes of intermediate-level waste (ILW) and low-
level waste (LLW) which must also be disposed of.153  The ILW from reprocessing typically 
contains long-lived actinides (including plutonium), and therefore in most cases will 
probably have to be disposed of in deep geologic repositories along with the HLW.  Indeed, 
COGEMA has developed a “Universal Canister” to hold both vitrified HLW and ILW, so 
that customers receive back some canisters with vitrified HLW and other outwardly identical 
canisters with lower-level wastes.154 
 
The specific volumes of these types of waste generated during reprocessing have been 
the subject of some controversy, and have changed over the years as reprocessing technology 
has improved and the reprocessors have devoted more effort to further processing and 
compaction of these wastes.  BNFL and COGEMA appear to be in agreement that for current 
processes and spent fuels of current and future burnups, the volume of vitrified HLW 
canisters is approximately 0.12 m3/tHM.155 Hence, the volume of vitrified HLW resulting 
from reprocessing is roughly 4 times less than the volume of original spent fuel (with no 
container). The volume of intermediate-level waste is larger and more variable in different 
reports: recent estimates are 0.8 m3/tHM from BNFL, and 0.35 m3/tHM from COGEMA.156  
The most recent waste volume estimates from these firms do not include low-level wastes 
which can be buried in cheaper low-level waste disposal sites.  Previous estimates indicate 
that the amount of LLW generated during reprocessing is roughly 2.8 m3/tHM—that is, in 
sheer volume terms, more than the volume of spent fuel in its waste package.157 
  
HLW canisters, like spent fuel assemblies, will in most countries be put in a waste 
package, which serves as an engineered barrier to release of radionuclides to the 
environment. As with spent fuel, the volume of the total package should be taken into 
account for HLW.  One German study, for example, envisioned 6 Cogema vitrified waste 
                                                                                                                                                       
would have very much larger physical volume per unit of electricity generated, and would therefore require 
different packaging and repository design – but it is likely to remain true that repository volume and cost would 
be driven more by the heat generated from the fuel than by its physical volume. 
153 These are the European classifications.  In the United States, the reprocessing wastes classified as ILW in 
Europe would be considered transuranic (TRU) wastes.  For discussions of the wastes that have arisen to date, 
and are expected to arise in the future, from reprocessing, see BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue Waste 
Working Group, Interim Report (London, UK: The Environmental Council, February 28, 2000 available at 
http://www.the-environment-council.org.uk/Dialogue/bnfl_national_dialogue.htm), and Frank Homberg, 
Mathie Pavageau, and Mycle Schneider, Cogema-La Hague: The Waste Production Techniques (Paris, France: 
World Information Service on Energy-Paris, May 1997). 
154 E. Blanc, F. Chotin (Cogema), “The Universal Canister Strategy,” paper presented at Global ’99, Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming, August 30-September 2, 1999. 
155 For COGEMA, see Barré and Masson, “State of the Art in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing,” op. cit., citing a 
figure of 0.115 m3/tHM.  For BNFL, see  BNFL input to the BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue Waste 
Working Group, Interim Report, op. cit., Appendix 3.  BNFL estimated .08 m3/tHM for lower-burnup spent fuel 
that had been reprocessed in the past, and .12 m3/tHM for fuel planned to be reprocessed in the coming years. 
156 Barré and Masson, “State of the Art in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing,” op. cit., and BNFL input to the BNFL 
National Stakeholder Dialogue Waste Working Group, Interim Report, op. cit., Appendix 3. 
157 See, for example, Mike Smith and Nigel Mote, Recommendations for Normalizing Reprocessing Waste 
Quantities and Characteristics (Atlanta, GA: Nuclear Assurance Corporation International, January 1998). 
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canisters in a Pollux cask, resulting in a disposal package volume of 1.2 m3/tHM158—
effectively identical to the packaged volume for spent fuel, rather than many times less.  The 
UK study noted above envisioned 2 vitrified waste canisters, each containing 0.148 m3 of 
glass (the equivalent of 0.123 tHM of fuel, at the rate of 0.12 m3/tHM appropriate for higher-
burnup fuel) would be placed in each waste package, which would be 3.2 meters long and 0.9 
meters in diameter, for an average of 0.83 m3/tHM—roughly half the volume envisioned in 
the same study for direct disposal of spent fuel.159  Packaging may also increase volumes for 
ILW and LLW, in some cases. 
 
One important point is that wastes from decommissioning the reprocessing plant and 
associated facilities are not included in these waste volume estimates.  The ILW and LLW 
from decommissioning the Sellafield and La Hague sites are expected to be substantial.  
Including these wastes, pro-rated over the quantity of fuel processed over these facilities’ 
lifetimes, would be likely to increase significantly the estimates of volume of wastes 
generated per ton of fuel processed. 
 
Overall, several points can be made: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                
With no packaging, the volume of vitrified HLW is roughly four times less than the 
volume of the spent fuel from which it came. 
This changes substantially when ILW is included. With no waste package, the volume of 
spent fuel is equal to or less than the combined volume of the HLW and ILW resulting 
from reprocessing. 
If waste packages are included for spent fuel and HLW, the total volume for disposal 
ranges from roughly equal to approximately half as large for the HLW (not including the 
ILW). 
If low-level waste is also included, the total volume of waste arising from reprocessing is 
significantly larger than the total volume arising from direct disposal. 
More complete estimates should ultimately include decommissioning wastes from both 
fuel cycles. 
 
Costs of Managing ILW and LLW From Reprocessing 
 
From the point of view of a reactor operator attempting to decide whether to sign a 
contract to have spent fuel reprocessed or plan on disposing of it directly, the main waste 
volumes of interest are the ones that will get returned to the customer after reprocessing—
and the main fact of interest about those volumes is how much it will cost to manage and 
dispose of them.  The costs of HLW disposal are discussed in the text. 
 
Currently both Cogema and BNFL require customers to take back the wastes after 
reprocessing.  It appears, however, that wastes from decommissioning may end up being the 
responsibility of the reprocessors, rather than the customers.160  The costs of managing these 
 
158 Cited in Homberg, Pavageau, and Schneider, Cogema-La Hague, op. cit., p. 90. 
159 NIREX, “Scoping Assessment,” op. cit. 
160 Homberg, Pavageau, and Schneider, Cogema-La Hague, op. cit., p. 66. cite a document which says that 
decommissioning wastes “will not be returned,” but report that “the situation is evolving,” with new efforts  to 
negotiate customers’ “participation” in managing these wastes. 
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wastes are included in the estimates of the decommissioning costs for these plants (which in 
turn are included in our discussion of the costs of reprocessing, elsewhere in this report).  To 
date, plans for shipping wastes to customers focus primarily on the vitrified HLW and the 
ILW, not the LLW—whose large volume would make long-distance shipment expensive.  
BNFL has permission from the UK government to practice “substitution”—that is, an 
arrangement in which customers would take back a slightly larger amount of HLW in return 
for the reprocessors managing the LLW (on some equivalence basis to be negotiated)—and 
is proposing to follow the same approach with ILW as well.  If substitution were 
implemented for ILW as well, BNFL estimates that the amount of HLW returned to foreign 
customers would increase by 17%.  BNFL does not describe how much additional HLW is 
being substituted for LLW under existing substitution arrangements, but presumably it will 
be at least a few percent.  Therefore, under this approach, the costs of HLW disposal per ton 
of fuel reprocessed would be multiplied by roughly 1.2, but there would be no cost to the 
customer for ILW or LLW management and disposal. 
 
If substitution did not occur, then the customer would have to pay for transport and 
disposal of the ILW and LLW, which could add several tens of dollars per kilogram of 
original spent fuel to the waste disposal costs—or more, for countries with high disposal 
costs for these types of wastes, or requiring very long-distance transport of them. 
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Sidebar: Reprocessing to Reduce the Need for Additional Repositories 
 
 In recent years, some advocates of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel have argued not 
that uranium will run out, but that available space for nuclear waste in geologic repositories 
will run out.  Spent nuclear fuel must be processed, and heat-generating radionuclides must 
be transmuted, it is argued, to make it possible to pack the nuclear waste from the generation 
of a much larger amount of nuclear energy generation into planned repositories.  This 
argument is one of the principal drivers of the Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Initiative of the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).161 
 
 In particular, DOE argues that existing nuclear power plants in the United States, 
discharging nearly 2000 tHM of spent fuel per year, will fill the 63,000 tHM legislative 
capacity limit for the Yucca Mountain repository by 2015, and a “theoretical” Yucca 
Mountain capacity of 120,000 tHM by roughly 2050 (if the current level of nuclear capacity 
were retained).162  The difficulty of gaining political acceptance and licensing for a second 
repository in the United States is assumed to be very high, but processing the fuel and 
transmuting the heat-generating radionuclides, it is argued, could make a second repository 
unnecessary, even if U.S. nuclear energy generation grows substantially in the future. 
 
 Several points should be made: 
• 
• 
                                                
First, whatever this argument’s merits in the U.S. context, it only applies to the United 
States.  Only the United States has chosen a repository site inside a mountain with fixed 
boundaries, whose capacity therefore cannot be increased indefinitely by simply digging 
more tunnels.  Most other countries are examining sites in huge areas of rock, where the 
amount of waste from centuries of nuclear waste generation could be emplaced at a single 
site, if desired.163 
Second, it is important to understand that traditional approaches to reprocessing and 
recycling, such as those discussed in this chapter, do not lead to reductions in the amount 
 
161 See, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, Report to Congress on 
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative: The Future Path for Advanced Spent Fuel Treatment and Transmutation 
Research (Washington, DC: January 2003, available as of December 16, 2003, at 
http://www.nuclear.gov/reports/AFCI_CongRpt2003.pdf).  Similarly, see Per F. Peterson, “The Pros and Cons 
of Nuclear Fuel Recycling,” letter, Science, Vol. 294, pp. 2093-2094, December 7, 2001.  Peterson argues that 
“for sustainable fission energy production, the scarce resource will not be uranium, but will almost certainly be 
repository capacity… this why, in the longer term, it will likely make economic sense to recycle actinides back 
into reactors.” 
162 See DOE, Report to Congress on Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, op. cit., p. I-3.  This maximum theoretical 
capacity estimate is dependent on a wide range of assumptions, some of which might be changed in the future to 
increase the available capacity, such as the maximum temperature that will be allowed within the mountain, 
what kind of cooling arrangements will be used for the repository (and for how long), how long wastes will be 
allowed to cool above ground before emplacement, how older and newer wastes will be arranged within the 
mountain, and the like. 
163 Granite formations do often have faulting in some areas that could limit the total area that could be used at a 
particular repository site – but sites will presumably be chosen to be far from nearby faults, and very large 
amounts of total material can be emplaced at typical sites of this type.  Even at Yucca Mountain, there are other 
mountain ridges in the same area that have similar geology, and could potentially be defined as part of the 
“same” repository.  Ultimately the issue is less the technical limits on repository capacity than the political 
limits on how much material can be emplaced at a particular location. 
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of repository space required per unit of electricity generated.  As discussed in the text, the 
needed repository volume is determined by heat output of the wastes, and if plutonium is 
recycled as MOX fuel in existing LWRs, the resulting buildup of heat-generating minor 
actinides means that the total waste heat per unit of electricity generated in this cycle is 
higher than for direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel.  Therefore, a separations and 
transmutation approach that would include separating and transmuting all the major long-
lived heat-generating radionuclides would be needed, if the goal was to avoid a second 
repository.  As discussed in the text, the most recent official analyses suggest that the cost 
of the complex separations and transmutation that would be needed is likely to be 
substantially higher than the cost of traditional reprocessing and recycling.  If we assume, 
as recent international reviews do, a higher reprocessing cost for these kinds of 
separations than the central estimate for traditional reprocessing used in the text, a higher 
fabrication cost (given the need for remote handling), and we assume that the needed 
transmutation reactors or accelerators would have a capital cost roughly $200/kWe higher 
than that of comparably advanced one-through systems, then separations and 
transmutation for this purpose would not be economic until the cost of disposal of spent 
fuel reached some $3000/kgHM, many times its current level.164  
• 
• 
                                                
Third, the argument is based on the questionable assumption that while it would be very 
difficult to gain public acceptance and licensing approval for a second repository, it 
would not be very difficult to do so for the complex and expensive spent fuel processing 
and transmutation facilities needed to implement this approach.  This assumption appears 
very likely to be wrong.  Reprocessing of spent fuel has been fiercely opposed by a 
substantial section of the interested public in the United States for decades—and such a 
transmutation approach inevitably would involve the handling of large quantities of 
extremely dangerous radionuclides in the presence of much larger sources of chemical or 
nuclear energy that might distribute them in the event of an accident than they would ever 
be exposed to below the ground.  Similarly, there seems little doubt that licensing and 
building the new reactor types required would be an enormous institutional and political 
challenge. 
Fourth, the argument is also based on a further questionable assumption—that even 
decades in the future, when repository space has become scarce and reactor operators 
become willing to pay a significant price for it, it will still not be possible to ship spent 
fuel from one country to another for disposal.  If, in fact, repository capacity does become 
scarce in the future, reactor operators will likely be willing to pay a price for spent fuel 
disposal well above the cost of providing the service, and it seems quite likely that if the 
potential price gets high enough, the opportunity for enormous profit will motivate some 
country with an indefinitely-expandable repository to overcome the political obstacles 
 
164 NEA, Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
cites a cost of $2000/kgHM for reprocessing in fast reactors intended for transmutation of heat-generating 
actinides, and a fabrication cost of $2600/kgHM for the core fuel for such systems.  DOE’s Generation IV Fuel 
Cycle Crosscut group uses the same figures.  Using these figures, and assuming that the whole job could be 
done with fast reactors with no need for accelerators (with the fast reactors having an additional capital cost of 
$200/kWe, we calculated the spent fuel disposal price at which the cost of electricity would be the same for 
once-through LWRs as for these transmutation fast reactors, using the same method as used in Chapter 3, with 
equations described in Appendix A.  We held the disposal cost for HLW constant, which is excessively 
generous, since this material also takes up repository volume, and if the cost of spent fuel disposal were rising 
dramatically, the cost of HLW disposal would also be increasing. 
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that have blocked international storage and disposal of spent fuel in the past, and offer to 
accept spent fuel from other countries on a commercial basis.  (It is worth noting that 
Russia has already passed legislation approving such imports of foreign spent fuel, 
though the prospects for implementation of that project remain uncertain.)165  
 
In any case, given the availability of proven, low-cost dry cask storage technology that 
can store spent fuel safely for decades,166 there is no rush to resolve these debates.  With 
time, technology, politics, and economic circumstances will evolve, and the costs of any 
approach that is ultimately chosen can be discounted into the future. 
 
                                                 
165 For an extensive discussion of the political history and prospects for such concepts, see Bunn et. al, Interim 
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, op. cit., Chapter 4. 
166 See discussion in Bunn et. al, Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, op. cit., Chapter 2. 
 
   
3. Direct Disposal vs. Recycling in Fast-Neutron Reactors 
3.1.  Plutonium Breeding and Recycling in Fast Reactors 
From the dawn of the nuclear age, the nuclear industry believed that uranium was 
relatively scarce and that the number of reactors would grow rapidly, and as a result the price 
of uranium would increase quickly. Hence, the industry projected that there would be a rapid 
transition from light-water reactors (LWRs), which primarily rely on fissioning the rare U-
235 isotope (0.7% of natural uranium), to fast-neutron reactors (FRs), which would 
efficiently transform the common uranium isotope, U-238 (>99% of natural uranium), into 
plutonium, which could then be recycled and used as fuel. The industry did not see recycling 
of plutonium in LWRs as a long-term solution, but only as a temporary expedient until the 
transition to FRs began. (See sidebar, “Thermal-Neutron and Fast-Neutron Reactors.”) 
This transition to FRs has taken much longer than once expected.  Uranium has turned 
out to be abundant and cheap, the world’s use of nuclear energy has grown much more 
slowly than expected, and FRs have so far been more expensive and problematic than 
anticipated. As a result, only Russia, India, and Japan still have near-term plans for 
commercializing FRs (and Japan’s plans, stretching out to two to three decades from now, 
are more properly characterized as long-term). Russia is the only country in the world that 
currently operates a commercial-scale FR, the BN-600; active construction of a slightly 
larger plant, the BN-800, has recently resumed after having been largely on hold since the 
1980s.167 In the 1990s, the United States, France, Britain, Germany, and other countries 
terminated large-scale FR commercialization efforts, though in a number of countries some 
longer-term R&D continued. More recently, as part of the various efforts to develop 
advanced systems for a possible future resurgence of nuclear energy, including the 
“Generation IV” initiative and others, FRs have again received increased attention as a long-
term option.168 
Hence, having found in the last chapter that reprocessing and recycling in LWRs will not 
be economic until uranium prices increase to some ten times their present level (or 
reprocessing costs are dramatically reduced), the next logical question is: at what point would 
recycling in fast-neutron reactors be economic? That is the subject of this chapter. 
                                                 
167 For a discussion of the current status of the BN-600 and the construction on the BN-800, see “Director of the 
Beloyarskaya Power Plant: Results for 2002 and Priorities for 2003,” (Interview) www.gazeta555.narod.ru, 
December 30, 2002 (translated by U.S. Department of Energy). Note, however, that another BN-800 at Mayak, 
whose construction had also been started but then put on hold, has been abandoned in favor of building a 
cheaper LWR at the same site. See Sergey Savenkov, “Minister Rumiantsev: Minatom Will Not be Privatized,” 
(Interview), www.uralpress.ru, April 4, 2003 (translated by U.S. Department of Energy). Rumiantsev said “we 
do not cancel the BN-800 construction at Beloyarskaya NPP because it is our testing ground and we have tested 
all our reactors for peaceful purposes there,” implying that he did not expect that this initial unit would be 
economically competitive or would soon lead to full commercialization. 
168 See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee and 
Generation IV International Forum, A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems 
(Washington, DC: DOE, December 2002). 
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3.2.  Breakeven Uranium Price for Fast Reactors 
This question introduces additional complications, because one must account not only for 
the differences in fuel-cycle costs but also the fact that the capital cost of FRs and LWRs 
may be different—and reactor capital cost is a much larger contributor to the overall cost of 
nuclear-generated electricity than are fuel-cycle costs. (We have assumed for the sake of 
simplicity that the non-fuel operations and maintenance (O&M) costs of LWRs and FRs 
would be the same, so that only the capital costs and the fuel costs would vary; this is a 
generous assumption, as some studies have suggested that FRs would have higher non-fuel 
O&M costs.169) 
Traditionally, the estimated capital costs of sodium-cooled fast-neutron reactors have 
been 10-50% higher than those of light-water reactors. In the last couple of decades, a 
significant portion of fast-neutron reactor R&D has been focused on reducing the capital cost 
of FRs to a level roughly equal to that of LWRs—though at the same time there has been a 
continuing effort to reduce the capital cost of LWRs, and of other once-through thermal 
systems with which FRs must compete, such as high-temperature gas-cooled reactors. Hence, 
in the analyses in this chapter, in addition to varying the costs of the various fuel-cycle 
parameters, we also vary the capital cost difference between FRs and LWRs to explore this 
factor’s impact on the breakeven price and on the cost of electricity. 
In any assessment of the cost of services provided by large capital facilities (such as the 
cost of electricity from new reactors), the specifics of the financing arrangements, which 
depend on who owns the facility, turn out to be critical, as mentioned in Chapter 1. A 
government-owned facility can borrow money at low, risk-free rates, and typically does not 
have to pay taxes or insurance. A privately owned facility with a guaranteed rate of return—
such as a reactor owned by a regulated utility—has to pay a higher cost of money (though 
still a modest one, given the low risk the investors face with guaranteed returns), and has to 
pay corporate income taxes, property taxes, and insurance, all of which drive up the cost 
significantly. A privately owned facility whose returns are unregulated—as is increasingly 
the case for power plants in a number of countries—has to pay still higher costs of money, 
reflecting the higher risks to investors. Our assumptions with respect to these three generic 
types of cases are discussed in more detail below, as are our assumptions with respect to the 
other cost parameters in this calculation. 
Just as in the previous chapter, it will be cheaper to use LWRs with direct disposal of 
spent fuel until the uranium price gets high enough that the reduction in uranium cost from 
                                                 
169 See, for example, J.G. Delene, J. Sheffield, K.A. Williams, R.L. Reid, and S. Hadley, An Assessment of the 
Economics of Future Electric Power Generation Options and the Implications for Fusion, ORNL/TM-1999-243 
(Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1999), p. 11, which assumes non-fuel O&M costs for an 
advanced FR 20% higher (adding 1.8 mills/kW-hr) than those for an advanced LWR. Similarly, J.P. Crette, 
“Review of the Western European Breeder Programs,” Energy, Vol. 23, No. 7/8, pp. 581-591 (1998), estimates 
that once both were in series production, the non-fuel O&M cost of the European Fast Reactor (EFR) design 
would be 10% higher, per kilowatt-hour generated, than would that of an advanced PWR. See also Panel on 
Reactor-Related Options, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related 
Options (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995), p. 318, which estimates non-fuel O&M for small 
fast reactors at a somewhat higher cost per kilowatt-hour than those for large LWRs (though the estimate is the 
same as for small LWRs).  
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breeding and recycling plutonium in FRs compensates for their additional capital and fuel 
cycle costs. Figures 3.1-3.3 show the breakeven uranium price as a function of the difference 
in capital cost between LWRs and FRs ($/kWe), for government-owned facilities, facilities 
owned by a regulated utility with a guaranteed rate of return, and facilities owned by a 
private entity without a guaranteed rate of return.170 (For a description of the generic FR used 
in these calculations, see the sidebar, “Characteristics of the Model Fast Reactor.”) Table 3.1 
shows our central, low, and high estimates for the various cost parameters used to produce 
these graphs, along with the sensitivity of the outcome to changes in each parameter. The 
equations used to produce these results are given in Appendix A. 
Of these three cases, we have chosen the reactor owned by a regulated utility with a 
guaranteed rate of return as the reference case for the sensitivity analysis in table 3.1. This in 
itself may be a generous assumption, given the global trend toward increased reliance on 
Figure 3.1.  Breakeven uranium price for government-owned reactors, as a function of the 
capital cost difference between FRs and LWRs. 
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170 The graphs give the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the breakeven uranium price for a given capital cost 
difference, estimated using a Monte Carlo simulation in which each of the parameters in table 3.1 was 
represented by an independent probability distribution. In most cases we assume truncated normal distributions 
with 5th and 95th percentiles given by the “low” and “high” values in table 3.1; we assume a log-normal 
distribution for reprocessing costs and a uniform distribution for breeding ratio.  
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Figure 3.2.  Breakeven uranium price for utility-owned reactors v. capital cost difference.
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Figure 3.3.  Breakeven uranium price for private venture ownership v. capital cost 
difference. 
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Table 3.1. Estimates of fuel-cycle costs and other parameters and sensitivity analysis for the 
breakeven uranium price when the reactor is owned by a regulated utility. 
Parameter Value Breakeven U price (central = $340/kgU) 
Parameter low central high low high 
change 
compared 
to central 
Capital cost difference ($/kWe) 0 200 400 134 560 
–205 
+221 
Reactor owner  govt utility private 222 574 –118 +234 
Reprocessing cost ($/kgHM) 500 1000 2000 255 516 –85 +176 
Enrichment ($/SWU) 150 100 50 282 415 –58 +75 
LMR core fabrication ($/kgHM) 700 1500 2300 286 394 ±54 
LMR breeding ratio 1.0 1.125 1.25 294 386 ±46 
Geological disposal cost 
difference ($/kgHM) 300 200 100 322 358 ±18 
LEU burnup (MWtd/kgHM) 43 53 53 322 340 –17 
Construction time (yr) 3 6 9 326 355 ±15 
LMR blanket fab. ($/kgHM) 150 250 350 325 355 ±15 
LEU fuel fabrication ($/kgHM) 350 250 150 327 353 ±13 
Capacity factor (%) 90 85 80 328 353 ±13 
Preop, contingency costs (%) 5 10 15 330 350 ±10 
Interim storage ($/kgHM) 300 200 100 332 348 ±8 
Conversion ($/kgU) 8 6 4 338 342 ±2 
Depleted uranium ($/kg) 6 6 U price 340 341 +1 
 
privatized power plants operating in competitive electricity markets without guaranteed rates 
of return. While there remain some major countries where power plants are built and 
operated by a government-owned monopoly, this is not likely to be the case in most countries 
that will have to consider the choice between once-through nuclear reactors and FRs with 
recycling. 
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As shown in figure 3.2 and table 3.1 for the case of a utility-owned reactor, if the capital 
cost of FRs is $200/kWe greater than that of LWRs, and the other parameters are at the 
values listed as our central estimates, recycling plutonium in FRs will not be economic until 
the price of uranium rises to over $340/kgU, which is not likely to occur for many decades, if 
ever. If the capital cost of FRs is equal to that of LWRs, the breakeven uranium price for our 
central estimates of the other parameters is roughly $130/kgU—still a price that remains far 
in the future. For a government-owned facility with its lower costs of money, possible 
differences in capital cost between FRs and LWRs would make less difference, while for a 
private entity without a regulated rate of return, these differences would be even more critical 
than in the utility case. 
One generous assumption we have made in preparing these graphs should be noted. Since 
there are currently hundreds of tons of already separated plutonium in storage, awaiting use 
as reactor fuel, we have assigned zero cost to providing the plutonium needed for the initial 
FR reactor cores. A number of past analyses (including by FR advocates) have assumed that 
the cost of reprocessing LWR fuel to recover plutonium for the initial core must be charged 
to the cost of the FR; in general, this cost is then envisioned as being capitalized over the life 
of the reactor.171 This assumption may still be valid, if the switch to fast reactors is in fact 
driven by them becoming economically competitive with rising uranium prices: if fast 
reactors were then deployed in numbers large enough to make a substantial contribution to 
growing world electricity demand, existing stockpiles of separated plutonium would not be 
sufficient to start them up, and reprocessing of spent fuel to provide the necessary plutonium 
would be needed. Moreover, by the time uranium increases in price to a level at which 
deployment of FRs would be seriously considered, separated plutonium will begin to have 
substantial value. If the cost of reprocessing LWR fuel was $1000/kgHM and each kilogram 
of LWR fuel reprocessed provided roughly 10 grams of usable plutonium, then the cost of 
start-up plutonium would be $100,000 per kilogram; taking full account of possible savings 
in storage and waste-disposal costs and the value of the recovered uranium, the cost is on the 
order of $30,000 per kilogram.172 In that case, the cost of the plutonium for the start-up fuel 
would add over $300/kWe to the initial cost of the kind of FR we have been considering.173 
(HEU could be used for the initial core, but cost per kilowatt would even higher than with 
                                                 
171 See, for example, J.G. Delene, L.C. Fuller and C.R. Hudson, ALMR Deployment Economic Analysis, 
ORNL/TM-12344 (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1993).  See also Y.I. Chang and C.E. Till, 
“Economic Prospects of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) Fuel Cycle,” undated paper (ca. 1991). Chang and Till 
conclude that at a cost of $1000/kgHM, reprocessing LWR fuel “is too expensive for the LMR startup: 
including the ex-core inventory, the fissile inventory cost would run close to $1 billion per GWe.” 
172 This assumes that reprocessing would avoid interim storage of spent fuel (at $200/kgHM) and would reduce 
the cost of geological disposal by $200/kgHM, and that the value of the recovered uranium is $300/kg 
(appropriate for uranium prices of $360/kgU). 
173 The characteristics of the generic fast reactor we have used in our calculations are drawn from those used in 
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, Generation IV Roadmap: 
Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group (Washington, DC: DOE, March 18, 2001, available as of December 
16, 2003 at http://www.ne.doe.gov/reports/GenIVRoadmapFCCG.pdf.). This generic system has a core loading 
of 11.5 kgHM/MWey (24.6% plutonium) and a core fuel residence time of 3 years, and hence an initial core 
loading of 0.0085 kgPu/kWe; at $30,000/kgPu, this amounts to about $250/kWe. Including an additional one-
third core for the initial reload brings the total cost to over $300/kWe.  The model system we have used is 
described further in As described in the sidebar, “Characteristics of the Model Fast Reactor.” 
 
DIRECT DISPOSAL VS. RECYCLING IN FAST-NEUTRON REACTORS  73 
 
 
plutonium.174) This could be offset somewhat by the sale of excess plutonium generated 
during the operation of the reactor; rough calculations indicate that with a breeding ratio of 
1.25, such sales would reduce the net plutonium cost to about $200/kWe.175 Even if the other 
capital costs of the FR could be reduced to be equal to that of a once-through system, for the 
other nominal values of our parameters, the uranium breakeven price would still be at our 
central estimate of about $340/kgU, a level at which the quantities of uranium resources 
available would likely be sufficient for 100 years or more, even with substantial nuclear 
growth. 
 
Table 3.2 gives breakeven values of several other price parameters for the case of a 
regulated utility owner, assuming a uranium price of $50/kgU and central values for other 
parameters. Note that reductions in the price of reprocessing alone cannot make FRs 
economic so long as the FRs remain $200/kWe more expensive than LWRs.  
 
Table 3.2.  Breakeven prices of selected parameters, assuming a regulated utility 
owner, a uranium price of $50/kgU, and central values for other parameters. 
 
Parameter 
Central 
Estimate 
Breakeven 
Value 
Breakeven 
Central 
Capital cost difference ($/kWe) 200 –95  
Disposal cost difference ($/kgHM) 200 3400 17 
Interim spent fuel storage ($/kgHM) 200 4100 21 
Enrichment ($/SWU) 100 570 5.7 
Reprocessing ($/kgHM) 1000 < 0  
Uranium ($/kgU) 50 340 6.8 
    
3.3.  Cost of Electricity for Fast Reactors and Once-through Systems 
Figure 3.4 shows the difference between the cost of electricity from FRs with recycling 
and LWRs operating on a once-through cycle, as a function of the price of uranium, for 
difference in capital cost between the FRs and the LWRs of $0 to $400/kWe. (for the case of 
reactors owned by regulated utilities, with other parameters set at their nominal values). 
Since the FRs can rely on the very large existing stockpiles of depleted uranium for their 
make-up fuel (at least until those stockpiles are consumed), their electricity price is not 
affected by increasing uranium price, while the electricity price from once-through LWRs 
                                                 
174 The start-up core and initial reload would require 46 kg/kWe of HEU with an enrichment of about 25% U-
235. Assuming uranium, conversion, and enrichment prices of $50/kgU, $6/kgU, and $100/SWU, respectively, 
the cost would be $8,300/kg of HEU, equivalent to $380/kWe. Using the breakeven price of uranium in our 
reference case ($340/kgU) would increase these costs to $22,000/kg HEU and $1000/kWe. 
175 The generic LMR with a breeding ratio of 1.25 produces an excess of 0.3 kgPu/MWey; at $30,000/kgPu and 
a discount rate of 5%/y over 30 y, and taking into account the plutonium recovered from the final core, the net 
present value of the recovered plutonium is about $130/kWe. 
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increases as the uranium price increases. Nevertheless, the electricity price for FRs will 
remain significantly higher than that for LWRs operating on a once-through cycle until 
uranium prices reach many times their current level—a development that is not likely to 
occur for many decades to come. 
Figure 3.4.  The difference in the cost of electricity between an FR with recycling and an 
LWR with direct disposal as a function of the price of uranium, for differences in the 
initial capital cost of $0, $100, $200, $300, and 400/kWe, assuming a utility ownership. 
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This overall finding is broadly consistent with recent studies by the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the Generation IV Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group. The NEA assessment found that all of the 
approaches it examined which included FRs resulted in higher electricity costs than a once-
through approach using LWRs, with electricity generated entirely by FRs that recycled 
plutonium and minor actinides being roughly 50% more expensive than electricity generated 
by once-through LWRs.176 The NEA study, however, did not examine how this would be 
changed by possible future increases in uranium price. The Generation IV Fuel Cycle 
Crosscut Group examined the fuel cycle contribution to electricity costs for different types of 
nuclear energy mixes throughout the 21st century, during which time they projected uranium 
prices to increase dramatically; despite those projected increases (and despite looking only at 
fuel cycle costs, and therefore not including any increased capital cost of fast reactors), the 
                                                 
176 NEA, Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 219. 
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costs for all the mixes that included fast reactors remained higher throughout the century than 
the price for electricity from once-through LWRs.177 Similarly, a mid-1990s study by a 
committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (using somewhat different assumptions 
than our own, including charging the cost of separating plutonium for startup fuel to the cost 
of the FR) concluded that the electricity cost of FRs would be substantially higher than that 
of once-through LWRs until uranium reached a price of well over $250/kgU (1992$), even if 
reprocessing costs for LWR fuel and FR fuel could be reduced to roughly the lower bound of 
our projected range.178 
3.4.  Cost Parameters and Variations 
In the remainder of this chapter, we explain the particular central, high, and low values of 
the parameters we have chosen for modeling the economics of FRs, and discuss the 
sensitivity of the outcome to variations in these individual estimates. Since there are no 
commercial-scale FRs now operating that were built in countries that were market economies 
at the time, the parameters for the fast reactor case are largely based on studies of potential, 
but as-of-yet unrealized, breeder systems. We have relied heavily on recent overviews of fuel 
cycles including FRs, to provide an update of current thinking on costs of particular 
parameters.179  
3.4.1.  Difference in capital cost 
The two most sensitive parameters in this analysis are the difference in capital cost 
between FRs and LWRs and the financing arrangements for capital costs. We have assumed 
a central value of $200/kWe for the difference in capital cost, with a low case of $0 (equal 
capital cost) and a high case of $400/kWe. For the reference case of a privately-owned utility 
with a regulated rate of return, this central estimate results in a breakeven uranium price of 
$340/kgU; this breakeven price is reduced by about $200/kgU if the capital cost difference is 
eliminated, and increased by $220/kgU if the capital cost difference is doubled. 
We chose our range to reflect past experience and current peer-reviewed estimates for the 
additional capital cost of fast reactors, and the expectation that there would be further 
progress in bringing costs down before fast reactors would be deployed. The most recent FR 
designs before major commercialization efforts were canceled in the United States and 
Western Europe were expected to be significantly more expensive than comparably advanced 
LWRs. The capital cost of the U.S. Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR) was estimated 
in the mid-1990s, shortly before the program’s termination, to be 20-30% higher than the 
capital costs of advanced LWRs—a difference amounting to an additional $400/kWe (1992 
dollars) compared to a small PWR or $600/kWe compared to a large PWR ($500-$740/kWe 
                                                 
177 DOE, Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, op. cit., pp. 3-53, 3-68, 3-72, 3-
76, 3-79. 
178 U.S. National Research Council, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, Committee on Separations 
Technology and Transmutation Systems, Nuclear Wastes—Technologies for Separations and Transmutation 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), pp. 218-222. 
179 See particularly NEA, Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel 
Cycles, op. cit., and DOE, Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, op. cit.  
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in 2003 dollars, well above the range of extra costs we examine here).180 Similarly, the 
European Fast Reactor (EFR), after having achieved major reduc–tions in various elements 
of capital cost compared to earlier European FR designs, was expected to have a capital cost 
in series production 20-30% higher than that of a comparable LWR.181 Even Russia’s 
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), in recent years one of the institutions most 
enthusiastic about the near-term commercialization of fast reactors, has acknowledged, in the 
words of Minister Alexander Rumiantsev, that “life has proved that a VVER-1000 reactor [a 
modern Russian LWR design] is one and a half times cheaper than a BN [fast neutron] 
reactor…[LWRs] are cheaper, safer, and economically more viable.”182 Minister 
Rumiantsev’s statement suggests that the capital cost of the new fast reactor is 50% higher 
than the capital cost of a comparable LWR. Some fast reactor designers argue, however, that 
recent developments would make it possible to build FRs at a cost no higher than that of 
LWRs,183 and the Japanese fast reactor program, among others, has set capital cost equality 
with LWRs as an explicit goal.184 
 New FR concepts being pursued for the long-term future of nuclear energy, such as lead-
cooled and gas-cooled FR systems, are hoped to have lower capital costs than traditional 
sodium-cooled FRs.185  The economic features of these proposed concepts remain 
undemonstrated, however.  At the same time, new once-through systems are hoped to have 
significantly lower capital costs than traditional LWRs, so the target that FRs must reach to 
be equal in capital cost to once-through systems is moving.  In the case of both advanced fast 
reactor concepts and once-through systems such as the proposed pebble-bed reactor, for 
example, it is hoped to reduce cost by avoiding the need for high-pressure containment 
structures. 
                                                 
180 See, for example, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, op. 
cit., p. 318. This study drew on a DOE technical review committee assessment of costs estimated by vendors 
proposing different reactor concepts, including the ALMR and several LWRs. 
181 The final report of the European Fast Reactor programme is European Fast Reactor 98: Outcome of Design 
Studies (Lyon, France: EFR Associates, 1998). The contribution of initial capital cost to generating cost is 
shown there to be 30% higher for the EFR in series production than for a comparably advanced LWR (p. 19). In 
a personal communication from J.C. Lefevre, head of the EFR design team, April 2003, however, he put the 
excess capital cost in the range of 20%. See also Crette, “Review of the Western European Breeder Programs,” 
op. cit., which estimates a capital difference of 26% in series production. 
182 Sergey Savenkov, “Minister Rumiantsev: Minatom Will Not be Privatized,” (Interview), www.uralpress.ru, 
April 4, 2003 (translated by the U.S. Department of Energy). 
183 See, for example, C.E. Boardman, M. Hui, G. Carroll, and A. E. Dubberley, “Economic Assessment of S-
PRISM Including Development and Generating Costs” (San Jose, CA: GE Nuclear Energy, no date). 
184 See, for example, Hiroshi Noda and Tatsutoshi Inagaki, “Feasibility Study on Commercialized FR Cycle 
Systems in Japan—The Results in the First Phase and Future Plans of the Study,” paper presented at “Global 
2001: The Back End of the Fuel Cycle—From Research to Solutions,” Paris, September 9-13, 2001.  This paper 
specifies that initial demonstration fast reactors are expected to be far more expensive than LWRs, but it is 
hoped in the future to reduce their costs to 0.34 million yen/kWe, (compared to .3 million yen/kWe for LWRs), 
and then, after further cost reductions (now the target of feasibility studies), to reach the goal of 0.2 million yen/ 
kWe,, which is the cost expected for LWRs in the 2030 time frame.  This corresponds to roughly $1800/kWe  
(2003 dollars).  The same target was specified in Kiyoto Aizawa, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, 
“Feasibility Studies on Commercialized FR Cycle System,” presentation, Aomori, Japan, July 22, 2000. 
185 See, for example, NERAC, A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems, op. cit. 
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Recent estimates of the cost of building LWRs cover a broad range.186 Estimates based 
on actual industrial experience—that is, the costs of advanced reactors that have been built in 
recent years—tend to be over $2000/kWe.187 Estimates for future construction from official 
peer-reviewed assessments are in the range of $1500-$2000/kWe. The Nuclear Energy 
Agency of the OECD, for example, reported overnight construction costs ranging from 
$1585 to $2639/kWe (in 1996 dollars; $1800 to $3000/kWe in 2003 dollars). Similarly, the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its most recent Annual Energy Outlook, 
assumed overnight capital costs for advanced nuclear systems that could come on-line in 
2007 of $1750/kWe (2001 dollars), or $2137/kWe when a 10% contingency factor and a 10% 
multiplier for technological optimism were included (with this higher figure declining, in the 
reference case, to $1906/kWe by 2025); the EIA also examined an “advanced nuclear cost” 
case, in which the higher figure including contingency and optimism factors started at 
$1535/kWe in 2010, declining to $1228/kWe in 2025.188 By contrast, a wide range of reactor 
vendors have projected overnight capital costs for their proposed systems of $1000 to 
$1500/kWe.189 
If LWRs at the future date when FRs might begin to be deployed commercially had a 
capital cost of $1500/kWe, then our range of $0-$400/kWe difference in capital cost would 
translate to 0 to 27%—the high end of our range being comparable to the percentage of 
additional cost envisioned in the most recent fully designed commercial systems, and the low 
end representing success in current development efforts focused on equalizing the capital 
cost. The range we have chosen is substantially more generous to future fast reactor systems 
than the range chosen in the most recent NEA assessment, whose nominal estimate for future 
fast reactors was $400/kWe higher than their $1700/kWe nominal estimate for future LWRs, 
with a range from $150/kWe higher than the LWR figure to $900/kWe higher.190 Hence, we 
believe our range is a conservative estimate of the possible additional capital costs of 
building fast reactors. This is particularly the case given that recycling in future fast reactors 
must compete not only with LWRs but with other future once-through nuclear systems 
designed for low capital cost (such as the particle-bed high-temperature gas reactor, among 
others). 
3.4.2.  Reactor ownership and financing arrangements 
The next most sensitive factor are the financing arrangements for the additional capital 
costs of the FR. As already mentioned, we consider three generic cases: government 
ownership and financing of the reactor; ownership and financing by a regulated utility with a 
guaranteed rate of return; and ownership and financing by a private company with no 
                                                 
186 For a useful overview, see John M. Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power: An 
Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 2003, available as of 
July 30, 2003 at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/).  
187 Tokyo Electric Power, for example, reports that its most recently completed plants (1,356 MWe GE 
Advanced Boiling Water Reactor designs) cost 418 billion yen and 367 billion yen (roughly $2200-$2600/kWe, 
at an exchange rate of 120 yen/$).  See Deutch and Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power, op. cit. 
188 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2003 (Washington, 
DC: EIA, March 2003), p. 73, and p. 85. 
189 See, for example, the listing in Deutch and Moniz, co-chairs, The Future of Nuclear Power, op. cit. 
190 See NEA, Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. 
cit., p. 216. 
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guaranteed rate of return. The differences in calculated uranium breakeven price between 
these three cases are large: if the difference in capital cost is $200/kWe, government 
ownership would reduce the breakeven uranium price by about $120/kgU from the $340/kgU 
estimate for the nominal regulated utility case, while ownership by an entity with no 
guaranteed rate of return would increase the uranium breakeven price by $230/kgU.  
These changes are driven by the very different financial context for each of these three 
cases. For the government case, we assume a 4% real cost of money, and no taxes or 
insurance. With a 30-year recovery period, this leads to an annual fixed charge rate (FCR)—
the fraction of the initial capital cost that revenue must bring in every year—of 5.8%. For the 
regulated utility case and the unregulated private venture case, we use substantially higher 
costs of money, reflecting the higher risks to investors in these cases, along with payment of 
corporate income taxes, property taxes, and insurance, leading to FCRs of 12.3% and 20.8% 
per year, respectively. These figures are drawn from a major National Academy of Sciences 
study of fuel cycle options,191 and are somewhat more optimistic (for the utility case) than the 
Electric Power Research Institute’s approach to assessing the cost of new power plants.192 
For these comparisons, we have assumed that the reactors take 6 years to build, with a 
range from 3 years to 9 years. Construction time enters into the economics by affecting the 
interest during construction (IDC), which is added to overnight cost; we have assumed a real 
average cost of money of 4% per year for the government, 6.4% per year for the regulated 
utility, and 13.9% per year for the unregulated private venture during the construction period. 
For the government, regulated utility, and unregulated private venture cases, IDC for this six-
year construction time and our assumed spend-out of the funds during construction adds 
about 11%, 19%, and 45%, respectively, to the overnight capital cost. Because the same 
period of construction is assumed for both the LWR and the FR in the comparison, 
construction time would not affect the uranium breakeven price if the difference in capital 
cost was zero; it only affects the outcome in cases where there is an additional capital cost 
(incurring additional IDC) for the FR. For the nominal regulated-utility-owned case with an 
extra overnight capital cost of $200/kWe for the FR, reducing construction time to 3 years 
decreases breakeven uranium price by $14/kgU, while increasing construction time to 9 years 
increases the breakeven price by $16/kgU. 
Once the power plant has been built, there are further costs in getting it ready for full 
operation, referred to as pre-operating costs. We have assumed a nominal figure for these 
pre-operating costs of 10% of overnight capital costs, with a low of 5% and a high of 15%. 
The low figure reduces the breakeven uranium price by $10/kgU, the high figure increases it 
by $10/kgU. 
In such calculations, a contingency factor is usually introduced to account for unexpected 
additional costs that may emerge as a reactor is being built. We have assigned a nominal 
value of 10% for both the FRs and the LWRs, with a low of 5% and a high of 15%. Here, 
too, the result of the variation is a change of ±$10/kgU in the breakeven uranium price. 
                                                 
191NAS, Nuclear Wastes—Technologies for Separations and Transmutation, op. cit., p. 432. 
192 Electric Power Research Institute, Technical Assessment Guide: Volume 3, Revision 8: Fundamentals and 
Methods - Electricity Supply TR-100281-V3R8 (Palo Alto, CA: EPRI, 1999). 
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3.4.3.  Reprocessing costs 
Uranium breakeven price for recycling in FRs is also sensitive to the cost of reprocessing 
FR fuel. For simplicity, we have chosen a central estimate of FR reprocessing cost (applied 
to both the core fuel and the blanket fuel) of $1000/kgHM, with a low of $500/kgHM and a 
high of $2000/kgHM—the same range considered in the previous chapter for reprocessing of 
LWR fuel. (This is the only case where we have used a log-normal distribution, extending 
higher above the central estimate than below.) At the low reprocessing price, the calculated 
breakeven uranium price falls by $85/kgU from the nominal $340/kgU, while at the high 
price, it increases by $175/kgU. 
Using a range equal to the range for reprocessing LWR fuel is a generous assumption, as 
reprocessing costs for higher-burnup FR fuels with much higher plutonium loadings 
generally will be significantly higher, given the greater difficulty of managing criticality with 
the higher plutonium content fuels, and increased complexity of dissolving them. The recent 
NEA review, for example, posited a range of 1000-2000-2500 $/kgHM (low-central-high 
values) for the costs of core fuel reprocessing, and 900-1500-2500 $/kgHM (low-central-high 
values) for the costs of blanket fuel reprocessing; both of these are substantially higher than 
our range.193 The $500/kgHM lower bound of our range is intended to cover the possibility of 
substantial technological advance in the future. The $2000/kgHM upper bound is by no 
means the actual upper bound of what FR reprocessing might cost, but if the actual 
reprocessing cost turns out to be higher there is little hope of uranium reaching the resulting 
breakeven price in the foreseeable future. Additional discussion of the cost of reprocessing in 
existing plants, and possible future developments, is provided in the previous chapter, and in 
Appendix B.  
3.4.4.  Core and blanket fuel fabrication cost 
We have assumed that the fabrication costs of FR core fuel amount to $1500/kgHM, with 
a range from $700/kgHM to $2300/kgHM. The low-end fabrication cost would reduce the 
calculated breakeven uranium price by about $55/kgU, while the high-end cost would 
increase it by $55/kgU.  
As with reprocessing cost, the range presented for plutonium fuel fabrication cost is the 
same range we used for the LWR recycling case. Here, too, the use of the same range is 
generous, since FRs will require fuel with much higher plutonium loadings, designed to 
reach much higher burnups, which will generally mean a significantly higher fabrication 
cost.194 The cost range we have assumed for core fuel element fabrication is approximately 
                                                 
193 NEA, Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 216. 
194The recent NEA study, for example, estimated fabrication prices for fast reactor MOX substantially higher 
than those for LWR MOX, and prices for fast reactor fuels containing minor actinides as well far higher still.  
See NEA, Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 216.  Higher costs for fuel certified to higher burnups and higher plutonium concentrations (which mean, 
among other things, greater care required in maintaining criticality safety) have been traditional in the fuel 
fabrication business, although this may change if non-pelletized fuels are adopted in the future.  The recent 
NEA study, for example, estimated fabrication prices for fast reactor MOX substantially higher than those for 
LWR MOX, and prices for fast reactor fuels containing minor actinides as well far higher still.  
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equal to that employed in the recent NEA analysis for fast reactors using plutonium-uranium 
mixed oxide (MOX) fuels (their estimates are within 10% of ours for the low, medium, and 
high figures).195 The large range between the lower and upper estimates employed by that 
study—obtained through consensus among international groups of experts—reflects the very 
modest industrial experience base for fabricating FR fuel. For metal-fueled reactors, where 
the NEA study assumed minor actinides would also be recycled with the plutonium, they 
envisioned that core fuel fabrication would be more expensive (because of the extra cost of 
handling the more radioactive minor actinides), with a range of 1400-2600-5000 $/kgHM. 
(Recent estimates of metal FR fuel fabrication costs that do not also include minor actinides 
are rare, because so much of the current emphasis in fast reactor development is focused on 
transmutation of these minor actinides.) 
We assume that fabrication costs of blanket fuel (made from depleted uranium without 
any plutonium content) are the same as those we assumed for LEU fuel for LWRs—a 
nominal figure of $250/kgHM, ranging from a low of $150/kgHM (representing possible 
future technological advance) to a high of $350/kgHM. This variable has only a small effect 
on the uranium breakeven price—about ±$15/kgU. This estimated range appears again to be 
generous to the FR case, as our range is a factor of two lower than that used in the recent 
NEA assessment.196 We have kept our estimates low because fuel that provides less power 
per kilogram generally costs less to fabricate (given the lower tolerances that are permitted), 
and FR blanket fuel typically provides little power.  
3.4.5.  Geological disposal of reprocessing waste 
The cost of disposing of reprocessing wastes (as compared to the cost of direct disposal 
of LWR spent fuel) is another important parameter in finding the breakeven uranium price. It 
is less sensitive than reprocessing price because, with a relatively modest nominal estimate of 
$200/kgHM, the range over which disposal cost might vary is substantially smaller than the 
range of possible reprocessing cost. Decreasing the present value at the time of fuel discharge 
of the cost of geological disposal of reprocessing waste to $100/kgHM or increasing it to 
$300/kgHM lowers or raises the uranium breakeven price by $18/kgU. Since the costs of 
direct disposal of LWR spent fuel are assumed to be $400/kgHM, the corresponding 
variation of the difference in costs between the disposal of reprocessing waste and the direct 
disposal of LWR spent fuel amounts to $200 ± $100/kgHM, the same range discussed in the 
previous chapter. Using the same range for disposal of reprocessing waste from FR fuel as 
for reprocessing of LWR fuel is again generous, as one would expect in general that 
reprocessing wastes from higher-burnup fast reactor fuel would have higher activity and 
higher volume, increasing their costs of disposal. (This factor is compensated for, however, 
by the fact that we have chosen the same cost of disposal for wastes from reprocessing the 
blanket fuel, which will have low burnup, and the core fuel, which will have high burnup.) 
These cost estimates are discussed in the previous chapter. 
                                                 
195 NEA, Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 216. 
196 NEA, Accelerator-driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles, op. cit., 
p. 216; their range was 350-500-700 $/kgHM for either oxide or metal blanket fuel fabrication. 
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3.4.6.  Breeding ratio 
The breeding ratio for the fast reactor—the ratio of fissile atoms produced to those 
consumed—is another sensitive parameter. In our model, the higher the breeding ratio, the 
worse the economics. This is because higher breeding ratios involve more blanket material 
that must be reprocessed each year, with the associated costs of reprocessing. This result, 
however, is in part an artifact of our assigning a zero cost to the initial core fuel; if producing 
fuel for startup of additional FRs was assigned a substantial value, then FRs with higher 
breeding ratios would be more competitive. 
We have assumed a nominal breeding ratio of 1.125, with a low of 1.0 and a high of 1.25. 
FRs with lower breeding ratios (consuming more fuel than they produced) would presumably 
not be deployed if the concern was depletion of uranium resources leading to escalating 
uranium prices, though they might be deployed to consume plutonium and minor actinides as 
part of a waste-management strategy. For the nominal regulated-utility-owned case, the low 
breeding ratio would reduce the uranium breakeven price by $46/kgU, while the high value 
would increase it by $46/kgU. 
3.4.7.  Depleted uranium price 
After their initial cores and first reloads, the only fuel FRs would require is additional 
depleted uranium as “make-up” material to replace uranium transformed into plutonium, 
fissioned, or lost in processing. Many thousands of tons of depleted uranium (DU) already 
exist in the stored waste from uranium enrichment plants. As long as uranium demand is 
driven by LWRs, there will be little use for this DU and its price will be low. On the other 
hand, once uranium prices increase enough that FRs would have some hope of being 
competitive, those holding stocks of DU may begin to assign some significant value to it, in 
anticipation of its use to fuel a large number of FRs in the future. In our study, we therefore 
assume a central DU price of $6/kgU—the price of converting the material from uranium 
hexafluoride. When the demand for uranium begins to be dominated by breeders, and 
previous stocks of DU begin to be drawn down, the price of DU should approach the price of 
natural uranium, since the use of DU and natural uranium are almost perfect substitutes for 
use in breeder blankets. Hence, we use the breakeven natural uranium price as the upper 
value for DU in our sensitivity analysis. Since the breakeven uranium price is likely to 
amount to hundreds of dollars per kilogram of uranium—according to our calculations at 
least—our sensitivity calculation change is highly asymmetric. In any case, even with such a 
high upper bound, the depleted uranium price has virtually no effect on the economics of 
FRs. 
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Sidebar: Thermal-Neutron and Fast-Neutron Reactors 
The likelihood that a neutron will split (or fission) an atom of U-235 or plutonium 
depends on the neutron’s speed. If the neutrons from a nuclear chain reaction are slowed 
down to the point where they are traveling at roughly the speeds that would result from the 
normal motion of the atoms at that temperature—so-called “thermal” neutrons—then their 
likelihood of hitting a nucleus of one of these isotopes and splitting it (the “fission cross-
section”) is greatly increased. As a result, with thermal neutrons a nuclear chain reaction can 
be sustained without as high a density of these atoms—for example in a reactor using fuel 
with only a few percent of U-235. Reactors operating on this principle are known as thermal-
neutron reactors, or simply thermal reactors. Nuclear materials that can sustain a nuclear 
chain reaction in such a thermal neutron spectrum are referred to as “fissile” materials.197 
This slowing down or “moderation” is accomplished by arranging the nuclear fuel 
amongst a substantial quantity of some light element; when the neutrons scatter off the light 
atoms, they lose some of their energy. The most common neutron moderators are water 
(either “heavy water,” meaning water in which the hydrogen atoms have not just a proton and 
an electron but a neutron as well, or ordinary water, known in the nuclear world as “light 
water”), and carbon (usually in the form of very pure graphite—the purity being required 
because many of the common impurities are potent neutron absorbers). In systems with high 
“neutron efficiency,” a very small fraction of the neutrons leak out or are absorbed by the 
moderator, and the nuclear reaction can be sustained with natural uranium (containing only 
0.7% U-235). This is the case, for example, with heavy-water moderated reactors such as the 
Canadian Deuterium-Uranium (CANDU) reactor. In systems with a lower neutron efficiency, 
such as in light-water reactors (LWRs), the fuel must be enriched to several percent U-235 to 
sustain the nuclear chain reaction. 
Reactors that rely on a nuclear chain reaction using neutrons that have not been 
substantially slowed down are referred to as “fast-neutron reactors,” or simply “fast reactors” 
(FRs). In this case, because the fission cross-section for these fast neutrons is much smaller, a 
much greater density of fuel atoms is needed to sustain the nuclear chain reaction. Typical 
FR fuels contain 20-30% U-235 or plutonium, compared to 3-4% for an LWR. 
For decades, the main reason for focusing on FRs was a concern that uranium would run 
out, and it would be necessary to produce plutonium from the U-238 that makes up more 
than 99% of natural uranium, vastly extending the available uranium resource. Fast reactors 
could be designed with a core of 20-30% U-235 or plutonium to sustain the chain reaction, 
surrounded by “blankets” of U-238 that would absorb neutrons and produce plutonium; by 
that means, such reactors could produce more atoms of potential fuel than they consumed, 
                                                 
197 The term “fissile material” is often mis-used to refer to materials that can sustain an explosive fast-neutron 
nuclear chain reaction, needed for a nuclear bomb. In reality, however, some materials (such as uranium 
enriched to 2-5%) can sustain a thermal-neutron chain reaction—and are thus properly “fissile”—but cannot 
sustain a chain reaction with fast neutrons and hence cannot provide the core of a nuclear bomb, while some 
other materials that cannot sustain a thermal-neutron chain reaction—and are thus not “fissile”—can sustain an 
explosive fast-neutron chain reaction, and are thus usable in nuclear weapons (such as the even-numbered 
isotopes of plutonium).  
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serving as “breeder” reactors. Hence FRs are often referred to as “fast breeder reactors,” or 
FBRs. (Since the most common types were to be cooled by molten metals, they are also often 
called liquid-metal fast breeder reactors or LMFBRs.) However, by taking away parts of the 
blanket (or otherwise reducing the degree of absorption in the blanket), FRs can be operated 
producing exactly the same amount of fuel as they consume (a “converter” system), or 
consuming more plutonium than they produce (a “burner” system). 
The nuclear material that absorbs neutrons to produce fissile material is referred to as 
“fertile” material (keeping the analogy implied by “breeding”). The most common fertile 
material considered is U-238, but the only naturally occurring isotope of thorium (Th-232) is 
another possibility that has been extensively examined; when it absorbs a neutron, it 
produces U-233, which is usable as fuel for either nuclear power plants or nuclear weapons. 
It is also possible to have thermal reactors that “breed”—that is, produce more fissile 
material than they consume. This is the idea behind the molten salt reactor (MSR), for 
example, which uses molten salts containing uranium or plutonium as fuel, coolant, and 
moderator all in one. These systems, however, tend to breed new fuel relatively slowly. 
Because the full extent of world uranium resources has only begun to be recognized (and the 
slow pace of the growth of nuclear energy has only become apparent in recent decades), most 
of the international research and development focused on breeding has been directed toward 
reactors that could produce a rapidly growing supply of nuclear fuel, which would be needed 
for a rapidly growing world nuclear reactor fleet. FRs offer higher capacity for such rapid 
breeding—usually measured by the “doubling time,” the time to double the amount of fissile 
fuel available—and hence have been the focus of most breeding research and 
development.198 
 
 
                                                 
198 For a useful summary of these issues written by scientists for the non-technical reader, see Richard L. 
Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and Megatons: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age? (New York: 
Knopf, 2001); for a more technical overview more specific to the issues discussed here, see, for example, 
Report to the American Physical Society by the Study Group on Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Waste Management, 
Reviews of Modern Physics, Volume 50, Number 1, Part 2, January 1978. 
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Sidebar: Characteristics of the Model Fast Reactor  
 
For the analyses in this chapter, we have based our calculations on a generic fast reactor, 
with characteristics drawn from those used in the recent report of the Generation IV Fuel 
Cycle Crosscut Team.199 
Our model specifies only those characteristics of the reactor that enter into calculations of 
electricity cost. We do not specify its total power. Rather, the important characteristics are 
specified per unit of power. We specify: 
• Capital cost in dollars per kilowatt-electric ($/kWe), as compared to comparably 
advanced LWRs (a nominal estimate of $200/kWe more than LWRs, with a range 
from no additional cost to $400/kWe). 
• Core loading of fuel, in kilograms of heavy metal per megawatt-electric-year 
(specified as 11.5 kgHM/MWey). This figure, combined with the unit costs of 
fabricating and reprocessing core fuel, determines the costs for core fuel per unit of 
electricity generated. The figure we have chosen is identical to that used in the 
calculations by the Generation IV team. Assuming a net electrical efficiency of 38% 
(as the Generation IV team did), and assuming that all the reactor power comes from 
the core, this corresponds to a burnup of 84 MWtd/kgHM. We have not varied this 
figure, which is independent of the breeding ratio and is determined by the burnup of 
the core fuel that can be achieved.200  For the nominal case of a utility-owned reactor, 
and our other nominal unit prices, if technological advances allowed the burnup to be 
doubled (and hence core fuel input per unit of electricity cut in half), the breakeven 
uranium price would be reduced by 21%, to approximately $320/kgU. 
• Blanket loading of fuel, examined at three different levels corresponding to the three 
breeding ratios described in the text (19.0 kgHM/MWey for a breeding ratio of 1.0, 
25.5 kgHM/MWey for a breeding ratio of 1.125, and 31.9 kgHM/MWe-yr for a 
breeding ratio of 1.25). The figures for breeding ratios of 1.0 and 1.25 are identical to 
those used by the Generation IV team, and the intermediate figure is a linear 
interpolation. As with core fuel, the amount of blanket fuel loaded each year, 
combined with the unit costs for its fabrication and reprocessing, determines the 
blanket fuel contribution to the electricity cost. 
• Residence time of core and blanket elements. With the annual input of core and 
blanket fuel fixed as input parameters, the only effect of changing the residence time 
is to change the period over which the costs of these fuels are discounted. We use a 3 
year residence time for core elements and a 3.25 year residence time for blanket 
elements, corresponding roughly to a weighted average of the residence times for 
                                                 
199 DOE, Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, op. cit., Table A2.5.4, 
supplemented by personal communication from David Wade, February 2003. 
200 The NEA analysis uses a figure of 10 rather than 11.5; this difference has a trivial effect on uranium 
breakeven price. 
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axial and radial blanket elements used by the Generation IV team (3 and 4 years, 
respectively). Varying the residence time has a minimal effect on uranium breakeven 
price. 
• Capacity factor, in percent. This is the fraction of the potential electrical generating 
capacity of the reactor that is actually used. Following the Generation IV team, we 
have used a nominal value of 85%; we have examined a range from 80% to 90%. 
The lower figure would increase the uranium breakeven price by $13/kgU for the 
nominal case, while the higher figure would reduce it by $13/kgU. 
• The fraction of the blanket that is replaced by fresh uranium in each year, to 
compensate for the uranium that is either fissioned or transmuted into plutonium or 
minor actinides (or, in fact, is lost during the entirety of the fuel cycle process) is 
called the make-up fraction in the blanket. We have assumed a nominal figure of 
2.4%, obtained by taking the weighted average for the axial and radial blankets used 
by the Generation IV team. Varying this fraction has virtually no effect on uranium 
breakeven price. 
  
   
   
   
4.  Conclusions 
  
The conclusions of this report can be simply stated: 
At a reprocessing price of $1000 per kilogram of heavy metal (kgHM), and with our 
other central estimates for the key fuel cycle parameters, reprocessing and recycling 
plutonium in existing light-water reactors (LWRs) will be more expensive than direct 
disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price reaches over $360 per kilogram of uranium 
(kgU)—a price that is not likely to be seen for many decades, if then. 
• 
• 
• 
At a uranium price of $40/kgU (comparable to current prices), reprocessing and recycling 
at a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM would increase the cost of nuclear electricity by 
1.3 mill/kWh.  Since the total back-end cost for the direct disposal is in the range of 1.5 
mill/kWh, this represents more than an 80% increase in the costs attributable to spent fuel 
management (after taking account of appropriate credits or charges for recovered 
plutonium and uranium from reprocessing). 
These figures for breakeven uranium price and contribution to the cost of electricity are 
conservative, because, to ensure that our conclusions were robust, we have assumed: 
 A central estimate of reprocessing cost, $1000/kgHM, which is substantially below 
the cost that would pertain in privately financed facilities with identical costs and 
capacities to the large commercial facilities now in operation. 
 A central estimate of plutonium fuel fabrication cost, $1500/kgHM, which is 
significantly below the price actually offered to most utilities in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 Zero charges for storage of separated plutonium or removal of americium. 
 Zero additional security, licensing, or shut-down expenses for the use of plutonium 
fuels in existing reactors. 
 A full charge for 40 years of interim storage in dry casks for all fuel going to direct 
disposal, and no interim storage charge for fuel going to reprocessing—even though 
most new reactors are built with storage capacity for their lifetime fuel generation, so 
few additional costs for interim storage need be incurred. 
 Geological disposal of spent MOX fuel at the same cost as disposal of spent LEU 
fuel. 
• Reprocessing and recycling plutonium in fast-neutron reactors (FRs) with an additional 
capital cost, compared to new LWRs, of $200/kWe installed will not be economically 
competitive with a once-through cycle in LWRs until the price of uranium reaches some 
$340/kgU, given our central estimates of the other parameters.  Even if the capital cost of 
new FRs could be reduced to equal that of new LWRs, recycling in FRs would not be 
economic until the uranium price reached some $140/kgU. 
• At a uranium price of $40/kgU, electricity from a plutonium-recycling FR with an 
additional capital cost of $200/kWe, and with our central estimates of the other 
parameters, would cost more than 7 mill/kWh more than electricity from a once-through 
LWR.  Even if the additional capital cost could be eliminated, the extra electricity cost 
would be over 2 mill/kWh. 
• As with reprocessing and recycling in LWRs, these figures on breakeven uranium price 
and extra electricity cost for FRs are conservative, as we have assumed: 
 Zero cost for providing start-up plutonium for the FRs. 
 Zero additional cost for reprocessing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel. 
   
88 ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
 
 Zero additional cost for manufacturing higher-plutonium-content FR fuel. 
 Zero additional operations and maintenance costs for FRs, compared to LWRs. 
• Costs for the far more complex chemical separations processes and more difficult fuel 
fabrication processes needed for more complete separation and transmutation of nuclear 
wastes would be substantially higher than those estimated here for traditional 
reprocessing.  Therefore the extra electricity cost, were these approaches to be pursued, 
would be even higher. 
• World resources of uranium likely to be economically recoverable in future decades at 
prices far below the breakeven price amount to tens of millions of tons, probably enough 
to fuel a rapidly-growing nuclear enterprise using a once-through fuel cycle for a century 
or more. 
 
In this report, we have focused only on the economic issues, and have not examined other 
issues in the broader debate over reprocessing.  Nevertheless, given (a) the costs outlined 
above; (b) the significant proliferation concerns that have been raised (particularly with 
respect to those reprocessing approaches that result in fully separated plutonium suitable for 
use in nuclear explosives); and (c) the availability of safe, proven, low-cost dry cask storage 
technology that will allow spent fuel to be stored for many decades, the burden of proof 
clearly rests on those in favor of investing in reprocessing in the near term.  
 
   
Appendix A.  Fuel-cycle Cost Calculations 
In this appendix we describe the fuel-cycle cost equations that were used to calculate 
differences in the cost of electricity between two fuel-cycle options. The difference in the cost of 
electricity depends on the price of natural uranium, as well as many other parameters; the 
“breakeven” uranium price is the price that would result in the same cost of electricity for both 
options, for a given set of other cost parameters. When uranium price is below the breakeven 
price, the fuel cycle with greater uranium requirements per kilowatt-hour (e.g., light-water 
reactors with direct disposal of spent fuel) is cheaper overall; when uranium price is above the 
breakeven price, the fuel cycle with lower uranium requirements (e.g., light-water or liquid-metal 
reactors operating with recycle of uranium and plutonium) is cheaper. 
A.1.  Direct Disposal v. Reprocessing and Recycle in LWRs 
 Here we take the point of view of a reactor operator that is deciding whether to reprocess 
spent fuel that has been discharged from a light-water reactor (LWR). If the utility decides not to 
reprocess, it would incur the costs of interim storage and permanent geological disposal of the 
spent fuel. Alternatively, the operator would pay to reprocess the spent fuel and to dispose of the 
resulting high-level waste (HLW) and other reprocessing wastes; these costs would be offset by 
the value of the recovered plutonium, which can be mixed with depleted uranium to produce 
mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, as well as the value of the recovered uranium, which can be used to 
produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. (When natural uranium and enrichment are cheap, as 
is currently the case, the recovered plutonium and uranium may have no value, and may even 
represent additional costs to the utility if their storage is expensive, as is the case with 
plutonium.) 
 Reprocessing and disposal of the resulting HLW generally is more expensive than direct 
disposal of spent fuel, while the value of the recovered plutonium and uranium increases with the 
price of natural uranium. The price of uranium that gives the same net present cost for both 
options is the “breakeven” price. The breakeven uranium price satisfies the following equation: 
  (A.1)  cost of interim storage cost of reprocessing value of recovered& disposal of spent fuel & disposal of HLW plutonium & uranium
    = −        

                                                
Uranium prices lower than the breakeven price favor direct-disposal; higher prices favor the 
reprocessing-recycle option. To simplify the analysis and ensure a level playing field, we assume 
that geological disposal costs of spent fuel and HLW are paid for at the same time after 
discharge, that spent MOX fuel is disposed of without reprocessing,201 and that other costs—
capital and non-fuel operations and maintenance costs—are equal for both options.202  
 
201 MOX fuel could be reprocessed and recycled, but undesirable isotopes build up with each recycling in light-water 
reactors, and there is a growing industry consensus that multiple recycling is not justified. For now, MOX spent fuel 
is being stored pending either geologic disposal or reprocessing to separate plutonium for use in fast-neutron 
reactors if they become commercially viable.  
202 Other costs may not be equal for both fuels, however. For example, there may be substantial costs to modify and 
license reactors to burn MOX and additional charges for secure storage of fresh MOX fuel at the reactor. The direct 
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A.1.1.  Direct Disposal 
 The direct-disposal option has two main cost components: interim storage and geological 
disposal of spent fuel. The net present cost at discharge of direct disposal per kilogram of spent 
fuel, Cdd (dollars per kilogram of initial heavy metal, $/kgHM) is 
 ( ) ( )1 1is ds
is ds
dd t
C CC
i i
= ++ + t  (A.2) 
where Cis is the cost of interim storage ($/kgHM), including packaging and shipping, paid at time 
tis after the fuel is discharged from the reactor, Cds is the cost of geological disposal ($/kgHM), 
including shipping, paid at time tds, and i is the discount rate (y–1). As discussed in chapter 2, we 
set tds = 0 so that Cds is the net present cost of geological disposal at discharge. In our reference 
case Cis = $200/kg, tis = 4 y, i = 0.05 y–1, and Cds = $400/kg, which gives Cdd = $200/(1.05)4 + 
$400 = $565/kgHM. 
 The amount added to the cost of electricity, cdd (dollars per kilowatt-hour, $/kWeh) to pay for 
direct disposal is 
 c C F
Bdd
dd c=
24 000, ε  (A.3) 
where B is the batch-average burn-up of the spent fuel at discharge (thermal megawatt-days per 
kilogram of heavy metal, MWtd/kgHM), ε is the thermal efficiency of the power plant (net 
electrical kilowatts per thermal kilowatt, kWe/kWt), and 24,000 is the number of kilowatt-hours 
per megawatt-day. The carrying-charge factor, Fc, which accounts for fact that the electricity 
revenues to pay for disposal are collected over the time τ the fuel is in the reactor, is given by 
 ( )1 1= + −c
iF
i τ
τ  (A.4) 
In our reference case, B = 43 MWtd/kgHM, τ = 4 y, ε = 0.33, and i = 0.05 y–1, which gives cdd = 
2.7⋅10–6Cdd = $0.0015/kWh = 1.5 mill/kWh. 
 In the United States, a charge of 1 mill/kWh is added to the price of nuclear-generated 
electricity to cover the costs of geological disposal of spent LEU fuel. This charge of is 
equivalent to Cds = $370/kgHM, which can be compared to our reference value of $400/kgHM. 
 A.1.2.  Reprocessing-recycle 
 The reprocessing-recycle option has two main cost components: reprocessing the spent fuel 
and geological disposal of reprocessing wastes. Offsetting these costs are the values of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
disposal of spent MOX fuel may be more expensive than spent LEU fuel of equal burn-up, due to higher heat 
generation and criticality concerns related to the higher concentration of plutonium in the spent MOX fuel. 
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plutonium and uranium recovered during reprocessing, which can be used to produce fresh MOX 
and LEU fuel. The net present cost per kilogram of spent fuel, Crr ($/kgHM), is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1= + − −+ + + +r dh Pu
dh Pu Pu rU rUr
rr t t t
C M C M CCC
i i i i rUt
 (A.5) 
where Cr is the cost of reprocessing ($/kgHM) paid at time tr after discharge (including 
transportation of spent fuel, short-term storage of spent fuel and plutonium, treatment and 
disposal of low- and intermediate-level wastes, and interim storage of HLW); Cdh is the cost of 
geological disposal of HLW at time tdh ($/kgHM) including shipping (as above, tdh = 0); MPu and 
MrU are the masses of plutonium and uranium recovered per kilogram of spent fuel reprocessed 
(kg/kgHM); and CPu and CrU are the expected values of recovered plutonium and uranium ($/kg) 
at times tPu and trU after discharge. 
 The mass of plutonium is adjusted for radioactive decay and losses during reprocessing: 
 ( ) 242
238
1 −
=
= − ∑ Pu rii tPu r Pu
i
M f x e λ  (A.6) 
where fr is the fraction of plutonium not recovered during reprocessing (about 0.5 percent), xPui is 
the fraction of plutonium isotope i in the spent fuel at discharge, λPui is the decay constant of the 
isotope (λ = loge(2)/t½, where t½ is the half-life), tr is the time between discharge and 
reprocessing (assumed equal to the time between discharge and payment for reprocessing). The 
adjustment for radioactive decay is necessary only for plutonium-241, which has a half-life of 14 
years. Similarly, 
  (A.7) ( )( 235 236 2381rU r U U UM f x x x= − + + )
where xU235 is the concentration of uranium-235, and so forth. Because these uranium isotopes 
have very long half-lives, radioactive decay can be ignored. Table A.1 gives the concentrations 
of uranium and plutonium isotopes in spent LWR fuel for various discharge burn-ups. 
 In our reference case, Cr = $1000/kgHM, tr = 4 y, Cdh = $200/kgHM, B = 43 MWtd/kgHM, 
tPu = trU = 5 y, fr = 0.005, MPu = 0.0104, and MrU = 0.94 kg. The method for calculating the 
values of the recovered plutonium and uranium are discussed below; for a uranium price of 
$100/kg and reference values of other parameters, CPu = $2,100/kg and CrU = $63/kg. Thus, Crr = 
$1000/1.054 + $200 – (0.0104)($2,100)/1.055 – (0.940)($63)/1.055 = $823 + $200 – $17 – $47 = 
$959/kgHM ($394/kgHM higher than direct disposal).  
 The cost of electricity, crr ($/kWeh) attributable to reprocessing can be calculated using 
equation (A.3). For our reference case and a uranium price of $100/kgU, crr = $0.0026/kWh = 
2.6 mill/kWh (1.1 mill/kWh higher than direct disposal). 
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Table A.1.  Isotopic composition of fresh and spent LEU (kilograms per kilogram initial heavy 
metal), for design and discharge burn-ups of 33, 43, and 53 MWtd/kgHM. 
 Fresh LEU Spent LEU 
Isotope 33 43 53 33 43 53 
U-235 0.03250 0.03700 0.04400 0.00884 0.00760 0.00768 
U-236    0.00391 0.00481 0.00594 
U-238 0.96750 0.96300 0.95600 0.94372 0.93250 0.91983 
Pu-238    0.00012 0.00021 0.00033 
Pu-239    0.00540 0.00572 0.00607 
Pu-240    0.00221 0.00262 0.00291 
Pu-241    0.00132 0.00160 0.00183 
Pu-242    0.00045 0.00068 0.00085 
Am-241    0.00003 0.00005 0.00006 
Total 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 0.96600 0.95579 0.94550 
Source: Nuclear Energy Agency, Plutonium Fuel: An Assessment (Paris: Organization for Economic Development 
and Cooperation, 1989), p. 41. 
 
  
 A.1.2.1.  Value of recovered plutonium.  The plutonium recovered from reprocessed spent 
fuel can be used to make MOX fuel. The value of this plutonium is derived from the ability of 
MOX to substitute for LEU fuel. Assuming MOX and LEU fuels with equal design burn-ups 
(and equal non-fuel costs), the value of recovered plutonium is given by  
 (1leu mox )Pu
Pu
C CC
x
−= mf−
                                                
 (A.8) 
where Cleu is the cost of fresh LEU fuel ($/kgHM), Cmox is the cost of fresh MOX (excluding the 
cost of the plutonium), xPu is the fraction of plutonium in fresh MOX fuel,203 and fm is the 
fraction of plutonium lost during MOX fabrication. Table A.2 gives the composition of fresh 
MOX fuel for several design burn-ups, produced from depleted uranium and plutonium 
recovered from spent LEU with discharge burn-ups of 33 and 43 MWtd/kgHM. If Cleu < Cmox, the 
value of the recovered plutonium is negative (i.e., producing MOX fuel would be more 
expensive than producing fresh LEU fuel even if plutonium was available at zero cost). 
 
203 Here xPu also includes americium-241, which results from the decay of plutonium-241 after reprocessing. 
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Table A.2.  Isotopic composition of fresh MOX fuel with design burn-ups of 33, 
43, and 53 MWtd/kgHM produced with plutonium recovered from LEU with 
discharge burn-up of 33 and 43 MWtd/kgHM. 
 33 MWtd/kgHM LEU Pu 43 MWtd/kgHM LEU Pu 
 Design Burnup (MWtd/kgHM) 
Isotope 33 43 53 43 53 
U-235 0.00213 0.00212 0.00209 0.00210 0.00207 
U-238 0.94632 0.93871 0.92667 0.93053 0.91631 
Pu-238 0.00070 0.00080 0.00096 0.00129 0.00156 
Pu-239 0.03019 0.03465 0.04172 0.03678 0.04457 
Pu-240 0.01215 0.01394 0.01679 0.01659 0.02010 
Pu-241 0.00550 0.00631 0.00760 0.00768 0.00931 
Pu-242 0.00248 0.00285 0.00343 0.00428 0.00519 
Am-241 0.00054 0.00062 0.00074 0.00075 0.00091 
Total 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
Source: Nuclear Energy Agency, Plutonium Fuel: An Assessment (Paris: Organization for 
Economic Development and Cooperation, 1989), pp. 50-51. 
 
  
The cost of fresh MOX fuel ($/kgHM), excluding the cost of plutonium, is given by 
 ( )
( )
( ) ( )
1
11 1
−= + −+ +f DU
mf Pu DU
mox t t
m
C x CC
fi i
  (A.9) 
where Cmf is the cost of MOX fuel fabrication ($/kgHM), CDU is the cost of depleted uranium 
($/kgU), fm is the fraction of DU lost during fabrication, and tf and tDU are the times that fuel 
fabrication and depletion uranium are paid for after time tPu. Here we will assume that the 
depleted uranium is free, except for the cost of chemical conversion to uranium oxide. For the 
reference case, B = 43 MWtd/kgHM, xPu = 0.0674, Cmf = $1500/kgHM, CDU = $6/kgU, fm = 
0.005, tf = 0.5, and tDU = 0, for which Cmox = $1464/kgHM.  
 The cost of fresh LEU fuel has four components: uranium feed, chemical conversion, 
enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The cost of LEU fuel ($/kgHM) is given by  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
11 1 1 1 1 1u c s
lfu c s
leu t t t
sf c
CC C S CRC
ff ftf i i i
   = + +  −− − + + + +    i
+  (A.10) 
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where Cu, Cc, Cs, and Cf are the costs of uranium feed ($/kgU), chemical conversion ($/kgU), 
separative work ($/SWU), and fuel fabrication ($/kgHM), tu, tc, ts, and tf are the times when these 
costs are paid relative to tPu (y), and fc, fs, and ff are the fractional losses during conversion, 
enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The ratio of uranium feed to enriched product, R, is given by 
 R
x x
x x
p
f t
= −−
t
t 
 (A.11) 
where xp, xf, and xt are the concentrations of uranium-235 in the product (i.e., fresh LEU fuel), 
feed, and tails, respectively. Values of xp for burn-ups of 33, 43, and 53 MWtd/kgHM are given 
in table A.1. For natural uranium feed, xf = 0.00711. The separative work required to produce a 
kilogram of product, S (SWU/kg), is given by 
  (A.12) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p t fS V x V x R V x V x= − − −
where ( )( ) 2 1 log
1e
xV x x
x
= −  − 
  (A.13) 
 For a given set of uranium, conversion, and enrichment costs, there is an optimum value of xt 
that minimizes the cost of the product. The optimum tails assay can be found by setting the 
derivative of equation (A.10) with respect to xt equal to zero (∂Cleu/∂xt = 0), which yields the 
following relationship: 
 ( )
( ) ( ) 1 2 2 ( )1
1 1 2
f t t
f t f t t t t
V x V x tx V x
x x x x x x
χ  − −= + +− − −  x −
 (A.14) 
where, χ, the enrichment-to-feed cost ratio, is given by 
 ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 1
11 1 1u s c s
s s
u c u
ct t t t
cc
s sf C f
C C C C
ff i i
χ
− −
− −=
+ +−− + +
C≅  (A.15) 
Table A.3 gives the optimum tails assay for several values of the cost ratio. Equation (A.14) does 
not have an analytical solution, but the following approximation for natural uranium feed is 
accurate to within about 0.5 percent for 0.05 < χ < 5: 
   (A.16) ( )
2
10 100.1631 log 0.47055log 2.645310tx
χ χ− + −≅
 For example, if Cu = $100/kgU, Cc = $6/kgU, Cs = $100/SWU, and fs = fc = 0.005, then χ = 
0.93 and xt = 0.0022. If B = 43 MWtd/kgHM, then xp = 0.037, R = 7.08, and S = 5.60 
SWU/kgHM. If Clf = $250/kgHM, tu = –1 y, tc = –0.5 y, ts = 0 y, and tf = 0.5 y, then Cleu = 
$1610/kgHM. From above, Cmox = $1464/kgHM for MOX fuel of equal design burnup; thus, in 
this case the value of the plutonium CPu = (0.995)(1610 – 1464)/0.0674 = $2100/kgPu.  
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Table A.3. Optimum tails assay as a function of the 
separation-to-feed cost ratio (natural uranium feed). 
Cost Ratio 
χ 
Uranium Price* 
Cu ($/kg) 
Tails Assay 
xt 
0.01 9,900 0.000067 
0.02 4,900 0.00013 
0.05 2,000 0.00029 
0.1 980 0.00052 
0.2 490 0.00088 
0.5 190 0.0016 
1 93 0.0023 
2 44 0.0030 
5 14 0.0040 
10 4 0.0047 
*Assuming Cs = $100/SWU, Cc = $6/kgU, and fs = fc = 0.005. 
 
  
  A.1.2.2.  Value of recovered uranium.  The uranium recovered from reprocessed spent 
fuel can be re-enriched and used to make LEU fuel. This would be economic only if the resulting 
fuel was no more expensive than fuel of the same design burn-up made using natural uranium. 
Unlike plutonium, the value of recovered uranium cannot be less than zero. This is because 
plutonium, which is hazardous and can be used to make nuclear weapons, incurs substantial 
storage charges if unused. Moreover, if separated plutonium remains in storage for a long time, it 
must be purified of radioactive decay products—at very high cost—before it can be used in the 
fabrication of reactor fuel. Recovered uranium does not have any of these liabilities. Thus, if the 
recycle of recovered uranium is uneconomical, the uranium can be stored at essentially zero cost 
for later use. The value of the recovered uranium, CrU, can be estimated by setting the cost of 
LEU made from natural uranium equal to the cost of LEU made from recovered uranium: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
11 1 1 1 1 1
1
11 1 1 1 1 1
u c s f
u c s
lfu c s
t t t t
sf c
rlfrU rc rsr
t t t
sf c
CC C S CR
ff f i i i i
CC C S CR
ff ftf i i i
   + + + =  −− − + + + +   
   + + +  −− − + + + +    i
 (A.17) 
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where R
x x
x xr
rp rt
rf rt
= −−   (A.18) 
and xrf, xrp, and xrt are the concentrations of uranium-235 in the recovered uranium, the LEU 
produced from the recovered uranium, and the tails when enriching the recovered uranium, and 
Crc, Crs, and Crlf are the costs of conversion, enrichment, and fuel-fabrication of recovered 
uranium. Because recovered uranium is more radioactive than natural uranium, Crc, Crs, and Crlf 
are somewhat higher than Cc, Cs, and Clf. Moreover, because the uranium-236 in recovered 
uranium absorbs neutrons, fuel made with recovered uranium must have a higher enrichment 
than fuel of the same design burn-up made from natural uranium. The required product 
enrichment, xrp, is given approximately by204 
 x
x
x
x
rp
p
rf
=
−1 0 21 236.
  (A.19) 
where x236 is the concentration of uranium-236 in the recovered uranium. (If laser-isotope 
separation is used this correction can be ignored and xrp = xp.) Values of xrf and x236 are given in 
Table A.1. As before, xrt is optimized for the costs of conversion and enrichment and the value of 
the recovered uranium. The following approximation for xrt is good to within one percent for 
0.007 < xrf < 0.009 and 0.05 < χr < 5: 
 ( )( ) ( )210 100.1626 0.06303 log 0.4705 0.00172 log 3.032 54.52910 rf r rf r rfx xrtx χ χ− + + + − +≅ x  (A.20) 
where ( )
( )
1
1
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r
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f C
C C
f
χ −=
+−
. (A.21) 
Because the value of recovered uranium depends on the tails assay, which in turn depends on the 
value of the recovered uranium, equation (A.17) must be solved numerically.  
 In our reference case, Cc = $6/kgU, Crc = $21/kgU, Cs = $100/SWU, Crs = $105/SWU, Clf = 
$250/kgHM, Crlf = $260/kgHM, B = 43 MWtd/kgHM, x236 = 0.00481, and xrp = 0.0427; if Cu = 
$100/kgU, we find that CrU = $63/kg.205 
 A.1.3.  Breakeven Uranium Price 
 In the reference case described above, for a uranium price of $100/kgU the reprocessing-
recycle option costs $959/kgHM compared to only $565/kgHM for the direct-disposal option. 
The breakeven uranium price is therefore substantially greater than $100/kgU. Using reference 
values of the various parameters we can solve equation (A.1) to find that the breakeven uranium 
                                                 
204 Nuclear Energy Agency, Plutonium Fuel: An Assessment (Paris: Organization for Economic Development and 
Cooperation, 1989), p. 158. The original expressions in the OECD report can be rearranged to give equation (A.19). 
205 For this value of CrU, χr = 1.24, xt = 0.0027, R = 8.10, S = 5.84 SWU/kgHM. 
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price is $368/kgU. When the price of uranium is equal to $368/kgU, the cost of fresh LEU fuel in 
the reference case would rise to $3,417/kgHM, the value of plutonium recovered from spent 
LEU fuel increases to $28,800/kgPu and the value of the recovered uranium rises to $303/kgU. 
Thus, the net cost of the reprocessing-recycle option falls to Crr = $1000/1.054 + $200 – 
(0.0104)($28,800)/1.055 – (0.940)($303)/1.055 = $565/kgHM, which is identical to the cost of 
the direct-disposal option. 
A.2.  Direct Disposal vs. Recycling in Fast-Neutron Reactors 
 Here we take the point of view of a firm that is deciding whether to build a new light-water 
reactor (with direct disposal of spent fuel) or a liquid-metal reactor (with breeding and recycle of 
plutonium). In a competitive market, the firm should build the reactor that would produce 
electricity at the lowest cost. The cost of electricity, celec, can be divided into three major 
components: 
  (A.22) elec cap om fuelc c c c= + +
where ccap, often referred to as the “capital cost,” is the cost due to financing and repayment of 
construction costs (and other costs that are proportional to construction cost), com is the 
operations and maintenance cost, and cfuel is the fuel cost. 
 A.2.1.  Capital Cost 
 For both types of reactors, the cost of electricity attributable to the financing and repayment 
of construction costs (and other annual costs that are proportional to construction cost), ccap 
($/kWeh), is given by 
 
( )( )( ) (1 1 1
8766
cap idc preop cont
cap cr tax ins
C F F F
c η
+ + += )F F F+ +  (A.23) 
where Ccap is the total construction cost, in dollars per kilowatt of installed net electrical capacity 
($/kWe), Fidc and Fpreop are factors that account for interest during construction and other costs 
before the plant begins full-scale operation, Fcont is a contingency factor to provide for cost 
overruns and other unforeseen costs, η is the capacity factor (the total amount of electricity 
produced in a year divided by the total amount that would be produced from continuous 
operation at full power), 8766 is the average number of hours in a year, and Ftax, and Fins are 
annual charges for property taxes and insurance (y–1), which for simplicity are assumed to be 
proportional to the initial investment. The “fixed charge rate,” Fcr (y–1), is the fraction of the 
initial investment that must be collected each year to repay the initial costs, including interest or 
return on investment. We discuss Fidc and Fcr in more detail below. 
 For example, if Ccap = $2000/kWe, and using reference values for other parameters suitable 
for a utility-owned reactor (Fidc = 0.189, Fpreop = Fcont = 0.1, (Fcr + Ftax + Fins) = 0.123, and η = 
0.85), ccap = $0.0475/kWh. 
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 A.2.1.1.  Interest during construction.  The interest-during-construction factor, Fidc, 
accounts for the fact that interest charges accumulate on money borrowed before reactor 
operation begins. If we assume that funds are borrowed at one-year intervals: 
  (A.24) ( ) 1
1
1 − +
=
= + ∑
n
n k
idc k idc
k
F f i 1 −
where n is the construction time (y), fk is the fraction of the total up-front costs borrowed at the 
beginning of year k, and iidc is the interest rate. We model fk with a beta-binomial distribution: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1
Γ Γ + − Γ + − Γ += Γ Γ − + Γ + + − Γ Γk
n k n k
f
k n k n
α β α β
α β α β  (A.25) 
where α and β are parameters that determine the shape of the distribution.206 The following 
shape parameters give a good fit to the distribution of costs assumed in previous reports:207 
 ( )0 432 11 51 − −= + . n .eα  (A.26) 
 ( )1−= p
p
αβ  (A.27) 
where p is the fraction of n at which half of the total capital costs have been spent. We assume 
that iidc is equal to the weighted cost of capital (see Table A.4). For the reference case n = 6 y, iidc 
= 0.064 y–1, and p = 0.65, which gives Fidc = 0.189.  
 A.2.1.2.  Fixed charge rate.  The fixed charge rate, Fcr (y–1), is the fraction of the initial 
investment that is collected each year to repay the principle (construction and other up-front 
costs) with a return on the investment. If the principle is repaid with interest at a fixed rate i (y–1) 
during the lifetime of the facility N (y), then Fcr is simply  
 ( )1 1 −= − +cr N
iF
i
 (A.28) 
For example, assuming N = 30 y and i = 0.04 y–1 (appropriate for a government-owned and 
financed project), Fcr = 0.058 y–1. 
                                                 
206 The beta-binomial distribution was chosen for its extreme flexibility with a small number of parameters. If α = β 
= 1, the distribution is uniform (i.e., fk = k/n); if α and β > 1, the distribution is convex (i.e., peaking in the middle); 
if α = β, the distribution is symmetrical; if α > β, the distribution is skewed to the left. The beta-binomial 
distribution approaches a binomial distribution with π = α/(α+β) when α and β >> 1. 
207 National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Separations Technology and Transmutation Systems, Nuclear 
Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutations (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1996), p. 
424; National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and 
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1995), p. 83. 
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 The situation for a privately owned and financed facility is different in two ways. First, 
principle is often raised with a combination of bonds (i.e., loans by investors) and equity (i.e., 
sale of stock giving part ownership of the facility by investors), with various rates of return. 
Second, private firms pay tax on net income, which excludes bond dividends and other business 
expenses.  
 To derive the fixed charge rate in the more general case, suppose that a firm raises principle 
P to build a reactor, of which bP is financed with a bond with a rate of return of ib, and the 
remainder, (1 – b)P, is financed with equity with a rate of return of ie. For simplicity, assume that 
the term of the bond is equal to the lifetime of the reactor, N, and that the salvage value (i.e., the 
value of the reactor after year N) is zero. During the operation of the reactor, the annual net cash 
flow, NCF, is given by 
  (A.29) = − − − −NCF I E S B T
( )
( )
G
where IG is the annual gross income of the plant, E is the annual plant operating expenses, S and 
B are annual payments relating to equity and bond financing, and T are taxes, given by 
  (A.30) = = − − −T e G d eT I t I E D B t
where te is the income tax rate and IT, the taxable income, is the gross income minus tax-
deductible expenses and payments, which include depreciation, D, and dividends paid on the 
bond, Bd. The annual payment for equity financing, S, is given by 
 ( )
1
1 1 −
= − +
e
N
e
b P i
S
i
−
= b
 (A.31) 
The annual payment for bond financing consists of dividends Bd (paid at rate ib on the entire 
principle for the term of the bond) and principle Bp; assuming equal annual payments invested at 
rate ib to repay the principle at the end of the term, we have 
 d  (A.32) B bPi
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 −= + = + =+ − − +
b
d p b N
b b
B B B bP r
i i
b
N
bP i bP i  (A.33) 
Assuming straight-line depreciation over the life of the plant, the annual depreciation expense is 
given by 
 =D
N
P  (A.34) 
Inserting equations (A.30) through (A.34) into equation (A.29), we have 
 
100 ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1− −
= − − − − − − − − + − +
e b
G GN N
e b
b P i bP i PNCF I E I E bPi t
Ni i
− b e  (A.35) 
which can be rearranged to give 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
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In order to stay in business, NCF ≥ 0, and so 
 ( )( ) ( )
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which can be written as 
 G crI F P E  (A.38) 
where Fcr, the fixed charge rate, is given by 
 ( )( ) ( )
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 (A.39) 
Note that if the tax rate is zero (te = 0), this simplifies to 
 ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1−
= +− + − +
e b
cr N
e b
b i biF
i i −
−
N  (A.40) 
which is simply equation (A.28) with the principle divided between bond and equity financing. 
Equation (A.39) easily can be generalized to different types of stocks and bonds having various 
rates of return. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, we have relied on peer-reviewed estimates of the fixed charge rate 
for different financing arrangements developed by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences, 
which are summarized in table A.4. The fixed charge rates differ somewhat from those generated 
by equation (A.39), as they assume that the facilities are depreciated for tax purposes over half 
their useful life, rather than over the entire life, as is assume in (A.39). 
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Table A.4.  Fixed charge rates for reactors owned and financed by government, utility, 
and private ventures. 
  Owner
  Government Utility Private
Financial structure (%) i (%/y) (%) i (%/y) (%) i (%/y)
 Common stock   46 8.5 70 16.0 
 Preferred stock   8 4.1   
 Debt 100 4.0 46 4.8 30 9.0 
 Weighted cost of capital 4.0  6.4  13.9 
Tax assumptions    
 Income tax rate (%)  38 38 
 Tax recovery period (y)  15 15 
 Book life (y)  30 30 
Property taxes, insurance (%/y)  2 2 
Fcr + Ftax + Fins (%/y) 5.8 12.3 20.8 
Source: National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Separations Technology and Transmutation 
Systems, Nuclear Wastes: Technologies for Separations and Transmutations (Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press, 1996), p. 432. 
 
  
 A.2.2.  Operations and Maintenance Cost 
 Operations and maintenance costs are continuing costs of running a plant that do not relate to 
its fuel—such as worker salaries and routine plant maintenance. Most of these costs do not 
depend on the amount of electricity produced by the plant, and so most calculations, including 
this one, assume a fixed annual expense. Provisions placed into a fund for eventual 
decommissioning of the plant are also included in most estimates of operations and maintenance 
costs. The contribution of these expenses to the cost of electricity is given by 
 
8766
+= om dd ddom C C Fc η  (A.41) 
where Com is the annual non-fuel operations and maintenance cost ($/kWey), Cdd is the cost to 
dismantle and decommission the plant at the end of its operating life ($/kWe), and Fdd (y–1) is the 
annual annuity factor, given by 
 
102 ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
 
 ( )1 1
dd
dd N
dd
iF
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= + −  (A.42) 
where idd is the annual rate of return on the funds invested and N is the length of time the annuity 
is paid (usually the same as the period over which the construction costs are repaid). For 
example, if the rate of return is 3 percent per year and the annuity is paid over 30 years, Fdd = 
0.021; if Com = $80/kWey, Cdd = $150/kWe, and η = 0.85, then com = $0.0112/kWeh. 
 A.2.3.  Fuel Cost 
 A.2.3.1.  LWR fuel.  The fuel cost for an LWR with direct disposal of the spent fuel is  
 
( ) ( )1 1 1
24 000
−− + + + + +=
leu dsis
t tt
leu is ds cLWR
fuel
C i C ( i ) C i
c
, Bε
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where Cleu is the cost of LEU fuel ($/kgHM) as given by equation (A.10), paid at time tleu, and B, 
ε, Cis , Cds, tis, tds, and i are as defined above in equations (A.2) and (A.3). All times are measured 
from the time the fuel is inserted into the reactor. The carrying-charge factor, Fc, is given by 
 ( )( )
1
1 1
+= + −c
i i
F
i
τ
τ
τ
 (A.44) 
where τ is the number of years that the fuel remains in the reactor.208  
 For our reference case, B = 43 MWtd/kgHM, τ = 4 y, and i = 0.05 y–1, so that Fc = 1.128. If 
Cu = $100/kgU, Cc = $6/kgU, Cs = $100/SWU, and Clf = $250/kgU, then Cleu = $1,690/kg.209 If ε 
= 0.33, Cis = $200/kgHM paid at tis = 8 y, and Cds = $400 paid at tds = 4 y, then 
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208 This differs from the carrying charge given by equation (A.4) by a factor (1 + i)τ, because this was applied to the 
value of the fuel at discharge. 
209 The cost ratio χ = 0.93, for which the optimum xt = 0.0022. If xp = 0.037 (B = 43 MWtd/kgHM), then R = 7.08 
and S = 5.60 SWU/kg. Assuming fc = fs = 0.005, ff = 0.01, and tu = 2 y, tc = 1.5 y, ts = 1 y, tf = 0.5 y, we have 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
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 A.2.3.2.  LMR fuel.  Liquid-metal breeder reactors have two types of fuel elements: core and 
blanket elements. Fresh core elements, which contain about 25% plutonium, produce most of the 
fission energy and neutrons; fresh blanket elements, which contain only uranium, absorb 
neutrons and produce plutonium. Both types of elements are reprocessed, and the recovered 
uranium and plutonium are used to produce fresh core and blanket elements. In equilibrium, only 
a small amount of fresh uranium (or natural or depleted uranium) is needed to make up for the 
uranium and plutonium that is consumed in the fission reactions. 
 The contribution of fuel costs to the cost of electricity from a breeder reactor is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
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where Cfc and Cfb are the costs of fabricating core and blanket fuel ($/kgHM), Crc are Crb are the 
costs of reprocessing fuel ($/kgHM), Cdc and Cdb are the costs of disposing of the resulting high-
level reprocessing wastes ($/kgHM), Cu is the cost of make-up uranium ($/kgU) and fu is the 
fraction of natural uranium in blanket elements, Mc and Mb are the annual loading of core and 
blanket fuel elements (kgHM/MWey), Fcc and Fcb are carrying charges for core and blanket 
elements assuming residence times of τc and τb (y) in the reactor, and 1000 is the number of 
kilowatts per megawatt. As before, we assume that transportation, storage, and safeguards-
related costs are included in fabrication, reprocessing and disposal costs.  
 Equation (A.46) is a good approximation in the steady-state situation for a large breeder 
reactor economy, in which there is no net breeding of plutonium and the plutonium recovered at 
the end of one reactor’s life is used to start up a replacement reactor. If the number of breeder 
reactors is growing, the cost of the plutonium for the initial fuel loading would have to be 
included as well as the sale of excess plutonium produced by net breeding during the operation 
of the reactor (e.g., to start up additional reactors). Rough estimates indicate, however, that these 
factors offset each other for reasonable breeding ratios and discount factors.210 
 In the reference case, Cfc = $1500/kgHM, Cfb = $250/kgHM, Crc = Crb = $1000/kgHM, Cu = 
$6/kgU, Cdc = Cdb = $200/kgHM, fu = 0.024, Mc = 11.5 kgHM/MWey, Mb = 25.5 kgHM/MWey, 
τc = τb = tdc = tdb = 3 y, i = 0.05 y–1, tfc = tfb = 0.5 y, and trc = trb = 4 y; this gives 
( )
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210 Consider, for example, a reactor with an initial core containing 3000 kgPu, an annual core loading of 1000 
kgPu/y, and an annual discharge (core + blanket) of 1100 kgPu/y (breeding ratio ≈ 1.25). Discounting the flows of 
plutonium over the 30-y life of the reactor at a discount rate of 3%/y gives a net present value of zero, assuming the 
initial plutonium is produced 1 y before start-up and excess plutonium is available for sale 2 y after discharge.  
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 A.2.4.  Breakeven Uranium Price 
 The breakeven uranium price, Cu, is the uranium price for which the costs of electricity are 
equal for LWRs and LMRs: 
   (A.48) c celec
LWR
elec
LMR=
To simplify the calculation, we assume that non-fuel operations and maintenance costs, Com, are 
equal for both reactors and that all factors related to the cost of principal, interest, taxes, and 
insurance are equal, except for the total construction cost. In this case, equation (A.48) can be 
written as 
 ( )
8766
cap LWR LMR
fuel u fuel
C F
c C cη
∆ = −   (A.49) 
where F = (1+Fidc)(1+Fpreop)(1+Fcont)(Fcr+Ftax+Fins+Frefurb), ∆Ccap is the difference in overnight 
construction costs between the LMR and LWR ($/kWe), and ( )LWRfuel uc C  is the cost of fresh LEU 
fuel as a function of the price of uranium.  
 In the reference case described above, with Cu = $100/kgU, the right-hand side of equation 
(A.49) (i.e., the difference in fuel cost) = 0.00714 – 0.00766 = –$0.00052/kWh. If both types of 
reactor produce electricity at the same cost, then ∆Ccap = –$22/kWe; that is, the LMR must be 
$22/kWe less expensive than the LWR. To find the breakeven uranium price for a given 
difference in capital cost, we solve equation (A.49) numerically. For example, in our reference 
case, where ∆Ccap = $200/kWe, the breakeven uranium price is $322/kgU.  
 
  
Appendix B.  World Uranium Resources 
 
B.1.  Introduction 
 
“There will always be ample fuel for nuclear reactors—we will never run out.  The only 
questions are from where, and at what cost.” 
—James Graham, Chairman, Board of Governors, World Nuclear Fuel Market211 
 
For decades, consideration of reprocessing, recycling, and breeding plutonium has been 
driven in significant part by concerns that resources of uranium would not be sufficient to 
support a growing nuclear energy system operating on a once-through cycle for long.212  
Advocates of reprocessing and breeding continue to argue that available resources of low-cost 
uranium are quite limited, making breeding and reprocessing essential in the relatively near 
term.213 This raises the obvious question: how much uranium is likely to be economically 
recoverable in the future? 
 
Uranium is roughly as common as tin or arsenic; Table B.1 shows typical concentrations 
in various media.214 The total amount of uranium in the earth’s crust is huge—on the order of 108 
Mt.  How much of this vast resource of uranium will be recoverable for use in nuclear energy 
depends on both technology and price.  Advancing technology increases the recoverable resource 
in two ways: by offering additional ways to find resources, and by making it possible to mine 
and process uranium at lower cost, making available resources that would previously not have 
been economic to recover.  Increasing prices also increase the available resource in two ways: by 
making lower-grade resources economic to recover, and by motivating additional exploration.  
(Increasing prices also tend to depress growth in demand, by encouraging more efficient use of 
                                                 
 Remarks to the WNFM annual meeting, June 9, 2003. 211
212 For a discussion from three decades ago (making the case that uranium resources were sufficient at that time to 
delay deployment of breeder reactors, which turned out to be more than correct), see John P. Holdren, “Uranium 
Availability and the Breeder Decision,” Energy Systems and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1975.  
213 See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, Report to 
Congress on Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative: The Future Path for Advanced Spent Fuel Treatment and 
Transmutation Research (Washington, DC: January 2003, available as of December 16, 2003, at 
http://www.nuclear.gov/reports/AFCI_CongRpt2003.pdf), pp. I-4: uranium “is not an infinite resource.  Expert 
organizations such as the World Nuclear Association project that between 2050 and 2080, nuclear power plants 
worldwide will encounter a serious shortage of the uranium needed to produce nuclear fuel.”  It is worth comparing 
this statement with the official World Nuclear Association (formerly the Uranium Institute) statement on “Supply of 
Uranium,” available as of December 16, 2003 at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf75.htm.  That statement 
begins with the following sentences, emphasized in the original as the key points: “Uranium is a common metal, 
found in both rocks and seawater. Its availability to supply world energy needs is great both geologically and 
because of the technology for its use. All mineral resources are greater than commonly perceived.” Later, it goes on 
to argue that: “Of course the resources of the earth are indeed finite, but… the limits of the supply of resources are 
so far away that the truism has no practical meaning.” 
214 From Ian Hore-Lacy, Nuclear Electricity 7th ed. (Melbourne: Uranium Information Centre, Ltd, and World 
Nuclear Association, 2003, available as of December 16, 2003, at http://www.uic.com.au/ne.htm), Chapter 3.  While 
this reference lists “high-grade” ores as being 2% uranium by weight, mines in Canada are now recovering ores that 
are more than 20% U3O8. 
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available resources—for example, by leaving lower assays in enrichment tails or using reactors 
with higher conversion ratios.) 
 
Table B.1.  Typical Uranium Concentrations 
 
Medium 
Average Concentration 
(ppm U) 
High-grade ore 20,000 
Low-grade ore 1,000 
Granite 4 
Sedimentary rock 2 
Earth’s continental crust 2.8 
Seawater 0.003 
  
 
Estimates of how much uranium would be available in the future at a given price are 
inherently uncertain, and there have been few serious attempts at a global assessment of total 
uranium resources (going beyond those already known to be available and recoverable) in recent 
decades.  Indeed, for many years investment in exploration for uranium resources has been low, 
because low prices and the availability of large, already known uranium reserves suggested there 
was little money to be made in finding new deposits.  As a result, as one analyst has noted, 
“predictions of the future availability of any mineral, including uranium, which are based on 
current cost and price data and current geological knowledge are likely to be extremely 
conservative.”215  The uranium resources that would likely be found if the price rose enough to 
motivate substantial investments in further exploration are likely to be far higher than today’s 
resource estimates. 
 
To understand the available estimates of how much uranium might ultimately be 
recoverable at various prices, it is important to understand the difference between “resources” 
and “reserves”.  The term “resources” refers to all of the quantities of a particular material that 
might ultimately be found and become economically recoverable, taking into account future 
improvements in the technologies of exploration and extraction, as well as future increases in 
prices.  The term “reserves”, by contrast, refers to those subsets of the resources that have been 
identified with high confidence and that are economically extractable at current prices using 
current technology.  Reserves can be increased through exploration to identify additional 
economically extractable resources and by improvements in technology and operational practices 
to make economical the extraction of already identified (but previously uneconomical) resources. 
  
                                                 
215 Hore-Lacy, Nuclear Electricity, op. cit.  It is worth noting that the statements on resources in this text which are 
quoted in this Appendix are all repeated verbatim in the World Nuclear Association statement “Supply of Uranium,” 
op. cit. 
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Exploration is expensive; hence, industries have little incentive to find and characterize 
more than the amount of material expected to be needed in the next few decades.  Investments in 
exploration typically are just sufficient to keep reserves constant or slowly growing as a multiple 
of annual consumption; if annual consumption exceeds annual additions to reserves over a 
prolonged period, with the result that the reserves fall significantly, the result is generally an 
increase in price that, in itself, converts some of the known but previously subeconomic 
resources into reserves and also calls forth an expanded  exploration effort.   The amount of 
material that will ultimately prove to be economically recoverable—termed “ultimately 
recoverable resources”—depends not only on the underlying geologic realities but also on the 
scope for improvement in the technologies of exploration, extraction, and use and on the amount 
by which the price of the material can rise before substitutes for it become economical and limit 
the demand.   
 
Given these definitions and relationships, it is natural that published estimates of reserves 
would be quite accurate (limited mainly by uncertainties in the characterization of known 
deposits, by variations in analysts’ assumptions about the capabilities of existing extractive 
technologies, and perhaps by corporate or national proprietary interests in less than full 
disclosure), while estimates of the ultimately recoverable resources would necessarily be much 
more uncertain.  For example, estimates of the total amount of oil that ultimately will be 
economically recoverable range over a factor of two for today’s technology, and over a factor of 
four or more assuming significant improvements in technology over the next two decades.216  
The uncertainties for natural gas are even larger.217  The uncertainties for uranium—given the 
very low investments in exploration in recent decades, the very small efforts that have been made 
to integrate the resource information on a global basis, and the large factors by which uranium 
prices could rise before significantly affecting the economics of nuclear energy overall—are 
larger still. 
 
B.2.  Fallacy of the Traditional Economic Resource Model 
 
Classical economic theory suggests that the price of non-renewable resources should rise 
over time, as the fixed available stock grows scarcer and more and more costly resources have to 
be used.218  Forecasters relying on this model have routinely predicted that the uranium price 
would imminently begin a steady rise as resources began to become scarce, and these forecasters 
have just as routinely been proved wrong. 
                                                 
216 Hans-Holger Rogner, et al., “Energy Resources,” chapter 5 in Jose Goldemberg, ed., World Energy Assessment: 
Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability (New York: United Nations Development Program, United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and World Energy Council, 2000), pp.139-144; available as of 
December 16, 2003 at http://stone.undp.org/undpweb/seed/wea/pdfs/chapter5.pdf.  
217 Ibid., pp. 144-147. 
218 For a useful discussion of the logical flaws of this classical model—still amazingly widely used, especially in 
projections of future uranium prices—see M.A. Adelman, “My Education in Mineral (Especially Oil) Economics,” 
Annual Review of Energy and Environment, Vol. 22, 1997, pp. 13-46.  Another excellent critique of the standard 
model (drawing on examples related to uranium resources) is  Thomas L. Neff, “Are Energy Resources 
Inexhaustible?” presentation to the “Global Energy Prospects: Supply-Side Issues,” London School of Economics 
and Political Science, November 11, 1985.  Neff’s basic answer is close to “yes,” and with respect to uranium, he 
concludes “we were not so much captive of nature’s limits as of our own in thinking about uranium reserves and 
resources.” 
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 The classical model fails to take into account the pace of discovery of new resources or 
the development of new technologies that reduce the cost of recovering material from less 
attractive sources.  Because of these factors, the stock of resources available at a given extraction 
cost is not fixed, but increases for as long as technological improvements and new discoveries of 
material outpace the depletion of known high-quality deposits.  And the fact is that, throughout 
the 20th century and for most mineral resources of interest, society has discovered new deposits 
and has improved the technologies of extraction at sufficient rates to more than compensate for 
the consumption of previously known reserves.  In recent decades the ratio of current annual 
consumption to known reserves—the number of years left at current consumption rates—has 
increased for most types of mined resources, even as the rate of consumption has increased.219  
Over the last 25 years, this ratio has increased from 30 to 40 years for oil, and from 50 to 60 
years for gas—despite increasing consumption.220 Increases in price have stimulated the largest 
increases in reserves, but reserves have increased even in periods of constant or declining 
price.221   
 
Technological improvements in resource extraction industries have been dramatic.  The 
average U.S. coal miner in 1990 produced 8000 tons/year, compared to only 2500 tons/year in 
1960; in the copper industry, output per miner increased at a remarkable rate of 8.6% per year 
from 1976 to 1987.222  The result, for a wide range of non-renewable resources, has been prices 
that have been declining in real terms—the opposite of the classical model’s prediction.  In the 
United States, for example, the real price of a broad range of metals declined throughout the 20th 
century (just as the uranium price has been doing for the last 20 years).223  There is little reason 
to believe that this trend will suddenly be reversed in the case of uranium, leading to the steady 
price rises throughout the 21st century that are often projected. 
 
Even if the uranium price did begin to increase steadily, it does not appear likely to 
increase very quickly.  For example, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in its last estimate of the future costs of the 
nuclear fuel cycle, assumed that uranium prices would increase 1.2% per year.224  If we assume 
that prices rise to $45/kgU by 2020 (as commercial and military inventories are exhausted and 
prices have to rise to a level that will result in sufficient production to meet demand), and 1.2% 
per year thereafter, it would be well into the twenty-second century before uranium prices 
reached a level at which reprocessing at $1000/kgHM would be economically competitive.225  
                                                 
219 See, for example, Adelman, “My Education in Mineral (Especially Oil) Economics,” op. cit. 
220 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003 (London: BP, June 2003); available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.bp.com/files/16/statistical_review_1612.pdf.  
221 Ibid. 
222 Craig B. Andrews, “Mineral Sector Technologies: Policy Implications for Developing Countries” (Washington, 
DC: The World Bank, 1992). 
223 Daniel E. Sullivan, John L. Sznopek, and Lorie A. Wagner, “20th Century U.S. Mineral Prices Decline in 
Constant Dollars” (Washington DC: U.S. Geological Survey, Open File Report 00-389, available as of December 
16, 2003 at http://pubs.usgs.gov/openfile/of00-389/of00-389.pdf).  
224 OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, The Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Paris, France: OECD/NEA, 1994), p. 
36. 
225 For a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM, in chapter 2 we derive a central value of the breakeven uranium price 
of $370/kgU, with a lower limit (5 percent confidence interval) of $220/kgU. Assuming a price of $45/kgU in 2020 
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Clearly, technological changes over that long period will make such a simple calculation focused 
on today’s LWR and reprocessing technologies irrelevant, but the calculation using today’s 
figures is enough to indicate that it is likely to be quite some time before the economic 
disadvantage of reprocessing evaporates. 
B.3.  Estimates of Uranium Resources 
 
The most widely available estimates of uranium resources are those in the “Red Book”: a 
compendium of data on uranium resources from around the world, published by the NEA and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).226 
 
 The 2001 edition of the Red Book estimates that total world “conventional” resources 
available at less than $130/kgU amount to 16.2 million metric tons of uranium (MtU).  This 
figure is the sum of “reasonably assured resources” (RAR, essentially what would be referred to 
as “reserves” if the uranium price were already $130/kgU), “estimated additional resources” 
(EAR, resources inferred to exist in extensions of known deposits and estimated to be 
economically harvestable at the indicated price227), and “speculative resources” (SR, resources 
that are expected to exist and to be discoverable and recoverable with existing technologies at a 
particular reported price level, based on geologic trends in particular areas).228  If already-mined 
inventories are included—commercial inventories, excess defense inventories, and re-enrichment 
of depleted uranium tails that would be economic if the uranium price were to rise to the range of 
$130/kgU—the total figure rises to 17.1 MtU.229  An international meeting sponsored by the 
IAEA in 2000 concluded that total resources available in this category likely amount to 20 
MtU.230 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Several points should be made about the Red Book total.  First, because of the lack of 
incentive for substantial investments in uranium exploration in recent years, there are almost 
certainly large quantities of uranium that are not yet included in these estimates.  Many countries 
remain lightly explored for uranium.  Despite past exploration, modest additional investments 
have led in recent years to dramatic increases in estimates of available resources: in early 2001, 
for example, the Canadian firm Cameco increased its estimate of the uranium available at its 
McArthur River mine (the world’s richest, with ore consisting of over 20% U3O8) by more than 
 
and an increase of 1.2 percent per year thereafter, uranium price would reach $220 and $370 in about 2150 and 
2200, respectively. 
226 At this writing (mid-2003), the most recent edition is Uranium 2001: Resources, Production, and Demand (Paris, 
France: OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002). 
227 Estimated additional resources (EAR) are reported in two categories, EAR-I and EAR-II.  EAR-I represents 
additional resources for which the geologic evidence is direct, while EAR-II represents resources for which the 
evidence is more indirect.  For more specific definitions—and how they correlate with how major uranium 
producing countries report their national resource estimates—see Uranium 2001, op. cit., pp. 13-15. 
228 RAR, EAR-I, EAR-II, and SR reported to be available at less than $130/kgU are, respectively, 2.853, 1.080, 
2.332, and 9.939 MtU.  See Uranium 2001, op. cit., pp. 21-27. 
229 R. Price and J.R. Blaise, “Nuclear Fuel Resources: Enough to Last?” NEA News, No. 20.2, 2002, available as of 
December 16, 2003 at http://www.nea.fr/html/pub/newsletter/2002/20-2-Nuclear_fuel_resources.pdf.  
230 “International Symposium on the Uranium Production Cycle and the Environment,” October 2000, Vienna, 
reported in IAEA, “International Symposium Concluded That Uranium Supply for Nuclear Power is Secure,” PR 
2000/26 (Vienna, Austria: IAEA, October 6, 2000, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2000/prn2600.shtml). 
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50 percent, based on analyses of drilling at that site over the previous few years.231  It should be 
expected that this trend will continue in the future:  the more energetically uranium firms look 
(when motivated to do so by increasing prices), the more uranium they will find. 
 
Second, since uranium prices in recent years have been in the $20-40/kgU range, there 
has been no incentive to look for uranium in the higher-cost categories.  Estimates of resources 
in these categories are therefore particularly uncertain, and very likely to be underestimates 
(probably by a large factor, as prices approaching $130/kgU would provoke intense exploration 
and technological improvements in recovering uranium from low-grade ores). 
 
Third, the reported total figure has been increasing over time—despite the minimal global 
investments in uranium exploration in recent decades, and despite inflation eating away at the 
real value of the $130/kgU cap at which resources are reported—and can be expected to continue 
to do so in the future.  The previous edition of the Red Book in 1999, for example, reported a 
comparable total of 15.4 MtU recoverable at less than $130/kgU, 800,000 tons less than the total 
reported two years later. 
 
Fourth, because many countries do not report resources in all categories, these resources 
are omitted from the total.  Only 28 countries report speculative resources, compared to 43 that 
report reasonably assured resources.  Australia, for example, with some of the world’s largest 
uranium resources, does not bother to estimate “speculative” resources because its better-known 
resources are so large already—but as the 2001 Red Book points out in its understated way, 
“countries, such as Australia, are considered to have significant resource potential in sparsely 
explored areas.”232  The Red Book table of speculative resources specifically notes that these 
totals are merely those that countries reported, and “do not represent a complete account of world 
undiscovered conventional resources.”233  Estimates based on extrapolations of Red Book data 
(to estimate resources in higher-cost and more speculative resource categories, and resources in 
countries for which no estimates are given) increase the total resource recoverable at costs less 
than or equal to $130/kgU by up to 45 percent, to about 24 MtU. 
 
Fifth, this estimate includes only “conventional” resources—geologic resources where 
the uranium ore is rich enough to justify mining it by itself at the indicated price.  In some cases, 
however, it may be attractive to produce uranium as a byproduct, as has been done with gold and 
phosphate mining.  An additional 22 MtU are estimated to be available in phosphate deposits 
worldwide (though at very low concentrations),234 and some noticeable fraction of this material 
may ultimately be economically recoverable as a byproduct of phosphate mining, as global 
demand for fertilizer continues to rise.   
 
In short, despite the inclusion of “speculative resources” in the 17.1 MtU figure, there is a 
very high probability that the amount of uranium that will ultimately prove recoverable at or 
below $130/kgU will be significantly greater.  Realistically, 17 MtU should be considered a 
                                                 
231 See Cameco, “Cameco Increases McArthur River Uranium Reserves,” press release, January 25, 2001. 
232 Uranium 2001, op. cit., p. 26. 
233 Uranium 2001, op. cit., p. 27. 
234 Uranium 2001, op. cit., p. 28. 
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lower bound, not an upper bound, on the amount of uranium likely to be recoverable at 
$130/kgU. 
 
 Another way to approach the problem is to estimate the shape of the curve of resource 
availability as a function of price.235  The limited available data make this estimation difficult.  
Based on geologic relationships, which indicate that exponentially larger resources are available 
at lower ore grades, it seems likely that the relationship between price and resources is roughly 
exponential.  According to one industry observer, “a doubling of price from present levels could 
be expected to create about a tenfold increase in measured resources.”236  (The conservative 
nature of the Red Book figures, particularly in the higher cost ranges, can be judged from the fact 
that in its estimates of known conventional resources, doubling the price from $40/kgU to 
$80/kgU leads to only a 48% increase in resources estimated to be available.)  If this correctly 
describes the relationship between price and resources, and if we calibrate the curve (very 
conservatively) by assuming that the 2.1 MtU of known resources reported in the 2001 edition of 
the Red Book as recoverable at $40/kgU represent the sum total of all resources in the world that 
will ever be recoverable at that price,237 then the curve of resources as a function of price would 
be: 
 
2.1
40
 =   
pR
ε
 (B.1) 
 
where R is the total uranium resource (MtU) recoverable at price p ($/kgU) and ε is the long-
term price elasticity of supply. If a doubling of price leads to a tenfold increase in resources, then 
ε = log(10)/log(2) = 3.32. By this crude estimate, doubling the price to $80/kgU would increase 
the recoverable resources to 21 MtU, and over 100 MtU would be available at $130/kgU. 
                                                 
235 More precisely, decreasing quality and accessibility of ores would be expected (if technological improvements do 
not keep pace) to lead to increases in extraction cost.  The relationship between extraction cost and market price is 
complex, having to do with monopoly or cartel power; expectations of future prices; costs of bringing additional 
production on-line; costs of shifting additional resources to reserves; elasticities of demand; and more.  The uranium 
market, which is characterized by utility buyers for whom uranium is only a small part of the cost of electricity 
production, but which are extremely concerned to ensure that fuel will be available when they needed it, is 
particularly sensitive to perceptions of future shortages or surpluses (and hence the price has been quite volatile over 
the last two decades).  Nevertheless, in general in the uranium market, additional production capacity is brought on-
line whenever prices rise high enough for it to be profitable for producers to bring that capacity on-line (taking into 
account the risks, including the risk that the price will decline again).  Rather than saving their limited reserves for 
later production when prices might be higher, in other words, producers tend to act “as if their finite stocks were 
infinite” (Adelman, “My Education in Mineral (Especially Oil) Economics,” op. cit.).  If this behavior continues, 
and no durable cartel is formed, long-term average prices should be related to costs of production plus competitive 
rates of profit.  Hereinafter we will refer only to price, with the notion that price will in general be such as to allow 
producers to extract the resource and earn a competitive profit. 
236 Hore-Lacy, Nuclear Electricity, op. cit. 
237 The resources available at this low price are the best-explored and best-characterized, and therefore the best 
available basis for calibration of such a relationship.  Nevertheless, they are certain to be quite conservative.  The 
Red Book figures in this low-cost category include only the best-characterized deposits (equivalent to reserves, 
rather than resources); it is virtually certain that additional investment in exploration would substantially increase the 
quantity of material reported as available at this cost.  Moreover, the Red Book itself points out that the total 
quantity of resources available at $40/kgU or less “are higher than reported in the tables because certain countries do 
not report resource estimates, mainly for reasons of confidentiality.”  Uranium 2001, op. cit., p. 22. 
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One of the few serious attempts to estimate how much uranium is likely to be available 
worldwide concluded that a ten-fold reduction in ore concentration is associated with a 300-fold 
increase in available resources.238  Although the authors made no attempt to associate costs of 
extraction with ore grades, if the phenomena reflected in equation (B.1) are similar to those 
examined in this geologic analysis, this would imply that doubling the price would make 
economical the exploitation of ores with uranium concentrations 2.5 times lower. This seems 
plausible, because not all of costs of uranium mining scale in direct proportion to the quantity of 
material that has to be mined and processed per ton of uranium recovered. If, at the other 
extreme, we assume that costs are inversely proportional to ore grade (as might be true at very 
low concentrations, when total costs became dominated by the amount of material mined and 
processed), the exponent ε in equation (B.1) would be 2.48, and the expected resource available 
for $130/kgU or less (using the same calibration technique) would be about 40 MtU. 
 
More recently, the Generation IV fuel cycle crosscut group advising the Department of 
Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, basing itself on the amounts of uranium recently estimated 
to be available in the United States at $30/kgU and $50/kgU, also predicted an exponential 
relationship between resources and price, and judged that the exponent ε in equation B.1 might 
be as low as 2.35.239  Calibrating by the Red Book estimate of 2.1 MtU available at $40/kgU or 
less gives 34 MtU available at $130/kgU or less.240  Table B.2 summarizes these estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
238 Kenneth S. Deffeyes and Ian D. MacGregor, “World Uranium Resources,” Scientific American, January 1980.  
This article is based on Kenneth S. Deffeyes and Ian D. MacGregor, Uranium Distribution in Mined Deposits and in 
the Earth’s Crust: Final Report GJBX-1(79) (Princeton, NJ: Department of Geological and Geophysical Sciences, 
Princeton University, 1978).  It should be noted that Deffeyes is very far from being a wild-eyed resource optimist: 
his most recent book is Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001).  For a quite different effort to assess world uranium resources, from the same period (which also concluded 
even then that resources were likely larger than now reported in the Red Book), see DeVerle P. Harris, “World 
Uranium Resources,” Annual Review of Energy 1979 4:403-32.  See also  Neff, “Are Energy Resources 
Inexhaustible?” op. cit.  More recently, see Thomas C. Pool, “Uranium Resources for Long-Term, Large-Scale 
Nuclear Power Requirements,” Nonrenewable Resources, Vol. 3 No. 4, 1994, pp. 257-265.  Like Neff, Pool is so 
confident that “availability of uranium resources is unlikely to place any major constraint on the future development 
of large-scale nuclear power” that he does not attempt to put a number on the total resource likely to be available.   
239 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Generation IV Roadmap: Report of the Fuel Cycle 
Crosscut Group (Washington, DC: DOE, March 18, 2001, available at  
http://www.ne.doe.gov/reports/GenIVRoadmapFCCG.pdf.), pp. 1-30. 
240 Inexplicably, the Generation IV fuel cycle crosscut group appears to mis-calibrate their equation, offering a 
constant of 77.4, which would result in resources at all reported prices far below those reported in the “Red Book.”  
Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, op. cit., pp. 1-30.  This error is not an important one for the group’s work, 
however, as the actual model they use for estimating uranium resources as a function of price is based on linear 
interpolation of the 1999 “Red Book” figures (see discussion on pp. A2-12-A2-14), and bears no relation to the 
exponential equation offered on pp. 1-30. 
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Table B.2.  Uranium resource estimates, based on equation (B.1). 
 
R (MtU)  
Source 
Elasticity of 
Supply, ε p ≤  $80/kgU p ≤ $130/kgU 
Uranium Information Centre 3.32 21 105 
Deffeyes & MacGregor 2.48 12 40 
Generation IV Group 2.35 11 34 
    
 
These are very crude estimates of the relationship between price and available resources, 
based on extremely limited data.  It may turn out that the curve does not have a continuously 
exponential shape, but rather has steeper and flatter portions.241  More research on the actual 
quantity of uranium available worldwide in different price ranges is clearly needed.  
Nevertheless, the following points can be made about these relations: 
• All of them suggest that the total amount of uranium recoverable at prices at or below 
$130/kgU is likely to be substantially larger than the amount reported in the Red Book – 
from two to six times larger. 
• All of them use the very conservative estimate of the amount of uranium available at prices at 
or below $40/kgU.  If world resources available at that price turn out to be twice as large, 
then the total resource available at less than $130/kgU also would be doubled. 
• The relationships that result in smaller resource estimates are estimated based solely on 
geologic relationships, without including the likelihood that technology for recovering 
uranium at lower cost will improve in the future.  As technological improvement is virtually 
certain, total resources recoverable at a given price decades in the future are likely to be 
larger than these estimates suggest—possibly enormously larger.  The history of copper 
production is illustrative: as a result of improved technology, the real price declined by half  
from 1900 to 2000 despite a 25-fold increase in demand242 and a decline in the average ore 
                                                 
241 For example, one model includes, in addition to costs increasing as ore grade decreases, costs at any given ore 
grade increasing roughly linearly with the amount of material at that grade that has been extracted, as the most 
accessible ores of that grade are mined and less accessible ores must be pursued.  This more complex model predicts 
a flatter curve (and therefore lower expectations of total world resources extractable at higher prices).  See Clifford 
E. Singer, “An Analytical Uranium Sources Model,” in Proceedings of the Technical Committee Meeting on Recent 
Developments in Uranium Resources, Production, and Demand (Vienna, 10-13 June, 1997) (Vienna, Austria: 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998), pp. 27-38.  We have based the discussion in this chapter on the simpler 
model based on exponential distributions of ore grade, in part because the existing experience with a range of 
mineral resources suggests that to date, extraction costs in real terms have not in fact been rising at given ore grades 
(perhaps because reductions in cost resulting from technological progress are counteracting increases in cost from 
exploitation of less accessible deposits).  An examination of U.S. Geological Survey data covering a broad range of 
mined commodities over several decades, for example, demonstrates that real prices are typically flat or declining, 
and that price tends to decline slightly, rather than increasing, for those commodities for which annual demand has 
increased by the largest factor.  (William Sailor, personal communication, 2003.) 
242 Kenneth E. Porter and Daniel L. Edelstein, “Copper Statistics,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 
August 28, 2002, available as of December 16, 2003 at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/of01-
006/copper.html).  This estimate of a cut by a factor of two over the period is based on fitting a trend line to the 
statistics reported there; the actual ratio of the 2000 real price to the 1900 real price is 3.8, because there was a price 
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grade from 2 to 0.85 percent.243  Despite the dramatic increase in annual consumption, there 
is little risk that the world will soon run out of copper.  In the case of uranium, ores with 
concentrations as low as 4.5 parts per million—less than twice the average abundance in the 
earth’s crust—have been recovered as byproducts from copper mines, at costs of less than 
$52/kgU.244 
 
Finally, it is important to note that $130/kgU is considerably less than the price at which 
recycling would be economic. As indicated in chapter 2, a uranium price of more than $360/kgU 
would likely be needed to make recycle at a reprocessing price of $1000/kgHM economically 
competitive, which would likely increase recoverable resources by more than a factor of 10.  
 
B.4.  Uranium from Seawater 
 
Even if, in the distant future, mineral ores are thoroughly depleted, it is not obvious that 
reprocessing and recycle would become economical.  At the extreme of low-grade resources is 
the huge amount of uranium—4500 MtU—dissolved in the world’s oceans at a concentration of 
about 3 parts per billion.  Research has demonstrated that, using modern adsorbents, uranium can 
be recovered from seawater.  The primary research programs in recent years have been in Japan, 
and, to a lesser extent, in France. 
 
To date, only small amounts of uranium have been recovered by these methods.  The 
resources devoted to these research efforts have been extremely small—probably a thousand 
times less than has been spent in recent years on R&D for reprocessing and breeding.  
Substantial further research and development would be needed to determine whether recovery of 
uranium from seawater could be done at an industrial scale and what the price of the recovered 
uranium might be.   
 
The somewhat speculative estimates of the cost of recovering uranium from seawater that 
have been made in recent years have varied greatly from one study to another.  Early approaches 
involved pumping seawater through the adsorbent.  A pilot plant was built in Japan and operated 
for 2 years, but the pumping required more energy than would be provided by the recovered 
uranium, so this approach was abandoned.245  Very high early cost estimates (well over 
$1000/kgU) may have been associated with this pumped-water approach. 
 
More recent approaches rely on ocean currents to move seawater through fixed arrays of 
adsorbents, with a ship collecting the uranium-bearing adsorbents for on-board processing or 
delivery to a shore-based processing facility.  Japanese estimates for this latter approach in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
dip around 2000 and a price spike around 1900.  (The authors are grateful to William Sailor of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory for discussions on this point.)   
243 Oscar Groenveld, “The Technology Environment for the 21st Century—The Mining Industry,” presentation to the 
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 1998, available as of December 16, 2003 at 
http://www.atse.org.au/publications/symposia/proc-1998p1.htm.  
244 Described in Pool, “Uranium Resources for Long-Term, Large-Scale Nuclear Power Requirements,” op. cit. 
245 This is briefly discussed, for example, in T. Kato, K. Okugawa, Y. Sugihara, and T. Matsumura, “Conceptual 
Design of Uranium Recovery Plant From Seawater,” Journal of the Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering 
Society (in Japanese), 50, 1999, pp. 71-77. 
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early to mid-1990s were in the range of $200-$260/kgU (then-year dollars).246  In the late 1990s, 
both Japanese and French researchers put forward estimates as low as $100/kgU, though these 
were acknowledged to be highly uncertain and not backed by detailed engineering studies.247  
Such low total costs seem unlikely for facilities that must pay typical costs of money for 
privately owned facilities, as well as corporate income taxes.  Since then, as might be expected, 
estimates have increased again.  A Japanese paper from 1999 provides a detailed listing of the 
cost elements considered and arrives at an estimate of some $1200/kgU.248  This paper appears to 
include unrealistically low rates of return on invested capital (at least for U.S. and European 
markets); incorporating financial assumptions comparable to those we have used for a regulated 
utility with a guaranteed rate of return would increase the estimate to over $1700/kgU.  In 2000, 
French researchers put forward an estimate of roughly $250/kgU, but this is based on simple 
payback of capital with no return on investment and no payment of corporate taxes; using our 
financing assumptions for a regulated utility would almost double this estimate.249 The most 
recent Japanese paper of which we are aware, published in 2001, argued for a cost in the range of 
5-10 times the current cost of mined uranium; if we take that cost to be similar to current contract 
prices in the range of $35/kgU, this suggests a cost in the range of $175-$350/kgU, essentially 
comparable to the estimates for seawater uranium made a decade ago.250 Faced with these 
varying estimates, the 2001 edition of the Red Book chose a value of $300/kgU as representative 
of current thinking.251 
 
 
                                                
The cost of such an operation would be quite sensitive to the properties of the adsorbent 
material.  The more uranium adsorbed per kilogram of adsorbent (and the shorter the time in the 
ocean required for this to occur), the cheaper the operation would be.  Progress in developing 
improved adsorbent materials over the past decade has been substantial, and it is possible that 
there will be further progress in the future, reducing costs.  Indeed, both French and Japanese 
researchers in this area have suggested that this is likely to be the case. 
 
246See Toru Hiraoka, “Nuclear Electricity Generation by Seawater Uranium,” Journal of the Atomic Energy Society 
of Japan (in Japanese), Vol. 36, No. 7 (1994), pp. 644–645 (approximately $200/kgU), and H. Nobukawa et. al, 
“Development of a Floating Type System for Uranium Extraction from Seawater Using Sea Current and Wave 
Power,” Proceedings of the 4th International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference, Osaka, Japan, April 10-
15, 1994, pp. 294-300 (approximately $260/kgU). 
247 Tadao Seguchi, director of material development at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, estimated a cost 
of about $100/kgU (paper presented at Tokyo University-Harvard University workshop, Tokyo, May 23, 1998); 
Seguchi later put the cost at $100-$300/kgU in a plant producing 200 tU/yr, but emphasized that his specialty was 
adsorbent development, not cost estimation (personal communication to Richard L. Garwin, October 23, 1998).  
Jacques Foos, President of the CNAM Laboratory of Nuclear Sciences, prepared a report which, based on a review 
of the literature, suggested a range of $300-$370/kgU using then-existing technology, but suggested that this might 
be reduced to $80/kgU by the use of more advanced technologies being researched in his laboratory—while 
emphasizing that this estimate was very preliminary.  (Foos, personal communication to J. Syrota, forwarded to 
Richard L. Garwin and Georges Charpak, April 3, 1997.)   
248 Kato, et al., “Conceptual Design of Uranium Recovery Plant From Seawater,” op. cit. 
249 Jacques Foos, estimate described in detail in Richard L. Garwin, “Uranium From Seawater—A Green Fuel for 
the Future?” forthcoming. 
250 T. Sugo et al., “Recovery System For Uranium From Seawater With Fibrous Adsorbent and its Preliminary Cost 
Estimation,” Journal of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (in Japanese) 43 (10): 1010-1016, October 2001.  See 
also the earlier T. Sugo and K. Saito, “Progress in Recovery Technology of Uranium From Seawater,” Journal of 
the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (in Japanese), 36, 619–623, 1999. 
251 See Uranium 2001, op. cit.  p. 28.  The Generation IV crosscut team chose a value of $200/kgU, noting that such 
estimates are “highly speculative.” Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, op. cit. pp. 1-20, pp. 1-30. 
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 The performance of current adsorbents is highly dependent on temperature, and they are 
thus effectively limited to warm surface waters. Moreover, to minimize costs, current concepts 
typically involve placement in currents close to the shore. However, horizontal and vertical 
mixing of the ocean would make seawater uranium accessible in warm surface waters at 
essentially constant concentration for many centuries, so long as the rate of extraction did not 
exceed ~2 MtU/y (30 times current consumption rates).252 
 
 These cost estimates do not include the value of the other metals that are co-recovered 
with the uranium.  Current adsorbents used in Japan recover almost twice as much vanadium as 
uranium.  Other metals such as cobalt, titanium, and molybdenum can also be co-recovered.253  
At today’s prices, such co-recovered materials would pay for only a very small fraction of the 
cost of the recovery operation.  If such materials became scarce and expensive in the future, 
however—as might occur by the time uranium became scarce and expensive enough for 
seawater extraction to be considered—the value of these co-recovered materials might be 
sufficient to substantially reduce the net per-kilogram recovery cost for uranium.  
 
 
                                                
If uranium could be recovered from seawater economically, this would represent a vast 
energy resource for the future and could postpone for many centuries any need for breeding or 
reprocessing plutonium.  But as the discussion above makes clear, it is not yet by any means 
certain whether uranium can be recovered from seawater at an industrial scale at a price below 
the reprocessing breakeven price.  Given that all estimates of the cost of recovery from seawater 
are far above the current uranium price, industry has no incentive to fund further development of 
these concepts.  We recommend a significant government program to explore both the total 
terrestrial resources likely to be recoverable as a function of price, and the possibilities for 
recovering uranium from seawater. 
 
B.5.  Uranium Consumption  
 
If the above estimates of resource availability are matched to estimates of future uranium 
consumption, it is clear that uranium resources will not run out for a very long time to come.  
World uranium requirements in 2001 were roughly 64,000 tU.254  Hence the Red Book estimate 
of 17 MtU available at less than $130/kgU represents more than 250 years’ supply at current 
rates. 
 
It is quite possible, however, that nuclear energy will grow in the future, and that if the 
world nuclear energy system relied primarily on once-through cycles without reprocessing, 
annual world uranium requirements would increase substantially.  A recent study by the NEA on 
the potential contribution of nuclear energy to reducing greenhouse gas emissions envisioned 
 
252 This is a rough estimate by the authors based on the flow rate between surface and deep ocean waters and vertical 
and horizontal mixing within surface waters, assuming the extraction of uranium is distributed throughout the five 
major ocean areas (north/south Pacific, north/south Atlantic, and Indian oceans).  
253 See, for example, Takanobu Sugo, “Uranium Recovery From Seawater” (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Atomic Energy 
Research Institute, 1999). 
254 Uranium 2001, p. 49. 
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three possible scenarios of future nuclear growth.  The highest-growth scenario would consume 
only 5.6 MtU—one-third of the 17 MtU Red Book figure—by 2050.255  While some official 
documents have raised the possibility of a uranium shortage arising even sooner, they are 
confusing the possibility that commercial investment in bringing mines on-line will not respond 
rapidly enough to imagined future nuclear energy growth—an issue of industrial structure and 
price signals in the market—with actually running out of low-cost uranium resources.256 
 
Higher projections of nuclear growth are, of course, possible.  In a detailed study of 
future energy scenarios in 1998, the World Energy Council (WEC) and the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) outlined a wide range of scenarios for future energy 
supply, including nuclear energy.257  “Case B,” which the group considered the most plausible, 
was among the high-uranium-demand cases, and was used as the “base case” by the Generation 
IV fuel cycle crosscut team to examine the impact of large-scale future nuclear growth.258  In 
Case B, global installed nuclear capacity would grow from 380 GWe in 1990 to 800 GWe in 
2020, roughly 2000 GWe in 2050, and 5500 GWe in 2100.  During 2000-2100, nuclear energy 
would provide 1.4 million terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity.259  How much uranium would be 
consumed by providing that much electricity using a once-through cycle depends on assumptions 
about what types of reactors are used, with what burnup, and how much U-235 is left in the 
depleted tails from enrichment plants.  Assuming, quite conservatively, that the reactors are 
LWRs with an average burnup over the entire period of only 50 GWd/tHM, and a tails assay of 
0.2% U-235, then 19 tU/TWh would be needed, for a total consumption of 26 MtU by 2100.260  
This is modestly higher than the 17 MtU estimated by the Red Book to be available at $130/kgU 
or less, but smaller than the 33 to 100 MtU given equation (B.1) using the values of ε discussed 
above.  Other reactor systems designed for more efficient once-through uranium use could 
significantly reduce the uranium requirement in such a high-growth scenario. 
 
In short, it seems very likely that uranium resources will continue to be available at 
substantially below the breakeven price for reprocessing at $1000/kgHM throughout the 21st 
century. 
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